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The starting point of my dissertation is a traditional goal of medicine, the relief of 
suffering.  The central question that I dealt with is the appropriate clinical response to a 
patient’s suffering.  An underlying assumption in the answer that I provide is that a 
physician’s clinical response must be guided primarily by the principles of beneficence 
and respect for patient autonomy.  I argue that both principles require the physician to 
respond in a proportionate manner with medically appropriate care, which has the 
backing of relevant scientific and clinical data, and must be provided in a manner deemed 
acceptable by the patient.    
Central to the process of providing medically appropriate care aimed at the relief 
of suffering is an understanding of suffering itself.  To develop that understanding, I 
studied the works of Freud, Bakan, Frankl, and Cassell.  I concluded that suffering is 
primarily an existential problem associated with the whole person, in contrast to physical 
pain, which is primarily a neurophysiological problem associated with the body.  I define 
suffering itself as a state of emotion, consisting in an unrelenting tension between hope 
and despair, caused by a serious and unacceptable disruption in important personal 
matters.  As Frankl put it, when one suffers, one perceives a gap between the way 
important personal matters are at the moment as compared to how such matters ought to 
be.   
The matters are important because they involve something that the sufferer holds 
dear, while the disruption is unacceptable because the possibility of not overcoming that 
disruption is potentially devastating.  The sufferer’s hope derives from desire and belief 
 v
that disruption will be resolved favorably, while the feeling of despair reflects the threat 
of being overwhelmed by the disruption 
Although the intensity and duration of suffering vary with subjective factors and 
the particular circumstances, it follows that relief comes about in one of two ways.  Either 
hope is fulfilled, in which case the sufferer no longer perceives a gap, or relief is a matter 
of genuine acceptance, as opposed to resignation.  Genuine acceptance is the kind 
possible after adjusting to the death of a loved one, or the consequences of a divorce, or 
some other personal tragedy.   
Since some patients hope for relief through physician-assisted suicide, I next 
examined that issue from the physician’s perspective, and argue that physicians should 
not agree to such requests.  I base my conclusion in part on a requirement defended by 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, which is that physicians must provide medically appropriate 
care in a proportionate manner.  I developed their principle of proportionality with both a 
classical and a modern interpretation of that concept.  Aquinas provides the basis of a 
classical interpretation of proportionality, while Gury and Knauer provide the basis of a 
modern interpretation. 
Based on a classical version of proportionality, I argue that physician-assisted 
suicide is morally unacceptable for three reasons.  One, it is contrary to the physician’s 
duty to heal, which does not necessarily mean cure.  The healer’s commitment is to care 
for patients even when cure is not possible, or the patient has a poor quality of life, or 
death is imminent.  This commitment reflects a long-standing legal, medical, and moral 
tradition that bars the practice of physician-assisted suicide.  Two, it is contrary to the 
public good due to its inherent potential for abuse.  I cite evidence from the Netherlands 
 vi
and from our own criminal justice system in relation to the death penalty in support of 
this claim.  I also dispute Brock’s claim that safeguards are an effective method of 
reducing the level of abuse in physician-assisted suicide to a level below that in other 
end-of-life care strategies.  Third, I claim that physician-assisted suicide is contrary to the 
virtuous practice of medicine because it does not qualify as medically appropriate care.  
Due to this deficiency, physicians are led to substitute their own personal views about the 
worth of continued living, which exceeds the limits of their professional expertise.  This 
deviation from established medical protocol goes beyond the particular case to the level 
of medical principle for all other patients similarly situated, without ethical warrant. 
Based on a modern interpretation of proportionality, I argue that physician-
assisted suicide fails Gury’s version of that principle, which requires a predominance of 
good in the immediate outcome.  Such results cannot be calculated in a case of physician-
assisted suicide, because the immediate results of death are known only by the patient, if 
at all, after death.  Physician-assisted suicide also fails Knauer’s version, which requires 
that the net effect must be measured in the long run and on the whole, which are likewise 
unknown by the physician.  Knauer also requires that there be no less harmful way of 
securing the value sought, in this case, relief of suffering.  In the case of suffering, 
however, a less onerous method is available, namely, acceptance.  Although acceptance is 
not possible for some patients and not appropriate for others, it is an avenue of relief in 
all cases of suffering.   
Because suffering involves the whole person, I draw on the works of Frankl and 
Cassel to conclude that the appropriate clinical response to a patient’s suffering is a 
holistic approach to patient care.  From the individual’s perspective, Frankl claims that 
 vii
resolving suffering depends on the meaning and value that we each give to our 
experience of suffering.  From a clinical perspective, Cassell focuses on suffering as a 
psychological condition and offers a holistic response, consisting in two primary methods 
of relief.  One is to guide patients to assign meaning to their medical condition, which 
often resolves the suffering associated with that condition.  The other is to assist patients 
in developing a feeling of transcendence, which helps restore a sense of wholeness after 
injury to personhood.  His approach has three goals.  One is to define treatment plans in 
terms of a sick person, rather than in terms of a disease only.  The second is to maximize 
the patient’s function and not necessarily length of life.  The third is to minimize the 
family's suffering as well as the patient's.  In this respect, holistic medicine is centered in 
community, caring, compassion, and comfort, with a special emphasis on spiritual 
concerns.  Its chief aim is inspire patients to view themselves as persons of value to be 
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Any philosopher's argument which does not treat human suffering is worthless.  For just as there is no 
profit in medicine if it does not expel the diseases of the body, so there is no profit in philosophy either, if it 
does not expel the suffering of the mind. 
          Epicurus 
 
I.  The nature of suffering. 
Suffering is an inescapable part of the human condition.1  Although the 
circumstances that give rise to suffering differ from person to person, suffering itself is a 
multidimensional cognitive experience that varies in intensity and duration.  Suffering is 
also distinct from physical pain, despite how we often describe it with "pain language" as 
if suffering and physical pain were equivalent experiences.2  For some, suffering is 
sporadic, unpredictable, and repeatable, while for others it is pervasive, relentless, and 
overwhelming.  Because suffering is a subjective experience, however, a reliable and 
useful explanation of that phenomenon must derive in part from the individual's 
interpretation of their own suffering.  In that case, what does each of us mean when we 
say that we suffer?  What would such interpretations reveal about the nature of suffering?   
 As a prisoner at Auschwitz during WW II, Viktor Frankl knew first hand the 
personal suffering that results from "every possession lost, every value 
destroyed...hunger, cold, and brutality, hourly expecting extermination..."3  He drew on 
such experiences and those of his imprisoned comrades to claim that suffering is the 
experience of an unrelenting tension between hope and despair, caused by a serious and 
                                                 
1Moseley, R. (1991), Becoming a Self before God: Critical Transformations. Nashville, Abingdon Press, p1; cf. 
Tournier, P. (1965), The Healing of Persons. San Francisco, Harper and Row, p. 143. 
2Throughout, I retain the distinction between suffering and physical pain unless otherwise noted. 
3Frankl, Viktor (1959), Man's Search for Meaning. New York, Pocket Books, p. viii.  
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unacceptable disruption in important personal matters.4  The matters in question are 
important and personal because they involve something that the sufferer holds dear, while 
the disruption is serious and unacceptable because the consequences of unfulfilled hope 
in overcoming the disruption are potentially devastating.   
 The sufferer perceives the disruption itself as an unacceptable gap between the 
way important personal matters are at the moment as compared to an ideal of how she 
believes they should be.  With that perception comes the threat of despair as long as she 
views the gap between the "what is" and the "what should be" as unacceptable and 
potentially unbridgeable.  Her hope in regard to these matters, on the other hand, derives 
from a desire and belief that the gap itself can and will be closed in a manner favorable to 
her.5  The tension between such hope and despair is unrelenting because the possibility of 
being overwhelmed by despair, along with the possibility of having her hope fulfilled, are 
both simultaneously ever-present and unyielding, and thus oppressive.  The ever-present 
and unyielding oppressive tension between hope and despair gives suffering its form, 
which Viktor Frankl describes as a "state of tension between what actually is on the one 
hand and what ought to be on the other hand."6  
 Intensity and duration, however, are the qualities that give suffering its character.  
The character of suffering can vary with several personal factors that involve the sufferer 
alone.  Such personal factors include the importance of the matters at hand, the intensity  
                                                 
4Frankl, Viktor (1986), The Doctor and the Soul. New York, Vintage Books, p. 107. 
5 In claiming that desire and belief are necessary aspects of hope, I do not make a claim about the constitutive elements 
of motivational states.  I merely borrow from Robert Stalnaker, who claims that desire and belief are "correlative 
dispositional states of a potentially rational agent.  To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to 
bring it about that P in a world in which one's beliefs, whatever they are, were true.  To believe that P is to be disposed 
to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with one's 
other beliefs) were true."  See Stalnaker, R. (1987), Inquiry. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, p. 15.   
6Frankl (1986), p. 108. 
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of the desire to resolve those matters and the ability to do so, the firmness of belief with 
respect to how, when, or even if the desired resolution will occur, and finally the 
consequences of the actual resolution.7  In other words, from the sufferer's perspective, 
the greater the desire to close the gap between the "what is" and the "what should be", the 
more firm the belief that the gap can and should be closed, the more grave the 
consequences and the more protracted the process of doing so, the more intense the 
suffering is likely to be.   
 Another factor that affects the character of suffering is the degree of uncertainty 
that always accompanies the experience.  Because suffering means that something of 
grave importance persistently hangs in the balance, awaiting an unpredictable but 
passionately desired outcome, uncertainty is an inherent part of the experience itself.  The 
intensity of suffering increases as the sufferer's control over the circumstances that led to 
the suffering decreases.  Without that control, the intensity and duration of suffering (as 
well as its relief) then depend more on how persons in close relationship to the sufferer 
respond to her suffering.  If those in close relationship can or should alleviate the 
suffering but fail to respond, their failure can magnify the uncertainty of the experience, 
which can unnecessarily prolong and intensify the suffering.  Their failure puts the 
burden of relief back on the shoulders of the sufferer, which might amount to unjust 
abandonment, especially when there is little the sufferer can do to relieve her own 
suffering. 
 
                                                 
7Tournier (1965), pp. 143-155. 
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II.  Relief of suffering.  
 The foregoing discussion on suffering raises a question about the nature of its 
relief, the answer to which might lead to a paradox.  Given that suffering is the 
experience of an unrelenting, oppressive tension between hope and despair, which 
derives from contrasting perceptions of "what is" as compared to "what should be", 
another way of describing the experience is to say that suffering is essentially attitudinal, 
since perceptions shape attitudes.8  This suggests that relief of suffering occurs when the 
tension between the sufferer's hope and despair lessens or ceases altogether.  In that case, 
relief may derive from a change in perceptions that affects the sufferer's attitude.  In other 
words, relief of suffering corresponds to changes in perceptions of the gap between "what 
is" and the "what should be" such that a closing of the gap could occur merely by virtue 
of the adjustment in perceptions. 
 On the other hand, the gap also might close because the sufferer abandons her 
desire for the "what should be" and accepts the "what is" as the alternative.  Acceptance 
in this sense, however, is not to be confused with despair where one gives up the belief 
that the "what should be" is attainable without giving up the desire for that particular 
outcome.9  Nevertheless, the consequences of acceptance can be positive or negative.  If 
acceptance stems from an act of courage and self-determination, it can lead to wisdom 
and peace, which many view as a positive outcome.  On the other hand, if acceptance 
stems from indolent or cringing resignation, it can lead to resentment and bitterness.  
                                                 
8Frankl (1986), p. 108. 
9Frankl (1986), pp. 108 and 112. 
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Although such an outcome is perhaps just another form of suffering, many would view 
such a consequence in a negative light.    
 Even so, here is the paradox.  Although total relief of suffering (complete closure 
of the gap) might reflect the fulfillment of hope with a r 
ealization of the "what should be", total closure also might reflect a mere change in 
perception, or an adjustment in attitude, such that for the sufferer a gap no longer exists.  
After all, a gap no longer perceived is one that no longer exists for the sufferer, in which 
case, her suffering ends.10  Paradoxically, then, if suffering is essentially attitudinal, 
which is ordinarily under the control of the individual, and relief of suffering corresponds 
to a change in perceptions, a plausible argument is that the sufferer has a unique 
responsibility to relieve her own suffering merely by deliberately changing her 
perceptions.   
 It is doubtful that a victim of starvation would find such a claim at all persuasive, 
particularly if someone who could give her food here and now made the argument.  She 
more likely would find the idea that she can eliminate her own suffering due to starvation 
merely by changing her own perceptions rather ludicrous, and instead justifiably insist on 
a duty that others have to relieve her suffering.  This is not to deny that persons 
sometimes can and should relieve their own suffering.  Despite that possibility, the 
concern in what follows is the extent to which observers ought to respond to the suffering 
                                                 
10 I argue that suffering would end in such cases even if the perception itself were erroneous.  Consider the person 
dying from overexposure to the cold.  Shortly before death, the sufferer often experiences a tremendous feeling of 
warmth, whereupon she might dismiss the previous threat to her life and no longer protect herself from the cold.  In this 
case, although the perception is erroneous, the change in her perception about her body temperature might end her 
suffering from the cold.  Of course, erroneous perceptions also can cause suffering.  Consider the person who loses 
touch with reality and imagines that she will die soon from incurable cancer.  Although her perception about her health 
and imminent death is wrong, the suffering it causes can be as real for her as it is for one who is indeed dying from 
incurable cancer. 
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of others, especially when they, as observers, are not responsible for the circumstances 
that gave rise to the suffering.  The fundamental question concerns the moral imperative 
that mandates a response to the suffering of others, especially to those who seem unaware 
of their surroundings, such as a person numb from starvation or a comatose patient.11   
 In part, the answer relates to the way in which an observer responds through the 
eyes of compassion to see the objectionable gap between the "what is" and the "what 
should be" in the life of the other, and thus perceive her suffering even when she herself 
cannot.  Observing this gap connects one with the sufferer and inspires a compassionate 
response, which then provides motivation to close the gap for the other.  This is the 
fundamental meaning of compassion, namely, to suffer with or alongside the other 
person, and "to experience feelings of pity and the desire to alleviate or prevent their 
suffering."12   
 Although a failure to act in such cases might constitute a moral failure, depending 
on the personal harm at stake, true compassion demands an active regard for the one who 
suffers.  Perceiving a gap between the "what is" and the "what should be" in one's own 
life can lead to suffering, while perceiving such a gap in the life of another can lead to 
compassion.  What remains are the important questions about what constitutes a morally 
responsible and effective compassionate response to suffering in the clinical setting.  
Although such questions often do not lend themselves to easy answers in any realm, in 
the clinical setting, they have a special moral significance.  That significance stems 
primarily from the fact that persons often come to the clinical setting in search of relief 
                                                 
11In view of the role that perception plays in suffering, can a person who is numb from starvation, or perhaps a 
comatose patient, suffer at all?          
12Ruiz, P. O. and Vallejos, R. M. (1999), “The Role of Compassion in Moral Education.” Journal of Moral Education 
28(1), p. 7. 
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for their suffering.  More importantly, physicians in their role as healers assume a duty to 
relieve suffering when they respond affirmatively to such requests for relief. 
III.  Appropriate clinical relief measures. 
 Because of its pervasiveness, inevitability, and consequences for human life, 
suffering often determines the moral status of individuals as well as that of our 
communities.13  In this sense, the human capacity to suffer (along with the capacity to 
experience happiness) can operate as a moral compass and measure of our actions insofar 
as those actions bring about suffering or happiness, usually measured in terms of harms 
or benefits.14  Based on this premise, right actions are those that bring about the most 
benefit or prevent the most harm, and wrong actions are those that have the opposite 
effect.   
 In the clinical setting, determining right courses of action on a measure of benefits 
versus burdens is a methodology that often informs medical care choices of both 
physicians and patients.15  The presumption is that such a measure determines 
"appropriate care" in all its phases, from care at the beginning of life throughout its 
course to care at the end of life.  Determining appropriate care in the clinical setting is 
                                                 
13Loewy, E. H. (1991), Suffering and the Beneficent Community. New York, State University of New York Press, pp. 
12-14. 
14Burtt, E.A., ed. (1939), The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill. New York, Random House, p.792.  Jeremy 
Bentham is perhaps one of the earliest philosophers to make such a claim about the status of humans and the moral 
worth of their actions in terms of the benefits and harms produced by such actions.  Bentham maintained that an act is 
right insofar as it can produce "benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness...[or if it can prevent] "mischief, pain, 
evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered..."  On his view, an act is wrong on both counts if it has 
the opposite effect.  This is the manner in which Bentham described his "principle of utility", which, by his account, 
communities and individuals could use to unravel the moral complexities of human life. 
15President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment  (1983). Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, pp. 82-87.  
Medical care covers a wide spectrum of remedies and strategies irrespective of whether such care is simple or complex, 
natural or artificial, inexpensive or costly, usual or unusual. 
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thus a dynamic, mutual process shared by physician and patient (and by others, especially 
the patient's family).16 
Motivated especially by the need to know and understand what is wrong with 
them, patients begin this process when they seek medical relief from some malady.17  The 
medical practitioner, who agrees to provide such relief, implicitly or explicitly promises 
to do so by means of appropriate medical care based on the traditional goals of medicine 
and the relevant scientific evidence supporting certain clinical guidelines.  The goals of 
clinical medicine include the cure, restoration, or amelioration of disease or injury and 
the relief of suffering and pain.  In this sense, relief of suffering is a core value of 
medicine and serves as a touchstone for a determination of appropriate care.18  
 A determination of appropriate care in a given clinical encounter occurs when the 
medical practitioner19 and patient alike perceive the benefits of receiving such care as 
outweighing the associated burdens.20  This approach to patient care merges two different 
analyses and conclusions into a third determination, the treatment plan.  One analysis 
                                                 
16Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1983).  "The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical Medicine." The Clinical 
Encounter: The Moral Fabric of the Physician-Patient Relationship. E. A. Shelp. Boston and Dordrecht, D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, p. 162. 
17Callahan, D. (1996). “The Goals of Medicine.” Hastings Center Report Special Supplement (November-December), 
p. S9.  Cf. Graber, Glenn C., Ph.D. et al. (1985), Ethical Analysis of Clinical Medicine, Urban and Schwarzenberg, 
Baltimore-Munich, p. 14; Zaner, Richard (1990). “Medicine and Dialogue.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
15(3), p. 314; Hardy, Robert C. (1978). Sick: How People Feel About Being Sick and What They Think of Those Who 
Care for Them. Chicago, Teach 'Em.  
18In the following discussion of "appropriate medical care", the term "appropriate" applies to various procedures and 
treatment modalities that can range anywhere from the common-place to the rare, the inexpensive to the costly, the 
routine to the highly sophisticated, depending on the circumstances.    
19Herein, I refer to all those who provide direct, professional patient care as "medical practitioners" or “caregivers” and 
reserve the title "physician" for those whose training and official sanction qualifies them to diagnose medical 
conditions and to prescribe specific forms of treatment.  Where appropriate, I use titles other than "physician" for 
medical personnel who also diagnose conditions and prescribe treatment, such as "nurse practitioner" and "clinical 
psychologist".  I use the more general term "caregiver" to indicate any person who provides care of any kind to the 
patient.  As such, "caregiver" can include a wide range of persons, from family, friends, and hospital volunteers to 
compassionate strangers.  
20Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (1996-97), Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.035. Chicago, American 
Medical Association, Chicago; see also Ayanian, J.Z., M.D., M.P.P., Landrum, M.B., Ph.D., et al, (1998), “Rating the 
Appropriateness of Coronary Angiography--Do Practicing Physicians Agree With an Expert Panel and With Each 
Other?” NEJM 338(26): 1903.   
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reflects the physician's clinical judgment of physiological or psychological benefits 
versus burdens, while the other analysis is the patient's personal judgment of benefits 
versus burdens.  These judgments combine into the mutually agreed upon treatment plan.  
Although the judgments of both patient and physician overlap in some respects, each 
analysis includes other considerations and factors not part of the other's judgment.  
 More specifically, the physician bases her clinical judgment that certain care is 
appropriate on a combination of objective factors, including her education, training, 
clinical experience, and professional instinct, which she balances against scientific and 
clinical data, personal knowledge of her patient, and what her patient thinks is best in the 
circumstances at hand.21  David Thomasma refers to these factors as the medical 
indicators.22  In his view, the physician relies on such medical indicators to evaluate the 
patient's condition and to determine which care is appropriate for the patient.  A clinical 
judgment of this sort generally reflects the clinical protocols suggested by professional 
standards and practice guidelines relative to the patient's condition, which are standards 
accepted by those who practice medicine within particular areas of medicine.23  These 
medical specialists accept and follow such standards because they encapsulate 
                                                 
21Tanenbaum, S. J., Ph.D. (1993), “What Physicians Know.” NEJM 329(17), p. 1269. 
22Thomasma, David C. (1986), “Philosophical Reflections on a Rational Treatment Plan.” The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 11: 157-165. 
23Although practice standards and guidelines are not without controversy, their popularity continues to increase.  The 
AMA's 1993 Clinical Practice Guidelines Directory listed approximately 700 guidelines, whereas its 1999 Directory 
listed approximately 2000.  In addition to physicians, various groups of medical professionals subscribe to and follow 
formal and informal practice guidelines, known by a variety of names.  By whatever name known, practice guidelines 
tend to fulfill one of the requirements of evidence based medicine by focusing on utilization of patient services under 
specific conditions, especially when evaluating alternative treatment modalities and when professional knowledge 
needs guidance or is uncertain.  Overall, designers of practice guidelines intend to promote high quality, appropriate, 
cost effective health care with reasonably objective criteria.  See Hsu, J., M.D., M.B.A. (1998). “Assessing the 
Appropriateness of Medical Care.” NEJM 339(20): 1241-1245; AMA Code of Medical Ethics (1996-7), Principle I, p. 
xiv; Field, M.J. and Lohr, K.N. (1992), Guidelines for Clinical Practice: From Development to Use. Washington, DC, 
National Academy Press, p. 2; Hirshfeld, E.B., J.D. (1991). “Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care in 
Malpractice Litigation?” JAMA (November 27), p. 2886; Leape, L.L., M.D. (1990). “Practice Guidelines and 
Standards: An Overview.” Quality Review Bulletin (February), pp. 42-44; AMA (1999). “Clinical Practice Guidelines 
Directory.”     
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professional opinion about the effectiveness of a specific treatment modality.  The 
supporting evidence includes the scientific and clinical data that suggests a benefit in 
terms of cure, amelioration, or comfort, as appropriate, with respect to a particular 
disease or ailment.24  Aware that patients look to the medical profession with trust and 
hope for relief of their suffering and pain, physicians agree and expect to provide such 
benefits by rendering appropriate medical care that reflects proven professional opinion.  
 On the other hand, the patient's personal judgment that certain care is appropriate 
results from a different sort of evaluation than the physician's clinical evaluation.  The 
patient usually weighs a wide variety of personal factors against the physician's 
recommended treatment.25  In addition to the anticipated outcome and a simple desire to 
get well, such factors may include concerns about the treatment itself, a fear that the 
recommended treatment is unnecessary, or that treatment may cause financial burdens, 
lost time at work, or time away from family.  Treatment might entail a period of 
recuperation unavailable to the patient, or might involve religious or cultural 
considerations, and so forth.  Thomasma refers to these factors as the patient's 
preferential indicators, some of which might not even relate to the condition at hand.26  
The patient's resolution of such considerations, fostered by a feeling of trust in her 
physician's professional abilities and clinical recommendations, generally lead her to 
consent to that treatment which she considers appropriate.27   
                                                 
24Institute of Medicine (1990), “Clinical Practice Guidelines: Directions for a New Program,” p. 38. 
25Graber (1985), p. 14.  
26Thomasma (1986), p. 160. 
27Pellegrino, E. D., M.D., Caplan, A., Ph.D., et al. (1998). “Doctors and Ethics, Morals and Manuals.” Annals of 
Internal Medicine 128(7), p. 569. 
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 Although some patients may reject the physician's clinical recommendation for 
various reasons, consent to treatment usually follows the patient's own determination that 
the benefits of receiving care outweigh the associated burdens.28  With such consent, the 
practitioner then may render the care deemed medically appropriate and reflected in the 
treatment plan.  From each of their own perspectives, both patient and physician deem 
certain care as appropriate and in the patient's best interest when each considers that care 
as more beneficial than burdensome.  In other words, each has concluded that a particular 
care plan maps back to her respective goals.  When these two different evaluations of 
appropriateness coincide, treatment usually proceeds with few conflicts.  Conflicts cannot 
always be avoided, however.  Given the differing perspectives of patient and physician, 
any given clinical encounter has the potential for conflict over choices and desired 
outcomes.29  Conflicts in protocol might arise when the patient's and the practitioner's 
evaluations of the benefits and burdens of care diverge.  The possibility of conflict 
increases dramatically as family members, significant others, and surrogates join the 
patient and practitioner in the process of measuring benefits and burdens. 
 Each participant's understanding of suffering often determines whether conflicts 
arise between physician and patient with respect to what constitutes appropriate care.  
Ideally, each participant in a clinical encounter grounds her view of appropriate care on 
her understanding of how to treat the underlying condition so as to relieve what is 
                                                 
28Commission (1983), p. 88; Lynn, J., M.D. and Childress, J. F., Ph.D. (1986), “Must Patients Always Be Given Food 
and Water,” in By No Extraordinary Means. Lynn, J., M.D., Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 
p. 54. 
29With the advent of managed care, some would argue that a "third" perspective, that of the third party payor, enters 
the calculation along with the views of practitioner and patient.  However, since payors seem willing to base 
reimbursement decisions on evidence of effectiveness, I assume that meeting the requirements of evidence based 
medicine will tend to satisfy the requirements of this additional perspective and do not give it specific attention herein.  
For a discussion of the third party payor's role in determinations of medical appropriateness, see Sharpe, V.A. (1997), 
“The Politics, Economics, and Ethics of ‘Appropriateness’.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 7(4), p. 340.  
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believed to be the suffering associated with that condition.  Even in less than ideal 
clinical encounters, relief of suffering still remains a prime consideration of those 
involved in the decision making process.30  As a result, how each party to the care 
process understands suffering has considerable influence on a measure of benefits and 
burdens, which largely determines the method of treatment chosen.   
 Conflicts and tensions about appropriate care can be numerous and problematic at 
all stages in the care process.31  These conflicts can revolve around a number of issues, 
including the physician's technical skills and clinical recommendations as well as the 
patient's preferences.  Regardless of the underlying issue, however, conflicts about 
appropriate care in end-of-life situations differ from conflicts that arise in life-care 
situations in at least one important respect.  In life-care situations, the conflict between 
physician and patient is usually a disagreement about how to cure or ameliorate the 
condition.  By contrast, in end-of-life-care situations, where the condition is beyond cure, 
the conflict is often a more profound disagreement about suffering itself and how best to 
relieve it.    
 In life-care, relief of suffering often occurs as an indirect by-product of treating 
some underlying physical malady.  In these situations, the primary focus is on malady 
rather than on suffering.  Relief of the malady depends heavily on the physician's 
professional judgment, technical skills and clinical recommendations in relation to the 
                                                 
30AMA Code of Medical Ethics (1996-97), p. 39; Lindholm, L. and Eriksson, K. (1993), “To Understand and Alleviate 
Suffering in a Caring Culture.” Journal of Advanced Nursing 18, p. 1354.  For a discussion of international support for 
relief of suffering as a goal of medicine, and other such goals, see Callahan (1996), pp. S1-S27. 
31I use the term "life-care" to indicate those preventive and therapeutic measures rendered to those who are expected to 
continue living for the foreseeable future as a means of addressing their present medical condition.  I use the term "end-
of-life-care" to indicate those preventive and therapeutic measures rendered to those persons who are in the process of 
dying in the hopes that such care will ease or eliminate the physical, psychological, emotional, and spiritual burdens of 
the dying process.   
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malady rather than on an understanding of suffering per se.  A consequence of this 
approach is that relief of the malady usually brings relief of the suffering, which is 
consistent with the patient's expectations of how relief will come about.32  If conflicts 
arise, they more often than not relate to either a physician's technical skills and clinical 
recommendations or to a patient's preferences, but rarely do such conflicts center on an 
understanding of the nature of suffering.      
 In end-of-life-care situations, on the other hand, the nature of the conflict often 
centers exactly on this issue.  When cure or amelioration is no longer possible, as in end-
of-life situations, the focus of care changes from the underlying malady to suffering 
itself.  Efforts aimed directly at relief of suffering then take center stage.  In the process, 
conflicts that arise usually pivot on an understanding of suffering because the 
understanding of each party to the decision-making process in that regard has a direct 
bearing on which care choices are made.  Ultimately, such choices determine the extent 
of relief.  Authentic relief is more likely when end-of-life-care decisions are made with a 
proper understanding of suffering.  In the absence of such an understanding, the 
physician's recommendations for relief may be no better, and perhaps even less 
efficacious, than the patient's own suggestions. 
 One consequence of the shift in focus from malady to suffering is that the need to 
relieve suffering itself at the end of life can put both physician and patient at a 
disadvantage.  Most dying patients are at a disadvantage because they lack the necessary 
skills and experience to relieve their own suffering and must turn to the medical 
                                                 
32This may not be the case where the malady is permanent impairment or chronic illness.  In these cases, some of the 
same considerations may obtain as in end-of-life-care where suffering becomes the focal point.  
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profession for healing.33  As healers, most physicians are at a disadvantage because the 
profession itself does not yet have an adequate understanding of suffering per se.34  
Consequently, physicians must rely on their own personal and professional instincts and 
clinical experience to relieve suffering, especially at the end of life.  This can be a 
disadvantage to the patient when the physician is professionally limited in this regard 
and, in some circumstances, might even cause harm to the patient.  In such situations, the 
disappointment that follows for both physician and patient can lead to serious and 
sometimes irresolvable conflicts. 
  Some medical practitioners claim that a fundamental reason for this unfortunate 
consequence is that most physicians receive academic and clinical training in the 
conventional model of medicine only, which does not formally or intentionally foster a 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of suffering.35  The conventional model 
encourages an understanding of the physiochemical aspects of suffering by focusing 
primarily on the body and only incidentally on the psychological aspects of disease and 
illness.36  Paradoxically, this focus on the body frequently leads to the undertreatment of 
physical pain and chronic illness, which contributes to an increase in patient suffering.37  
                                                 
33Callahan (1996), p. S3. 
34Thomasma, D. C., Kimbrough-Kushner, T., et al. (1998), Asking To Die: Inside the Dutch Debate About Euthanasia. 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Kluwer, p. 213. 
35Cassell, E.J. (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, New York and Oxford. Oxford University 
Press, p. 30; Coulehan, J. L. (1995), “Tenderness and Steadiness: Emotions in Medical Practice.” Literature and 
Medicine 14.2: 223; Aring, C.D. (1958), “Sympathy and Empathy.” JAMA 167, pp. 448-452.  
36Morse, J.M. and Johnson, J.L. (1991). The Illness Experience, Sage Publications, p. 315; Callahan, D. (1998), False 
Hopes, Simon and Schuster, pp. 27-33; Osler, S.W. (1932). Aequanimitas and Other Addresses to Medical Students, 
Nurses, and Practitioners of Medicine, 3rd ed. Philadelphia, Blakiston's Son and Co., p. 33; Lief, H.I. and Fox, R.C. 
(1963), “Training for Detached Concern in Medical Students,” in The Psychological Basis for Medical Practice. H. I. 
Lief, V. F. Lief and N. R. Lief. New York, Harper and Row, pp. 12-35. 
37Callahan (1996), pp. S11-12; Martino, A.M. (1998). “In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic 
Pain: What Can Medical Boards Do?” The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 26(4), pp. 332-349. 
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Such undertreatment reflects an inadequate understanding of and less than compassionate 
response to suffering itself, especially suffering caused by pain and chronic illness.38   
 In treating disease and illness, conventional medicine pursues its traditional three 
goals of cure, amelioration, and relief of pain and suffering.  On this model, physical pain 
and suffering are closely associated, if not synonymous,39 such that suffering is viewed as 
primarily physical in nature.  Its relief then becomes an indirect benefit of appropriate 
medical care.40  In other words, on the conventional model, the immediate focus of care is 
the patient's underlying physical condition and not on suffering itself.  The premise of 
conventional medicine is that suffering is an epiphenomenon of things gone awry in the 
body and that, if pain is relieved, so is suffering.  Consequently, on this view, since the 
physician's understanding of suffering need not go beyond a physiological understanding 
of the body,41 traditional education in conventional medicine need not foster a 
comprehensive understanding of suffering.  The unfortunate irony is that conventional 
medicine often falls short in the treatment of suffering because it does not take into 
account the psychological, social, and spiritual factors (as well as the underlying physical 
condition) that can cause a patient's suffering.42  
 Given the different emphases on suffering in the care process, and despite the 
influence that patients and their families have on treatment outcomes in both life-care and 
                                                 
38Goodman, E. (1999), “From Oregon, a call for compassionate care.” The Boston Globe. Boston: 1; Bormann, D. and 
Hansen, K. (1997). “Improving Pain Management Through Staff Education.” Nursing Management 28(7): 55-57; 
Editorial (1997). “Taking Better Care of the Dying.” ABA Journal 83, p. 51.   
39Loeser, J.D. and Melzack, R. (1999). “Pain: An Overview.” The Lancet 353(9164): 1608. 
40Jonas, H., Donhoff, C.M., et al. (1995). “Not Compassion Alone: Interview with Hans Jonas.” Hastings Center 
Report (Special Issue), p. 48. 
41Deeley, P.Q. (1999), “Ecological Understandings of Mental and Physical Illness.” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and 
Psychology 6(2), p. 108. 
42Guzzetta, C.E. (1998), “Reflections: Healing and Wholeness in Chronic Illness.” Journal of Holistic Nursing 16(2), 
p. 197. 
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end-of-life-care, a special responsibility to relieve suffering rests primarily with the 
physician as healer because it is to physicians that patients most often turn when they 
need healing.43  By accepting the role of healer, the physician does more than merely 
confirm the validity of the patient's need and search for relief.  As a representative of the 
healing profession, the physician also reinforces the view that relief of suffering is a 
traditional and valid goal of medicine.44  The physician's acknowledgment and 
acceptance of her role as healer represents to the patient a professional ability to meet the 
patient's expectations of relief.  In turn, by virtue of professional affiliation, one 
physician's claim of healing accrues to all other physicians who assume the role of 
healer.45  Thus, the physician's self-representation as one who can heal constitutes a 
unique and distinctive obligation for all physicians to relieve patient suffering.       
 The physician's professional obligation to relieve suffering is unique, although not 
exclusive, because the purported ability to heal suffering presumably rests on expert 
knowledge gleaned from professional training and experience that exceeds an ordinary 
lay person's understanding.  The purported ability to heal relies on, and indeed seems to 
demand, objective, verifiable evidence to support the method chosen or recommended for 
relief.  The need for such evidence is especially critical when relief of suffering appears 
to take place only under the care of the physician.  The profession often supports its 
claims about "what works" through the use of evidence based medicine.46 
                                                 
43Callahan (1996), p. S3. 
44Callahan (1996), p. S10. 
45Cassell (1991), p. 30.  Cassell discusses the obligation of physicians to relieve suffering.  I suggest that a similar duty 
comes about in the same way for all medical practitioners. 
46There is an appropriate place for experimental and investigative procedures or strategies in medicine, so long as they 
are acknowledged as such. 
 16
 Evidence based medicine is the notion that treatment recommendations and 
clinical application of therapies and interventions are based on the strength of scientific 
and clinical data supporting their use.47  Evidence based medicine represents the view 
that the medical profession, as a group of scientists, is dedicated to the use of 
theoretically and scientifically sound methods and procedures, frequently expressed in 
professional standards and practice guidelines endorsed by its members, aimed at the cure 
or ameliorate the patient's condition, or to provide comfort to their patients in their 
suffering.48  In contrast to this premise of evidence-based medicine, there appears to be 
an absence of a comprehensive understanding of suffering by the medical profession.49  
With all due respect, this absence would suggest that the medical profession lacks the 
necessary foundation in some clinical encounters to assure patients whether relief of 
suffering is available.  In other words, without formalizing and verifying its 
understanding of suffering and efficacious methods of relief, the medical profession falls 
short of its own reliance on evidence based medicine.  This short fall allows for 
questioning the justification of relief measures, which in turn, exposes whether the 
medical profession can lay legitimate claim to its traditional status as healer of suffering.  
In other words, the crucial question is whether medicine makes an unsustainable claim 
about its unique ability to heal the patient's suffering. 
                                                 
47Fontanarosa, Phil B., M.D. and Lundberg, George D., M.D. (1998), "Alternative Medicine Meets Science", JAMA, 
280(18): 1618-1619.  Although various meanings might be given to the notions of "what works" and "evidence based 
medicine", here I use these two terms interchangeably as the "conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of the current 
best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients".  See Sackett, D.L., et al. (1996). “Evidence 
based medicine: What it is and what it isn't.” British Medical Journal 312: 71-72; see also Gambrill, Eileen (1999), 
“Evidence-based Clinical Behavior Analysis, Evidence-based Medicine, and the Cochrane Collaboration.” Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 30, pp. 1-14. 
48Tanenbaum (1993), p.1268. 
49Thomasma, et al. (1998), p. 488. 
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 In view of these concerns, a caveat seems in order.  Questioning the skills of 
medical practitioners to relieve suffering is not meant to trivialize the personal knowledge 
and innate abilities of some clinicians who, from their own experience or from their work 
with patients, have learned first hand the meaning of suffering and how best to relieve it.  
In this regard, a special nod seems in order for physicians and nurses who work with 
patients suffering intensely with AIDS, terminal cancer, or chronic illness, or who have 
done work in third world countries where medical care is a rare commodity and 
unrelieved suffering the usual fare.50  Nor is a question about the medical profession's 
understanding of suffering meant to underestimate the insight and wisdom of some 
patients regarding their own suffering as well as that of their families and friends.  
Although some patients may not fully understand the nature of suffering, the insights 
possessed by even the inexperienced in terms of how best to relieve their own suffering 
can be invaluable for the practitioner caring for such patients.51  Likewise, the wisdom of 
some physicians and nurses, especially the more seasoned veterans, has enormous 
application toward effective relief in particular cases.  Nevertheless, questions regarding 
sustainable professional claims about the relief of suffering remain.   
 In addition to being unique, the physician's obligation to relieve suffering is also 
distinctive because, by reputation, tradition, and professional status,52 she exemplifies the 
kind of healer allegedly best able to relieve suffering through appropriate medical care.  
                                                 
50Gore, D.M. (1998), “Descending Into the Pit.” The Spectator 281(8887): 23-24.  Gore describes his experience as a 
doctor in Soweto, South Africa where the medical facility personnel show little or no compassion toward the patients 
who present for treatment.  
51Even without that understanding, a patient can know she is suffering and might very well know why, or can develop 
such insight as the suffering progresses.  These qualifications enhance, rather than diminish, the need for the 
practitioner's understanding of suffering due to her role as healer. 
52Cassell (1991), p. 30. 
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In accepting the burden of healer, physicians need an objective and comprehensive 
understanding of that which they seek to heal, particularly suffering itself.  In all such 
matters, moreover, the professional's understanding of suffering must exceed that of an 
ordinary lay person in order to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of the profession and 
to justifiably sustain the patient's hope for relief.  Otherwise, professional attempts to 
relieve the patient's suffering might prove to be unpredictable, unsound or even 
potentially harmful.  Such a consequence would seriously diminish the role of clinical 
healer and undermine the trust and hope of the patient.  Hence, it seems paramount for 
the medical profession to develop a comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
suffering that is based on the scientific and clinical evidence of "what works".  A better 
understanding of suffering will yield a better way of practicing medicine.   
 In view of the way in which relief of suffering underwrites medical care from the 
beginning to the end of life, the professional responsibility to relieve suffering clearly 
belongs to more than a few well-informed patients and physicians.  That responsibility 
belongs to all practitioners, regardless of specialized knowledge, who by reputation and 
tradition allege an ability to relieve suffering.53  Fulfilling this professional responsibility 
rests on the proviso that "medical treatments should be grounded in the best available 
scientific evidence" to ensure their effectiveness.54  Consequently, it seems appropriate to 
ask whether authentic relief of suffering requires a proficiency grounded in evidence that 
exceeds the conventional norm for appropriate medical care.  To meet that challenge, an 
authentic professional claim to relieve suffering demands a comprehensive understanding 
                                                 
53Pellegrino, E. D. (1998),  “Emerging Ethical Issues in Palliative Care.” JAMA 279(19), pp. 1521-1522.  As does 
Cassell, Pellegrino refers only to "physicians" as having a responsibility to relieve suffering.  As noted above, I suggest 
that such a responsibility accrues to all medical practitioners who allege an ability to heal suffering.   
54Callahan (1996), p. S7. 
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of the nature of suffering, which can then provide for application of sound clinical 
methods to ensure satisfactory outcomes for patients who suffer.  Otherwise, patients may 
be placing their hopes for relief of suffering in the hands of professionals who do not 
know what works in a clinical sense.  Such a possibility calls for a different, expanded 
model of medicine. 
IV.  The holistic model of medicine.   
In contrast to the conventional, scientific model of medicine that focuses primarily 
on the body, an alternative, expanded model of medicine would suggest that illness, 
rather than simply disease and physical ailments, ought to be the primary concern of 
medicine.  Medical holism is a model of medicine that makes such a claim, based on the 
premise that human lives consist of a complex network of meanings, interests, 
relationships and beliefs.55  On this view, illness results from some disruption in the 
complex interrelationship of physiological, psychosocial, spiritual and environmental 
factors in a person's life.56  On the holistic model, the term "illness" refers to how "the 
sick person and the members of the family or wider social network perceive, live with, 
and respond to symptoms and disability."57  The term "disease," on the other hand, is the 
way practitioners justifiably recast illness in biological terms according to the guidelines 
of medical education and training.58  Nevertheless, the distinction between illness and 
disease is clear; illness reflects the patient's perspective, while disease reflects the 
                                                 
55Deeley (1999), p. 108; Churchland, P.S. (1986), Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain, The 
MIT Press, p. 337; Taylor, Charles (1989). Sources of the Self. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 393-418; 
Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 96-124 and pp.164-180. 
56Freund, P. (1990). “The Expressive Body: A Common Ground for the Sociology of Emotions and Health and 
Illness.” Sociology of Health and Illness 12: 463, 466, 470; E. J. Cassell (1991), pp. 32-33. 
57Kleinman, A. (1988). The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition. New York, Basic Books, 
p. 5.   
58Kleinman (1988), p. 5.  For a similar treatment of the distinction between illness and disease, see Callahan (1996), p. 
S9 and Fulford, K. W. M. (1989). Moral Theory and Medical Practice, Cambridge University Press, Part III. 
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practitioner's perspective.  Medical holism holds the view that, while disease may be the 
origin of an illness, it is only one of its aspects.  Likewise, while physical pain may cause 
suffering, it is sometimes merely one aspect of the multifaceted personal experience 
called suffering, whose origin may stem from a variety of physical or nonphysical 
factors.  A holistic model of medicine may offer a more authentic method for the relief of 
suffering. 
 The term "holism" refers to any system of parts that constitute a whole of some 
sort, the members of which share certain relational properties.  Each part of the whole 
does not exist necessarily, but necessarily has at least one relational property with other 
members of the whole.59  For example, it is not necessary for any particular family 
member to be a sibling, but of necessity, one cannot be a sibling without there being 
someone else who is also a sibling.60  More precisely, the relational property (in this case 
"sibling") does not depend on how one describes the relationship of the members, but 
how the members in fact relate to one another.  In other words, the relational properties of 
a holistic system go beyond mere description to the level of fact.       
 Many disciplines use the term "holism" in a distinct way to indicate an integrative 
and comprehensive understanding of whole systems with constituent linkages and 
continuities among the respective parts.61  For example, the life sciences often employ the 
parallel term "vitalism" to represent a holistic theory of a living organism.  On this view, 
the organism has its many constitutive inanimate parts determined and enlivened by an 
                                                 
59Esfeld, M. (1998). “Holism and Analytic Philosophy.” Mind 107(426), p. 367. 
60Esfeld (1998), p. 370.  
61Lawrence, C. and Weisz, G., eds. (1998), “Medical Holism: The Context,” in Greater Than The Parts: Holism in 
Biomedicine 1920-1950. NY, Oxford University Press, p. 2. 
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autonomous vital component that both forms the relationship between those parts and 
also controls the life processes of the organism itself.  The upshot is that the whole 
organic system is not reducible to nor can be fully understood in terms of its parts 
alone.62 
 In the healthcare context, holism, or more precisely, medical holism, represents an 
approach to patient care where the practitioner focuses on the whole person rather than 
the patient's body and its diseases alone.63  Such an approach might vary on a continuum 
that ranges from those practices outside the bounds of conventional medicine to a more 
conservative approach that complements standard medical practice.  When considering 
practices outside the bounds of conventional medicine, some might view medical holism 
as a radical alternative to standard patient care in that medical holism emphasizes 
preventive and therapeutic self-healing strategies to enhance one's own biological 
mechanisms.64  For example, because naturopathy relies heavily, if not exclusively, on 
the body's own healing powers through a regimen of "natural foods, light, warmth, 
massage, fresh air, regular exercise, and the avoidance of drugs,"65 it might be viewed as 
a radical form of holistic medicine.   
 When considering practices within the bounds of conventional medicine, some 
might view holistic medicine as a complement to standard medical practice.  Medical 
                                                 
62Lawrence and Weisz (1998), p. 6. 
63Robinson, G. C. (1939). The Patient as a Person: A Study of the Social Aspects of Illness. New York, The 
Commonwealth Fund.  Although medical holism has roots deep in antiquity, Robinson was an early advocate for 
medical holism.  For another advocate from the same period, cf. Peabody, F. W. (1925). “A Study of 500 Admissions 
to the Fourth Medical Service, Boston City Hospital.” Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 193: 630.  See also 
Williams, T. F. (1950). “Cabot, Peabody, and the Care of the Patient.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 24: 462-481.    
64Eskinazi, Daniel P. (1998), "Factors That Shape Alternative Medicine," JAMA 280(18): 1622. 
65Glanze, Walter D. et al., eds. (1992), The Mosby Medical Encyclopedia.  New York.  Penguin.  Herbal medicine, 
which has roots in both the East and West, might also go outside the bounds of conventional medicine.  For discussion 
of 17th century Western herbal medicine, see Tobyn, Graeme (1997), Culpeper's Medicine: A Practice of Western 
Holistic Medicine, Rockport, MA, Element Books, Inc., pp. 176-226. 
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holism can be an especially effective complement in this regard when it functions on the 
premise that appropriate medical care responds to patients as persons and in a manner 
that fully recognizes the need for integrating the many parts of their lives.66  On this more 
conservative view of medical holism, a satisfactory integration of the varied parts of a 
patient's life tends to promote health, while a threat to such wholeness can lead to illness.  
The following encapsulates this more conservative goal for medical holism and its 
beneficial influence on patient care: 
Holistic health, then, is a state of integration of the physical body and of the mental 
and emotional soul-self, in harmony with the spiritual self...The concept refers to the fact 
that the whole of a person is greater than the mere sum of his parts, and that there is an 
approach to the whole person who is ill, instead of merely to his parts or to his illness as 
if they were separate from the whole of him.67  
  
Despite the appeal of such rhetoric, it might be difficult for physicians to situate the 
patient as "person" in the way that even conservative medical holism requires.  For 
instance, every patient has a genetic and experiential history that extensively shapes her 
current life-style, which in large measure might have led to the present physical ailment.  
As an example of two such ailments that often result from life-style, consider sexually 
transmitted diseases and alcoholism.  The fact that a person's history can have such 
significant influence on her health status raises an important question about how much 
personal history a treating physician must learn to meet the requirement of medical 
holism to treat the patient as person.  Such principles require that only when the physician 
                                                 
66Alster, K. B. (1989). The Holistic Health Movement. Tuscaloosa and London, The University of Alabama Press, pp. 
48-49.   See also Gordon, J. S. (1996). “Alternative Medicine and the Family Physician.” American Family Physician 
54(7): 2205-2210.  
67Svihus, R. H. (1979). “On Healing the Whole Person: A Perspective.” The Western Journal of Medicine 131(6): pp. 
480-481. 
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learns a great deal about the patient as person can she construct a sound treatment plan.68  
Unfortunately, the current financial and time constraints on clinical practice render such a 
requirement difficult to achieve and perhaps untenable. 
 In addition to learning about the patient's personal history, another holistic way to 
situate the patient as person is to focus on the person's economic, social, or employment 
setting, since those aspects often play a significant role in whether there will even be a 
clinical encounter, not to mention the kinds of healthcare decisions made.69  Those 
factors also frequently have both a direct and an indirect effect on a person's health.70  
Unfortunately, cultivating an awareness of the patient's circumstances in this sense 
sometimes has little effect on any preventive measures the physician would recommend 
because expecting patient compliance is unrealistic.   
 As an example of this last point, consider the patient who is a coal miner with 
severe breathing problems, a family of five to support, no other job skills or realistic 
employment alternatives, and no means to look for work in another locale.  Disregarding 
any temporary medical care available for this patient, ultimately the person needs a 
change in work environment to realize any lasting health advantage.  Imagine the miner's 
response to the physician's suggestion that he quit his job because of how working in the 
mine adversely affects his lungs and breathing.  The suggestion seems pointless and 
                                                 
68Bar, Bonnie, R.N., M.S. (1998), "The Effect of Holism on the Healthcare System," Hospital Materiel Management 
Quarterly, 20:1, p. 73.  See also Principle Number 3 of the American Holistic Medical Association's Principles of 
Holistic Medical Practice, which states, "Holistic Physicians expend as much effort in establishing what kind of patient 
has a disease as they do in establishing what kind of disease a patient has." 
69Rosenberg, C.E. (1998), “Holism in Twentieth-Century Medicine,” in Greater Than The Parts: Holism in 
Biomedicine, 1920-1950. C. Lawrence and G. Weisz. NY, Oxford University Press, p. 339. 
70The negative influence of socioeconomic factors on health has long been an issue for those concerned with public 
health matters.  More recently, others have turned their attention to this crucial relationship; cf. Cecire, V. Ruth et al. 
(2000), "Urban Bioethics," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10(1): 1-20. 
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perhaps insensitive without simultaneously providing him a variety of socioeconomic 
remedies.71   
 The difficulties noted above might suggest that medical holism fails in the clinical 
setting as an effective and realistic approach to patient care because, in the face of 
inevitable suffering and death, it cannot deliver on the promise of "wholeness" as a 
reward for human striving.72  To put it another way, one might suggest that medical 
holism fails as a reliable patient care strategy because health itself is not something to be 
attained once and for all time, but is an ideal maintained more or less through a dynamic 
process of living and caring that has a lot of loose ends and many uncontrollable aspects.  
In this way, since wholeness is rarely the acknowledged goal by patient or physician, 
medical holism is not necessarily seen as the solution. 
 An interesting clue to answering such a criticism comes from William James, who 
modified simple holism with his notion of "someness" as a counter to what appear to be  
unrealistic claims about an integrated whole with interconnected parts.  On James' 
account, to better understand the whole, he proposed a notion of "someness" where only 
some of parts of the whole connect with each other, while other parts do not connect at 
all.73  In speaking this way, James expressed his version of a world view, but I believe his 
idea of "someness" has application in the clinical setting.   
 Consider "someness" in the life of a patient.  On this view, because a person’s life 
has parts, some of which are connected and others not, that life manifests itself in ways 
                                                 
71Brock, Dan W. (2000), "Broadening the Bioethics Agenda," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10(1), pp. 21-38. 
72Marty, M. E.  (1994). “The Tradition of the Church in Health and Healing.” International Review of Mission 83(329), 
pp. 227-243. 
73James, Wm.  (1977). A Pluralistic Universe. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 40-41. 
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that limit the attainability of wholeness.  These limited connections also yield a partial set 
of meanings useful for interpreting and coping with disease and suffering.  As a result, 
neither physicians nor followers of other vocations can heal everything or be all things to 
all people.74  Thus, achieving wholeness with the help of only one healer may not be 
possible.  Nevertheless, rather than refuting the wisdom of employing medical holism in 
the healthcare setting, these limitations suggest that a modified version of holism 
analogous to James' notion of "someness" might offer a less ambitious but more 
attainable approach to patient care, especially care aimed at the relief of suffering. 
 As a complement to standard medical practice, a modified version of medical 
holism acknowledges the efficacy of some nontraditional preventive and therapeutic 
measures, such as spiritual exercises, meditation, massage and healing touch therapy, and 
other such remedies.  Relying on such alternative measures when the need arises gives 
full recognition to personal dimensions other than the physical aspects of a patient's life.  
In defending this modified version of medical holism, I claim that the appropriate way to 
relieve suffering in the clinical setting comes through a holistic approach to patient care 
where the practitioner must view the patient as a whole person with many needs--
physical, emotional, and spiritual--rather than merely as a patient with physical needs 
only.  Considering the nature of suffering in terms of hope and despair, viewing patients 
as whole persons makes it possible to meet their needs more fully, which in turn, makes it 
possible to relieve their suffering more effectively.   
                                                 
74Kopelman, L. and Moskop, J. (1981). “The Holistic Health Movement: A Survey and Critique.” Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 6(2), p. 226.  See also Tillich, P. (1961). “The Meaning of Health.” Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 5(1), p. 92 
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 On the holistic model, the healer begins to relieve the patient's suffering by 
acknowledging a complexity of possible causes that stem from an underlying disruption 
in the patient's life.  The healer and patient both are open to various methods of relief that 
depend in part on the specific disruption.  The patient experiences relief through a 
complex healing process that ultimately repairs the disruption by restoring the patient's 
network of meanings, interests and relationships, or aids the patient in coping with 
permanent changes in that network.   
 To heal the patient in this holistic way requires a commitment to non-
abandonment in all phases of care, especially at the end of life when suffering can be 
very intense and difficult to relieve.75  Accepting such a commitment is crucial for all 
professional healers who promise to heal, especially for physicians and nurses because 
they are most often the primary care givers in the clinical setting.  One effective way in 
which the physician or nurse fulfills a commitment to non-abandonment is by sustaining 
a compassionate presence with the one who suffers.  Such an effort involves not only 
maintaining a physical presence, but also making oneself available "without an agenda, to 
be with them at times in silence, to be a nonjudgmental force in their lives, and to allow 
them the time and space...to heal."76  In this way, the physician and nurse give deliberate 
attention to the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual needs of the patient.   
                                                 
75See Chapter 4 for a more developed concept of "non-abandonment" that incorporates Pellegrino's characterization of 
the patient-physician relationship as the healing relationship.  In that context, within certain parameters, the same 
considerations given to terminally ill patients apply to chronically ill patients who have come to the end of their 
endurance.  As a matter of note, my definition of "non-abandonment" does not exclude the very real possibility, and at 
times even necessity, of ending a patient-physician relationship before healing takes place.  However, if the physician 
wants out, justice demands that she honor her professional promise to heal by exiting in a manner least harmful to the 
patient who is vulnerable.     
76Slater, Victoria et al. (1999), "Journey to Holism," Journal of Holistic Nursing 17(4), p. 373. 
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 Sustaining a compassionate presence at times can be an enormous task.  On the 
holistic model of medicine, it need not always be the duty of the physician or nurse alone 
to carry out that task.  These practitioners can and often should call on other healthcare 
professionals, beloved family members, special friends, or members of the clergy, for 
example, to be this presence by becoming more directly involved in the healing process.  
Calling on others in this holistic way is perhaps even more vital when the primary focus 
is relief of suffering itself, as often happens at the end of life.77  In calling on others for 
such assistance, the physician or nurse still orchestrates the attention that others give to 
the patient because engaging other co-healers does not spare either of the professional 
obligation to relieve the patient's suffering.   
 Although others might assist in the healing process, the holistic model of 
medicine acknowledges more fully the professional obligation to heal by expecting the 
professional healer to have a comprehensive understanding of suffering itself that 
exceeds the current norm for appropriate medical care allowed by the conventional 
model.78  On the holistic model, the practitioner adopts an orientation to suffering in the 
clinical setting that promotes healing by considering the vital influence of many factors 
on the patient's illness, including the underlying physical ailment.  With this orientation, 
the physician recognizes when and how others can promote healing and at times includes 
them in the healing process for that purpose.  On the holistic model, the physician 
                                                 
77Cohen, J.J., M.D. (1998). “Remembering the Real Questions.” Annals of Internal Medicine 128(7): 564.  Cf. 
Pellegrino (1983), p. 162. 
78Pellegrino, E. D. (1998), "Emerging Ethical Issues in Palliative Care," p. 1521. 
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promises to heal the patient with competent measures that address the patient's medically 
relevant needs in a way that remains consistent with the patient's goals and values.79    
 Viewed holistically, a commitment to non-abandonment is thus a mutual 
undertaking between patient and physician that respects the values of each.  Such mutual 
regard for the personal and professional values of each, however, is not without 
qualification.  For instance, there are two moral agents acting within the healing 
relationship.80  On the one hand, there is the professional who accepts an obligation to 
heal, but does not assume a concomitant obligation to act against her own personal and 
professional values to effect such healing.  On the other hand, there is the patient who 
asks for healing, but retains the right to refuse the recommended care in that regard.  
Thus, a commitment to non-abandonment means that a physician's professional and 
moral obligation to render appropriate medical care does not preempt a patient's right to 
refuse such care if it is unwanted.   
 There are other ways in which a physician who is committed to non-abandonment 
honors her patient's wishes and values.  For instance, such a physician would recommend 
medical care that is consistent with and respects her patient's conception of an acceptable 
life.  Hence, this physician would not seek to preserve life at all costs by consigning her 
patient to a life sustained only by machines when that alternative clearly is not the 
patient's choice.81  Likewise, she would not leave her patient alone and isolated merely 
                                                 
79Pellegrino (1983), p. 165.   
80Pellegrino, Edmund D., M.D. (1987), “Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality.” The Journal of Medical 
Humanities and Bioethics 8(1), p. 13. 
81Despite this claim, I will argue in Chapter 3 that non-abandonment does not include physician-assisted suicide. 
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because medical science can no longer do anything to cure or ameliorate the underlying 
medical condition so as to restore a level of daily functioning acceptable to the patient.   
As another example, physicians committed to non-abandonment attempt to relieve 
unbearable and chronic pain with appropriate palliative measures, even at the risk of 
hastening the patient's death, provided the patient agrees.  To deny the patient such 
measures merely because they hasten death reflects a false sense of obligation to preserve 
life at all costs, and exhibits a lack of compassion and disregard for simple comfort care.  
These are some of the many ways in which physicians can fulfill a commitment to non-
abandonment while simultaneously honoring the patient's goals and values.  To do 
otherwise is a professional failure in that it unjustly violates a professional agreement to 
heal the patient's suffering on the patient's terms.    
 On my account, the optimal forum to avoid such failure is the holistic model of 
medicine.  Holism requires a comprehensive understanding of suffering itself, which in 
turn fosters reliance on a wide array of methods, procedures, and persons to facilitate 
healing of the patient's suffering in the clinical setting.  In this sense, a holistic strategy 
better serves the patient's needs because it protects her values and dignity, which allows 
the physician opportunity to provide an authentic compassionate presence during the 
healing process and fulfill her professional commitment to non-abandonment in all 
phases of care, even at the end of life when healing seems illusive and impossible. 
V.  Holistic patient care at the end of life.  
 At the end of life, when medicine arrives at the crossroads where life-care must 
give way to end-of-life-care, troubling questions frequently arise about which 
interventions are appropriate, especially in regard to withholding or withdrawing 
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treatment or food and water.  Even more troubling are questions about physician assisted 
suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, that is, prescribed death, as appropriate care to 
relieve patient suffering.82  In the absence of a comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of suffering, clinical recommendations about its relief are unreliable and unpredictable.  
Thus, successful transition from life-care to end-of-life-care might elude both physician 
and patient.     
 In end-of-life care, conventional strategies to cure or ameliorate the disease or 
ailment usually are no longer efficacious.  Such efforts are frequently at odds with the 
patient's condition and seem to diverge in unacceptable ways from the patient's genuine 
needs and inevitable death.  In sharp contrast to life-care where cure or amelioration is 
the focus and where relief of suffering hovers in the background as touchstone, end-of-
life cases often have no ready answers with respect to the kind and extent of response 
needed.  Perhaps, at the end of life, relief of suffering and pain is all medicine is able to 
do.  To provide answers in end-of-life situations, relief of suffering and pain become the 
dominant goals and function as the decisional framework for patients, their families, and 
practitioners in making both personal and clinical judgments about appropriate care.83  As 
a guiding principle, relief of suffering and pain become the direct aim of and very 
justification for specific care at the end of life.   
                                                 
82The phrase "prescribed death" is meant to incorporate both "physician-assisted suicide" and "voluntary active 
euthanasia".  Since my focus is on the healthcare setting, the term "prescribed" refers to the role that physicians 
perform in either scenario, namely, to prescribe the drug and dosage that results in death regardless of who ultimately 
administers that drug.  The term "death" refers to the goal of ending the patient's life.  
83Loewy, E.H. (1992). “Suffering as a Consideration in Ethical Decision Making.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics (2), p. 139.   Loewy makes the interesting point that relief of suffering, as a guide for decision making at any 
stage of medical care, operates more effectively than the traditional principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, or 
respect for patient autonomy 
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 In end-of-life-care, relief of suffering becomes the primary objective inasmuch as 
cure or amelioration of the disease is no longer a realistic goal.   In such circumstances, 
how the physician and patient seek to relieve suffering may be determined by the 
understanding of suffering that each has.  If viewed as synonymous with intolerable or 
unacceptable physical pain, as it may on the conventional model of medicine, then 
suffering may be viewed as tied to the body only.  Thus, where pain management seems 
no longer effective, an emerging solution for the physician might be to prescribe death 
and for the patient to embrace death.84  This prescription would operate on the 
assumption that, to get rid of the suffering one must get rid of the body.  On the other 
hand, if the physician and patient adopt the holistic model, where emphasis is on the 
person situated in an intricate network of meanings, interests and relationships and where 
suffering is viewed as distinct from physical pain, solutions other than prescribed death 
may emerge.  
 Questions about the clinical efficacy of prescribed death rest on the notion that 
there is a distinction between suffering caused by physical pain and suffering caused by 
other factors.  If suffering derived only from physical causes, one might argue reasonably 
that death of the body brings relief of suffering.  On a physical basis alone, in the absence 
of the proper physiological mechanisms and sense organs, suffering seems impossible to 
experience.  If, on the other hand, suffering is an inherent part of being itself, with many 
                                                 
84Quill, T.E., M.D., Meier, D.E., M.D., et al. (1998), “The Debate Over Physician Assisted Suicide: Empirical Data 
and Convergent Views.” Annals of Internal Medicine 128(7), p. 555.  To supplement Quill's suggestion that death 
might be perceived as a benefit, in a discussion about such a benefit to the patient that may result from undergoing 
voluntary active euthanasia or physician assisted suicide in end-of-life-care, there may be two differing points of view: 
the practitioner's and the patient's.  This possibility clouds the issue of whether death is a benefit to the patient and to 
what extent.  A further complication derives from the controversy about the definition of death itself such that, in 
prescribing death, it is not clear what a physician prescribes.  See also Youngner, Stuart, et al (1999), The Definition of 
Death, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.  I note that the concept of "appropriate medical care" stated herein 
does not by itself preclude either procedure.  
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causes both non-physical and physical, it is unclear whether death brings relief of 
suffering because it is not clear that death is the end of being or merely a change in being, 
albeit a radical change.85  If death is merely a change in being, there might not be any 
benefit from prescribed death other than relief of physical pain.  In short, it is not clear 
that death is a benefit to the patient as a "being" as opposed to the patient as a "body."   
 The hypothetical claim that death relieves suffering--other than suffering from 
physical pain--lacks the support of scientific and clinical evidence.  At best, the scientific 
and clinical evidence from a dead body itself is physiological silence.  This lack, or 
absence, of evidence renders prescribed death a questionable medical benefit because 
such a remedy must rely on an inescapable but questionable metaphysical claim, namely, 
that suffering is of physical origin alone and, thus, ends with death of the body.  
However, in the context of evidence based medicine, the physician promises to render 
appropriate medical care, which is care that brings more medical benefit than harm to the 
patient, as evidenced by the scientific and clinical data.  Consequently, since the alleged 
medical benefit of prescribed death is questionable due to its questionable metaphysical 
basis, so is its use in the healthcare context.86   
 A different remedy for the relief of suffering may emerge under the holistic model 
of medicine that emphasizes the situated life of the patient in a network of meanings and 
relationships.  Consider how suffering itself results from a disruption in that network.  In 
                                                 
85Wildes, Kevin Wm., S. J. (1996), “Death: A Persistent Controversial State.”  Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 
6(4), pp. 378-381.  According to Wildes, death is not “merely a medical or scientific event.  It is a cultural, moral, and 
often religious event.”  He claims that such views “shape how it [death] is understood and determine appropriate 
behavior." 
86AMA Code of Medical Ethics (1996-7), p. 6.  I do not challenge a patient’s belief that death will bring relief of 
suffering.  I only question whether medical science ought to rely on such belief as justification for prescribing death. 
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an objective sense, suffering is a personal mode of being suspended in an unrelenting 
tension between hope and despair that the sufferer finds oppressive and unacceptable.87   
In a subjective sense, suffering is a psychological perturbance resulting from an 
interpretation of one's circumstances.88  On either the objective or subjective basis of 
suffering, under the holistic model, it may be possible to restore or heal the underlying 
disruption in the patient's network of meanings and relationships, and thus, objectively, 
lift the experience of unrelenting oppression, and subjectively, heal the patient's 
psychological perturbance.89  Thus, on the holistic model of medicine, in responding to 
the patient as person rather than as body, prescribed death may not emerge as the 
preferred solution to suffering because it may be viewed as inappropriate medical care.  
In other words, on the holistic model of medicine, prescribed death is simply not 
appropriate care because it does not address the patient's underlying condition.     
 On the objective basis of suffering--that suffering is a personal mode of being 
anchored in an experience of unrelenting oppression--to say that death relieves suffering 
is to say that death relieves oppression.  For medicine to prescribe death as the solution to 
oppression assumes that death is efficacious in this regard.  However, on evidence-based 
medicine, this may be a faulty assumption.  On the subjective basis of suffering--that 
suffering is a psychological perturbance resulting from an interpretation of one's 
                                                 
87Callahan (1996), p. S11. 
88Berenbaum, H., Raghavan, C., et al. (1999), “Disturbances in Emotion,” in Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic 
Psychology. Kahneman, D., Diener, E. and Schwarz, N. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 267-281; Cassell, E. 
J., M.D. (1999), “Diagnosing Suffering: A Perspective.” Annals of Internal Medicine 131(7): 532. 
89Wilkinson, R.G. (1996). Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality. London, Routledge, pp. 5-6; Williams, 
S.J. (1998). “Capitalising on emotions?  Rethinking the inequalities in health debate.” Sociology 32(1): 121-140; 
Lindholm, L. and Eriksson, K. (1998). “The Dialectic of Health and Suffering: An Ontological Perspective on Young 
People's Health.” Qualitative Health Research 8(4), p. 525.  I only suggest a link between psychological disturbances, 
illness, disease, and suffering, and that medicine could resolve patient suffering more satisfactorily if that link were 
included in developing treatment strategies.  Thus, I do not suggest that medicine abandon the conventional approach 
altogether, or approach illness and suffering only on psychological terms.      
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circumstances--to say that death relieves suffering is to say that we interpret our 
circumstances after death, if at all, in a way that does not cause us to be perturbed.  It also 
suggests that our circumstances after death, if any, and thus our interpretations, if any, 
bear no meaningful relationship to our physical life as a human.  Such speculations might 
work well as personal judgments about suffering and death as appropriate care.  
However, personal claims about what perceptions, if any, we have after death are 
speculative because they lack the support of scientific or clinical evidence.90  Without 
such evidence, all metaphysical speculations of this sort go well beyond the legitimate 
post mortem claims that medicine can make about the physiological condition of a dead 
body.91   
 Strong humanitarian or religious feelings might lead one beyond the scope of 
medical knowledge to claims about suffering and death.  Frequently, humanitarian claims 
show an unwarranted emphasis on the body and suggest that the physiological aspects of 
our existence are the only source of human suffering.  On that basis, the claim that death 
brings relief of suffering amounts to the claim that, once the body dies, suffering ceases 
as well.  From a different perspective, religious claims commonly reflect the view that the 
after-life is a better life.  The point is not to dispute such religious dogma or popular 
convention in this regard, but to emphasize that prescribed-death is an ambiguous 
                                                 
90What happens after death has long been a favorite topic for speculation.  For various philosophical perspectives on 
the concept of immortality, see Edwards, P., ed. (1997). Immortality. Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books.  Although 
controversial, near death experiences might be a form of evidence that indicates the nature of our perceptions after 
death.  For an account of near death experiences in both medieval and modern times, see Zaleski, C. (1987). 
Otherworld Journeys. New York, Oxford University Press.  For firsthand reports of such experiences, see Moody, R.A. 
(1975). Life after Life. Covington, GA, Mockingbird, and Valarino, E.E. (1997). On the Other Side of Life, Insight 
Books.  For children's accounts of near death experiences, Morse, M. and Perry, P. (1990). Closer to the Light. New 
York, Villard Books.  For an investigation into near death experiences in the clinical setting, see Sabom, M., M.D., 
F.A.C.C. (1982).  Recollections of Death. New York, Harper and Row.  Concerning the controversy over near death 
experiences, see Kellehear, A. (1996). Experiences Near Death: Beyond Medicine and Religion. New York, Oxford 
University Press.  Kellehear also does a comparison of reports made in the West with those made in the East.   
91Engelhardt, H.T. (1996). “Suffering, Meaning, and Bioethics.” Christian Bioethics 2(2), pp. 129-153. 
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medical benefit for the patient because the claim that it relieves suffering lacks scientific 
or clinical evidence.  In other areas of medical practice, physicians generally restrict their 
prescriptions to those methods and strategies that are clinically or scientifically proven as 
efficacious.  Thus, from a medical practice standpoint, extending the professional bounds 
of medicine to include prescribed-death as an alleged means to relieve suffering seems 
premature and ill-advised.    
 From an ethical standpoint, prescribing death as relief for suffering puts too much 
at stake because it constitutes a radical change to the practice of medicine.92  By tradition 
and professionally accepted ethical standards, medicine seeks to sustain life, promote 
health and relieve suffering.93  Thus, the moral justification needed for a physician to 
deliberately cause, or assist in, a patient's death raises fundamental ethical questions 
about how far relief of suffering ought to extend in the practice of medicine.94  If such 
justification turns on intolerable or worthless suffering, who should determine the 
threshold of tolerance or the value of suffering?  Is the patient's judgment in this regard 
sufficient justification for the physician to prescribe death?  Should a physician confirm 
the patient's judgment by reference to objective criteria?  Are such determinations strictly 
a matter of public policy or should they be made at the bedside between physician and 
patient?  Without answers to these and similar questions, prescribing death as appropriate 
medical care for the relief of suffering is without warrant. 
 
                                                 
92Jonas (1995), p. 46.  The following discussion leaves open the question of whether someone other than the physician 
might perform such acts without changing the character of medicine. 
93AMA Code of Medical Ethics (1996-7), p. 39. 
94Thomasma, et al. (1998), p. 213. 
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 VI.  Those who speak on behalf of sufferers. 
In light of the above considerations, it is clear that medicine stands in need of an 
authentic understanding of suffering itself and how death might bring its relief before 
prescribing death as the remedy.  An initial step toward achieving that understanding 
seems to require a consensus about what even counts as suffering.  Yet, medicine does 
not have such a consensus,95 which raises the question of whom to ask about suffering.  
Who can supply the missing components of a comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of suffering which can serve to build consensus regarding its relief?   
 Two groups well positioned to expand our collective understanding of suffering 
with their own descriptions and narratives are those who suffer and those who speak on 
their behalf.96  Given the extent to which suffering is a constitutive element of human 
existence, however, those who suffer or have suffered are legion.  Since obtaining useful 
accounts from such a multitude is impossible, representative empirical studies of personal 
experiences might be the better route.  Likewise, since the number of qualified groups 
who speak on behalf of those who suffer are also many, obtaining useful information 
from this source also requires a limitation.  In this regard, it seems appropriate to rely on 
the reflections of some physicians, nurses, psychologists, and bioethicists about the 
nature of suffering and how best to relieve it in the clinical setting.   
 Hoping to build on the work of those who know well the meaning of suffering, I 
intend to augment their accounts with my own views in the following explication and 
                                                 
95Thomasma (1998), p. 488. 
96Scarry, Elaine (1985). The Body in Pain. New York, Oxford University Press, p. 6.  Here, I borrow Scarry's point 
about pain. 
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analysis of the nature of suffering.  I hope that result will reveal some helpful suggestions 
about the better responses to suffering in the clinical setting.  My exposition begins with 
the premise that suffering is a personal experience that radically challenges us to make 
sense of what it means to be human.97  Paradoxically, we meet that challenge best with a 
comprehensive understanding of what it means to suffer.98  Acquiring that understanding 
by turning a rational eye to the personal experience of suffering demands guarding 
against trivializing or diminishing the emotional, spiritual, psychological and physical 
strength a person often needs to endure suffering.   
 To meet that demand, part of the strategy in what follows is to give a two-pronged 
account of the nature of suffering.  One prong analyzes suffering as "personal 
experience" so as to uncover the subjective viewpoint, while the second prong analyzes 
suffering from the objective viewpoint as "observable condition".  This second part seeks 
to account for how we share the experience of suffering and to explain our compassionate 
response to suffering, especially when those who suffer do not or cannot interpret their 
current experience as one of suffering.   
 Constructing such an account rests on the premise that suffering has morally 
weighty implications for medicine in all phases of patient care.  The aim is to answer 
three fundamental questions: what is the nature of suffering, what does it mean, and what 
is the appropriate medical response in a clinical setting.  In regard to the nature of 
suffering, the underlying theory is that suffering is an adaptive process triggered by the 
occurrence of undesirable events.  As such, suffering is not an end state that lends itself to 
                                                 
97Moseley (1991), p. 69.  
98Van Hooft, S. (1998), “The Meaning of Suffering.” Hastings Center Report 28(5), pp. 13-19. 
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traditional methods of relief in the clinical setting as though it were a disease, but a 
process of coping that is itself a method of relief.   
 In regard to the meaning of suffering, the answer depends solely on the sufferer's 
own interpretation of the circumstances giving rise to her suffering and has a usefulness, 
if any, that she alone determines.  This is not to suggest that suffering is so subjective that 
others cannot or should not attempt to influence its interpretation or outcome.  Rather, 
whatever meaning suffering has for both sufferer and observer is ultimately one's own.   
 Finally, in regard to methods of relief, the appropriate way to respond to suffering 
in the clinical setting comes through a holistic approach to patient care.  On this 
approach, the practitioner best views the patient as a whole person with many needs--
physical, emotional, spiritual--rather than merely as a patient with only physical needs.  
Viewing patients in this way makes it possible to meet their needs more fully, which, in 
turn, makes it possible to relieve their suffering more effectively, that is, to restore as 
close as possible the patient's network of meanings, interests, and relationships.  From a 
practical standpoint, following this strategy requires the practitioner to sustain a 
continuing compassionate presence with the one who suffers and a professional 
commitment to non-abandonment in all phases of care, especially at the end of life when 
suffering can be very intense and difficult to relieve.   
VII.  Conclusion. 
Although the circumstances that give rise to suffering may differ from person to 
person, suffering itself is the experience of an unrelenting tension between hope and 
despair, caused by a serious and unacceptable disruption in important personal matters.  
Viktor Frankl described this ever-present and unyielding tension between hope and 
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despair as a "state of tension between what actually is on the one hand and what ought to 
be on the other hand."  An implication of this view is that relief of suffering occurs when 
the tension between the sufferer's hope and despair lessens or ceases altogether.  In the 
clinical setting, the patient and physician hope to effect relief of suffering through 
appropriate medical care.  A determination of appropriate care in a given clinical 
encounter occurs when the medical practitioner and patient alike conclude that the 
benefits of receiving such care outweigh the associated burdens.  In this two-pronged 
determination of appropriateness, however, there are two different analyses and 
conclusions that coincide.  There is the medical practitioner's clinical judgment of 
"benefits versus burdens" and the patient's personal judgment of "benefits versus 
burdens", neither of which necessarily involve the same considerations or factors.   
 A consequence of the differing perspectives of patient and physician is that any 
given clinical encounter has the potential for conflict over choices and desired outcomes.  
However, conflicts about appropriate care in end-of-life situations differ from the 
conflicts that arise in life-care situations in at least one important respect.  In life-care, the 
conflict between physician and patient usually is a disagreement about how to cure or 
ameliorate the condition, while in end-of-life-care, where the condition is beyond cure, 
the conflict is often a more profound disagreement about suffering itself.     
 Some medical practitioners claim that a conflict between patient and physician 
about how to relieve suffering at the end of life is due in part to the academic and clinical 
training of most physicians.  Most physicians receive training in the conventional model 
of medicine, which does not formally or intentionally foster a comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of suffering.  Because conventional training focuses almost 
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exclusively on the physiological and chemical aspects of disease and pain, many 
physicians trained under this model do not develop an understanding of suffering that 
goes beyond those aspects.  Considering the essence of suffering as a perturbance of the 
emotions involving hope and despair, it is no wonder that these physicians might not 
have an understanding of suffering that exceeds the patient's, which often gives rise to 
conflicts between patient and physician about how best to relieve suffering.   
 The unfortunate consequence is that conventional medicine often falls short in its 
treatment of suffering because it does not take into account the psychological, social, and 
spiritual factors (as well as the underlying physical condition) that can cause a patient's 
suffering.  This short fall allows for questioning the justification of relief measures, 
which in turn, exposes whether the medical profession can legitimately claim its 
traditional status as healer of suffering.  In other words, without an adequate 
understanding of suffering, the crucial question with respect to conventional medicine is 
whether it makes an unsustainable claim about its unique ability to heal suffering, 
especially at the end of life where relief of suffering becomes the focal point of the care 
process.    
In contrast to the conventional model of medicine that focuses primarily on the 
body, an alternative, expanded model of medicine would suggest that illness, rather than 
simply disease and physical ailments, ought to be the primary concern of medicine.  
Medical holism is a model of medicine that makes such a claim, based on the premise 
that human lives consist of a complex network of meanings, interests, relationships and 
beliefs.  Medical holism holds the view that, while disease may be the origin of an illness, 
it is only one of its aspects.  Likewise, while physical pain may cause suffering, it is 
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sometimes merely one aspect of the multifaceted personal experience called suffering, 
whose origin may stem from a variety of physical or nonphysical factors.  Because 
medical holism considers a wider variety of causes with respect to suffering than 
conventional medicine, it may offer a more authentic method for the relief of suffering.   
 In the healthcare context, medical holism is an approach to patient care that varies 
on a continuum that ranges from practices outside the bounds of conventional medicine 
to more conservative approaches that complement standard medical practice.  Medical 
holism can be an especially effective complement to standard medical practice when it 
functions on the premise that appropriate medical care responds to patients as persons 
and in a manner that fully recognizes the need for integrating the many parts of their 
lives.  On this view, a satisfactory integration of the varied parts of a patient's life tends to 
promote health, while a threat to such wholeness can lead to illness.  Considering the 
nature of suffering in terms of hope and despair, viewing patients as whole persons 
makes it possible to meet their needs more fully, which in turn, makes it possible to 
relieve their suffering more effectively.   
 To heal the patient in a holistic way, that is, to restore the patient's network of 
meanings, interests, and relationships, the practitioner must sustain a continuing 
compassionate presence with the one who suffers, especially at the end of life when 
suffering can be very intense and difficult to relieve.  Compassionate presence means not 
only a physical presence with the person, but also making oneself available by giving 
deliberate attention to the physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual needs of a patient.  
While this compassionate presence need not always be the physician or nurse, these 
practitioners should orchestrate that attention.  In keeping with this claim, other 
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professional healthcare providers, beloved family members, special friends, or members 
of the clergy, for example, can and often should be called upon to be this presence by 
becoming directly involved in the healing process, perhaps more so when the primary 
focus is relief of suffering itself, as it is in end of life care.   
 In end-of-life-care, relief of suffering is the primary objective of medical care 
inasmuch as cure or amelioration of the disease is no longer a realistic goal.   In this 
circumstance, if suffering is viewed as synonymous with intolerable or unacceptable 
physical pain, as it may be on the conventional model of medicine, then suffering may be 
viewed as tied to the body only.  Thus, where pain management seems no longer 
effective, an emerging solution for the physician might be to prescribe death and for the 
patient to embrace death.  This prescription would operate on the assumption that, to get 
rid of the suffering one must get rid of the body. 
  A different remedy for the relief of suffering may emerge under the holistic 
model of medicine that emphasizes the situated life of the patient in a network of 
meanings and relationships.  Consider how suffering itself results from a disruption in 
that network such that, it may be possible to restore or heal the underlying disruption in 
the patient's network of meanings and relationships, and thus, objectively, lift the 
experience of unrelenting oppression, and subjectively, heal the patient's psychological 
disturbance.  Thus, in responding to the patient as person rather than as body, prescribed 
death may not emerge as the preferred solution to suffering because it does not address 
the patient's underlying condition.   
 From an ethical standpoint, prescribing death as relief for suffering puts too much 
at stake because it constitutes a radical change to the practice of medicine.  By tradition 
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and professionally accepted ethical standards, medicine seeks to sustain life, promote 
health and relieve suffering.  Thus, the moral justification needed for a physician to 
deliberately cause, or assist, a patient's death raises fundamental ethical questions about 
how far relief of suffering ought to extend in the practice of medicine.  Without answers 
to these questions, prescribed death as appropriate medical care for the relief of suffering 
is without warrant.  In keeping with professionally accepted ethical standards, the best 
clinical response to suffering, especially at the end of life, can be expressed as a 
compassionate presence moderated by a professional responsibility and commitment to 

























The Nature of Suffering 
The fairest thing we can experience is the mysterious.  It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the 
cradle of true art and true science.  
         Albert Einstein 
 
I.  Introduction. 
An explicit theory of suffering derived from lived experience, when applied in the 
clinical setting, can provide a sound defense for various medical responses to patient 
suffering.  Developing such a theory by analyzing an individual phenomenon like 
suffering, however, bears the inevitable risk of obscuring or forfeiting the personal 
dimension of that experience.  Arthur Frank implicitly acknowledges such a risk when he 
describes suffering itself as that "most elusive quality" of the human condition.1  
Drawing on his own illness experiences, Frank claims that the suffering patients often 
endure in the clinical setting due to their illness resists articulation, while it 
simultaneously compels a response by the observer.  According to Frank, an effective 
response to patient suffering demands an understanding that goes beyond the level of 
concept to that of lived reality.  Without that level of understanding, those who respond 
run the risk of worsening the suffering.   
 Pellegrino makes a similar argument about a clinician's response to patient 
suffering.  He claims that the practice of medicine commences "at the moment of clinical 
truth, when a decision is taken and an action initiated to heal or help a particular 
                                                 
1Frank, Arthur W. (2001), “Can We Research Suffering?” Qualitative Health Research 11(3), p. 353. 
 45
patient."2  Pellegrino characterizes this decision as an ideal that combines science and 
technology with a particular patient's preferences.  In his view, such a combination is a 
crucial step in the healing process that enables physicians to meet the clinical challenge 
posed by the patient's suffering.  Constructing such an ideal, however, begins anew each 
time a patient who suffers due to causes assessed as "medical" seeks relief for that 
condition from physicians.   
 In Kleinman's view, the physician's ability to relieve such suffering depends as 
much on a willingness to listen to the patient's story of pain and suffering as it does on 
educational and clinical skills.  Kleinman emphasizes this point with his own story about 
a seven-year-old girl who had been badly burned.3  As a medical student, Kleinman's 
official job was to hold this little girl's hand during the painful, daily process of 
debridement.  This reassurance was supposed to facilitate her treatment and healing.  
After several days of this routine, he was no longer able to tolerate either the process or 
his own impotence in consoling the little girl.  Out of frustration, he finally asked her how 
she tolerated such pain, what the feeling was like of being so badly burned and of having 
to experience the awful treatment ritual day after day.  Surprised by his openness and 
willingness to listen, she immediately stopped thrashing about and in direct, simple terms 
began to tell him.  As Kleinman describes this poignant moment: "While she spoke, she 
grasped my hand harder and neither screamed nor fought off the surgeon or the nurse.  
Each day from then on, her trust established, she tried to give me a feeling of what she 
                                                 
2Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1983),  "The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical Medicine," p. 164, in The 
Clinical Encounter: The Moral Fabric of the Physician-Patient Relationship. E. A. Shelp, ed. (1983).  Boston and 
Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp.153-172. 
3Kleinman, A. (1988). The Illness Narratives: Suffering, Healing, and the Human Condition. New York, Basic Books, 
p. xii. 
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was experiencing...the little burned patient seemed noticeably better able to tolerate the 
debridement."4   
 Kleinman's story calls attention not only to the healing power of a certain 
disposition on the physician's part, he also distinguishes between the "patient's experience 
of illness and the doctor's attention to disease..."5  In his view, physicians who listen more 
to illness narratives than to disease descriptions during patient visits sharpen their 
medical skills and the effectiveness of their responses to patient suffering.  In this sense, 
the relationship between patient and physician can be the most reliable and, at times, the 
only mode of access to the personal dimension of suffering.  Indeed, it is the primary care 
physician who claims a unique ability, backed by a particular education and special 
training, to listen to the patient's story of pain and suffering, and to respond with 
appropriate and effective measures of relief.6    
 Three clinicians who have employed just such a method as described by Frank 
and Kleinman to develop their respective theories of suffering are Sigmund Freud, 
physician and founder of psychoanalysis, David Bakan, clinical psychologist, and Eric 
Cassell, physician and bioethicist.  Although these clinicians do not present a unified 
theory of suffering, all three begin at the point of "lived reality" as related to them by 
their patients.  One explanation for this lack of unity might be that, as true scientists, each 
clinician focuses on the causes of suffering rather than on the experience itself.  With this 
orientation, Freud describes suffering as frustrated desire, while Bakan explains suffering 
                                                 
4Kleinman (1988), p. xii. 
5Kleinman (1988), p. xii. 
6Finn, William F. (1986),  "Patients' Wants and Needs: The Physicians' Response" in Suffering: Psychological and 
Social Aspects in Loss, Grief, and Care. Robert DeBellis, et al., eds. New York, The Haworth Press, p. 1. 
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as the psychic manifestation of a psychosocially disordered self.  Cassell too defines 
suffering in terms of its cause, which he describes as a perceived loss of self.  This 
theoretical focus on cause rather than on the nature of the experience itself leaves an 
intellectual gap that hinders the development of appropriate and effective measures of 
relief in the clinical setting.   
 To help close that gap, the following analysis highlights the personal dimension 
of suffering implied in the theories of Freud, Bakan, and Cassell, along with Frankl’s 
insights.  The view that emerges is that suffering itself is the experience of an unrelenting 
tension between hope and despair caused by the perception of a serious and unacceptable 
disruption in important personal matters.7  The disruption itself is an unacceptable gap 
between the way such matters are perceived to be at the moment as compared to how the 
sufferer believes they should be.  With that perception comes the threat of despair, as 
long as the sufferer perceives the gap between the "what is" and the "what should be" as 
unacceptable and potentially unbridgeable.  The matters in question are important and 
personal because they involve something that the sufferer holds dear, while the disruption 
is serious and unacceptable because the consequences of unfulfilled hope in overcoming 
the disruption are potentially devastating.  The sufferer's hope in regard to such matters 
derives from a desire and belief that the gap itself can and will be closed in a favorable 
manner.8   
                                                 
7Frankl, V., M.D., Ph.D. (1986). The Doctor and the Soul. New York, Vintage Books, p. 107. 
8 In claiming that desire and belief are necessary aspects of hope, I do not make a claim about the constitutive elements 
of motivational states.  I merely borrow from Robert Stalnaker, who claims that desire and belief are "correlative 
dispositional states of a potentially rational agent.  To desire that P is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to 
bring it about that P in a world in which one's beliefs, whatever they are, were true.  To believe that P is to be disposed 
to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with one's 
other beliefs) were true."  See Stalnaker, R. (1987), Inquiry. Cambridge, MIT Press, p. 15.   
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 The tension between such hope and despair is unrelenting because the possibility 
of being overwhelmed by despair, along with the possibility of having hope fulfilled, are 
both simultaneously ever-present and unyielding, and thus oppressive.  Combined with a 
fear of not being able to control the outcome, these factors give suffering its form, which 
Viktor Frankl described more concisely as a "state of tension between what actually is on 
the one hand and what ought to be on the other hand."9  
II.  Those who speak on behalf of sufferers. 
 A.  Sigmund Freud. 
 1.  Freud's theory of suffering. 
Freud's concept of suffering is related to his theory of desire and the role it plays in 
the human psyche.  Freud articulated the structure and function of the human 
psychological apparatus around the concepts of ego, superego and the id.10  In his view, 
the ego is the conscious sense of self that begins to evolve in infancy by virtue of an 
unavoidable confrontation with reality.  Through such experience, the infant learns to 
identify, classify, and control its own many sensations of pain and emotional discomfort.  
This process of differentiation provides for the development of an ego-feeling, or 
psychological sphere of sensation separate from all other experience.  Freud characterizes 
the ego as "something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything 
else."11  Ultimately, all experience that is not ego becomes object for the ego, which 
includes one's own body and other "ego-bodies", or individuals.    
                                                 
9Frankl (1986), p. 108. 
10Freud, Sigmund (1961),  "Civilization and Its Discontents." The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud. James Strachey and Anna Freud, eds. London, The Hogarth Press. XXI (1927-1931), p. 66ff. 
11Freud (1961), p. 66.  
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 At the same time, instincts also begin to exert their influence on the infant's 
behavior and thought processes.  Freud views two such instincts as pivotal in the ego's 
functioning.12  One is the preservation instinct, or Eros, which concerns itself with 
growth, development, reproduction, and socialization that compels the individual to join 
into ever-larger units.  The other is a contrary instinct that compels a kind of dissolution 
that returns the individual to a primeval, inorganic state, which Freud characterizes as the 
death instinct.  These two instincts are mutually opposing factors that provide the psychic 
energy, or psychic tension, that gives rise to human functioning. 
  In Freud's view, the dominating, instinctual function of the ego is to identify and 
pursue objects of pleasure, and to defend against that which produces pain and 
unpleasure.13  Although this process begins in infancy, it ordinarily evolves into a more 
sophisticated process that eventually involves the superego and the id as two additional 
agencies of such psychological functioning.  Both the superego and id are an unconscious 
part of the ego that shape and define the structure and quality of conscious experience.   
 The superego is a much more complicated aspect of the ego that develops during 
maturation as the internalization of external authority.14  The role of the superego is 
substantial.  As the internal voice of authority, its job is to demand retribution from the 
ego for wrongdoing, to impose feelings of guilt, and to constrain the satisfaction of 
desire.  The superego sustains the ego in a perpetual state of dependency on its decrees, 
                                                 
12Freud (1961), p. 118. 
13Freud (1961), p. 67.  At times, Freud uses the terms "pain" and "unpleasure" interchangeably to mean an unwanted 
experience that is the opposite of pleasure.  At other times, he uses "pain" in an ordinary physical sense as a useful 
warning device.  He also uses the term "unpleasure" to mean a state of affairs perceived as unwanted and to be avoided 
if possible.  To maintain a distinction between physical pain and psychological unpleasure, I use these terms in their 
distinctive rather than their interchangeable senses. 
14Freud (1961), p. 126-9. 
 50
irrespective of their rationality or severity, which continually affects the individual's 
emotional status and level of satisfaction.     
 As the other unconscious part the ego, the id is the source of desire that motivates 
behavior and structures thought processes.  In Freud's view, desire is innate, irrational, 
spontaneous, and largely uncontrollable as long as it remains on an unconscious level.15  
Because the id often has a deleterious effect on behavior, Freud developed 
psychoanalysis as a method of disclosing the id's hidden impulses to the conscious ego.  
The ultimate aim of such a process of reflection and self-inquiry is to reconcile the 
disclosed impulse with the requirements of the conscious ego.  In this way, "by 
uncovering the hidden impulse, examining it, resolving its uncertainties and finding ways 
of integrating it into consciousness," the individual releases psychic energy "which has 
been tied up with the unconscious impulse so that it can be put at the disposal of the 
ego."16  Even with psychoanalysis, however, the ego never completely controls or 
eliminates unconscious, instinctual desire.     
 In developing psychoanalysis as a rational method of exploiting hidden impulses, 
Freud relied on the premise that we are innately desiring beings who engage in a 
                                                 
15Freud uses the term "unconscious mind" as opposed to the more modern term "subconscious mind" to denote the 
unconscious functioning of the id.  Also, at times, Freud's meaning of "instinct" is not clear.  For the most part, he uses 
it in the sense of an innate, unlearned behavior or behavior pattern that manifests itself in a fundamentally uncontrolled 
way analogous to hunger.  On this view, while an individual might consciously exercise a level of control over a 
particular impulse, the impulse itself cannot be completely controlled or eliminated from one's motives.  Thus, 
irrespective of an individual's awareness, all impulses influence behavior and thought processes to one degree or 
another.  For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Freud's "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," The Standard 
Edition, Volume 14.  Many behavioral scientists now favor replacing the term "instinct" with the term "fixed-action 
pattern" to distinguish more clearly between the specific and rigid innate behavior of many animal species and the 
flexible behavior characteristic of humans.  For a classic exposition of this last point, see Tinbergen, N. (1969). The 
Study of Instinct. NY, Oxford University Press. 
16Frosh, Stephen (1997). For and Against Psychoanalysis. London and NY, Routledge, p. 90. 
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constant, life-long pursuit of pleasure as the dominant goal of life.17   He equates pleasure 
with happiness, and makes a finer point by characterizing its pursuit in two senses.18  In a 
broader sense, happiness is the absence of pain and unpleasure, while happiness in a 
narrow, genuine sense is a strong feeling of pleasure.  In focusing on desire and pleasure 
as the defining characteristics of human behavior, Freud opposes a long-standing 
philosophical tradition that places greater value on the human capacity to reason.   
 In any case, Freud held the view that pleasure derives from the sudden 
gratification of pent-up instinctual desire, which has been frustrated to a high degree or 
has gone unmet for long periods.  This sudden release of psychic tension yields a sense of 
satisfaction, the intensity of which varies according to the strength of the underlying 
desire.  In Freud's view, the standard by which to judge all pleasure is love expressed in 
sexual union, because it combines both physical and spiritual elements in a way that leads 
to the greatest degree of happiness.  The corollary, of course, is that a loss of love, or fear 
of such loss, has the opposite effect.19  Nevertheless, pleasure to any degree is possible 
only on an episodic basis, and thus more elusive than probable.  Consequently, we often 
settle for the absence of pain and unpleasure, or pleasure in reduced measure.   
 Freud calls this innate, double-sided pursuit of pleasure the "program of the 
pleasure principle", which also must meet the demands imposed by the "reality 
principle", that is, life in the real world.  These two principles define the level of 
happiness and the degree to which suffering can be avoided, which is a factor of realistic 
expectation and the level of independence that one develops.  Complete independence 
                                                 
17Freud (1961), p. 76. 
18Freud (1961), p. 76-7. 
19Freud (1961), pp. 82; 124-6. 
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from the world, however, is not possible.  We are not only part of that reality, because of 
our need to love and be loved, we are dependent on others, who are also part of the 
world.20   
 Our only option is to alter the world in a way that satisfies our desires and enables 
us to avoid suffering in the alternative.  Our success in that regard depends on our 
psychic energy and the use of effective defense mechanisms.  On the emotional side, 
when events indicate that our efforts will succeed in terms of achieving our goals, there 
arises a feeling of hope, while "events that suggest our efforts are futile foster despair."21  
On this view, hope and despair are not only opposite emotions, they are "intrinsically 
intertwined partners in the dance of desire, differing only in whether or not the object of 
desire is more or less likely to be reached."22  According to Freud, when our efforts fail 
and we lose the object of our desire, we experience suffering to one degree or another.23   
 Freud claims that suffering is "nothing else than sensation; it only exists in so far 
as we feel it, and we only feel it in consequence of certain ways in which our organism is 
regulated."24  On this view, suffering is a cognitive response that originates either with 
stimulation of a bodily sense organ, which is pain, or with the occurrence of a state of 
affairs perceived as unwanted, which is unpleasure.  In this sense, suffering may or may 
not have a neurological component, but always involves emotion, especially the feelings 
of hope and despair.   
                                                 
20Freud (1961), pp. 82; 101. 
21Nesse, Randolph M. (1999). “The Evolution of Hope and Despair.” Social Research 66(2), p. 429. 
22Nesse (1999), p. 431. 
23Freud (1961), p. 77. 
24Freud (1961), p. 78 
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 Freud identifies three principal causes of suffering:  pain and anxiety due to 
bodily decay or injury, the destructive forces of nature, and our relationships with others 
gone awry, especially the loss of love or fear of such loss.  The latter is social suffering 
and the worst sort because, according to Freud, it is gratuitous, though no less 
inevitable.25  Regardless of its cause, all suffering is an inevitable aspect of psychological 
functioning, which leads Freud to claim that prevention and alleviation depend on the 
specific cause of suffering.26   
 For example, we never overcome decay and weakness of the body, nor 
completely protect against the superior forces of nature.  As a result, there is little defense 
against the suffering caused by these factors.  On the other hand, Freud appeals to the 
psychology of the individual as the basis of three specific methods of prevention and 
relief: distraction, substitution, and intoxication.27  In no case, however, does Freud offer 
a cure for suffering, presumably because there is no cure for innate desire. 
 2.  Assessment of Freud's theory.    
 Although current research in cognitive psychology does not support Freud's thesis 
that innate desire is the overriding principle of autonomous human behavior, it clearly 
shows that desire is a central motive in such behavior.28  This lends support to Freud's 
argument that the satisfaction of desire is a matter of personal choice and learned 
                                                 
25Freud (1961), p. 86. 
26Freud (1961), p. 78. 
27Freud (1961), p. 75. 
28For example, see Dunning, David, et al. (1995), “A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories of 
Success a Product of Motivational Forces?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69: 58-68. 
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behavior.29  Experience shows that satisfaction depends on many factors, some more 
important than others.  Our health status, our relationships with others, and place in 
society ordinarily are matters more important than, for example, the color of a room.  
Regardless of the particular matter involved, however, Freud claims that the frustration of 
desire involving such matters gives rise to an experience of suffering, while the intensity 
and duration of that experience vary with the degree of importance and level of 
frustration.  
 In other words, suffering is a subjective determination that results from a 
perceived state of dissatisfaction.  Such an experience usually engenders hope for a 
favorable outcome in that regard, and a simultaneous fear that the gap in satisfaction will 
persist, or perhaps worsen, which engenders despair.30  Because this tension between 
hope and despair varies in intensity and duration, depending on the underlying desires, 
beliefs, and general disposition of the sufferer, its resolution is uncertain and not entirely 
within the sufferer's control.  As a result, this kind of mental angst is also oppressive.  
  In developing his theory, Freud distinguished between an experience of suffering 
and that of pain.  He described suffering as a cognitive experience that may have 
neurological aspects, and pain as a neurological experience that may have cognitive 
aspects.  Although pain can lead to suffering, Freud interpreted pain primarily as a 
warning sign that fosters survival and safety.  This distinction differs from a traditional 
biochemical model of patient care that treats both suffering and pain as facets of a single 
                                                 
29For a discussion of the role that desire has in relation to choice and behavior, see Edwards, Rem B. (1967), “Is 
Choice Determined by the Strongest Motive?” American Philosophical Quarterly 4(1): 1-7. 
30Sabini, John and Silver, Maury (1996), “On the Possible Non-Existence of Emotions: The Passions.” Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour 26(4), p. 395. 
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medical condition.  As a result, traditional medical remedies that focus on relief of 
suffering often fall short.31 
 Though Freud takes up the issue of suffering caused by pain and disease, his 
primary focus is on the suffering caused by "the irremediable antagonism between the 
demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization."32  In this sense, his professional 
aim is twofold.  One is to dissect the psychological trauma in individual suffering brought 
on by the sublimation of desire, while the other is to examine the loss of individual 
happiness imposed by civilization.33  He views the universal fear over the loss of love as 
the major contributing factor in such antagonism.34  He claims that this fear develops 
very early in childhood in response to the demands of external authority.  A child soon 
learns that a failure to comply with such demands not only jeopardizes the authority 
figure's love for her, a failure also threatens her safety and sense of security.  As the child 
matures, the superego assumes the authority figure's role and perpetuates the fear, as does 
the family unit and the community at large.  The end result is a diminished personal 
happiness. 
 By contrast, Viktor Frankl rejected this line of reasoning.  Although trained in 
classic psychoanalysis, Frankl did not accept Freud's view that the main purpose of 
human existence is the "mere gratification and satisfaction of drives and instincts."35  
Neither did he agree with Freud's claim that personal satisfaction stems from the 
                                                 
31Cassell, Eric J. (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. New York and Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 30. 
32Freud (1961), p. 65. 
33Frosh, Stephen (1997), p. 5. 
34Freud (1961), pp. 124-26. 
35Frankl, Viktor (1959). Man's Search for Meaning. New York, Simon and Schuster, p. 164. 
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"reconciliation of the conflicting claims of the id, ego and superego, or mere adaptation 
and adjustment to the society and environment."36  For Frankl, genuine happiness can be 
found only in "actualizing values and in fulfilling meaning" or purpose in life.  As a 
result, Frankl transformed Freud's comparison between “what is” and “what should be” 
into a comparison between "what one has already achieved and what one still ought to 
accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one should become."37  Although 
awareness of this gap creates a certain tension involving hope and possible despair, 
Frankl viewed that tension as an inherent aspect of human nature and an indispensable 
step toward mental well-being."38  In his view, suffering is a harbinger of mental health 
and thus a positive element in human existence.   
Fankl’s exception to Freud’s theory of suffering aside, there is a potentially 
troubling aspect of Freud’s theory as it may apply in the clinical setting to the question of 
physician-assisted suicide.  Freud claims that satisfying desire is learned behavior.  Given 
that imitation is a primary method of such learning, it follows that behavior motivated by 
desire is fundamentally imitative behavior.39  In this light, consider the influence that 
physicians have achieved in the area of healthcare and in the community at large.  
Membership in a healing profession with a long history of effectively relieving pain and 
curing disease alone fosters that kind of influence.  Such professional achievements have 
induced a general expectation and trust in physicians by society that exerts substantial 
influence on a particular patient's choice of medical care. The physician’s influence 
                                                 
36Frankl (1959), p. 164.  
37Frankl (1959), p. 166. 
38Frankl (1959), p. 166. 
39Lazar, Ariela (1999). “Deceiving Oneself or Self-Deceived? On the Formation of Beliefs 'Under the Influence'.” 
Mind 108(430), p. 282. 
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leaves its mark on the patient's choice, even when the physician has not been explicit in 
her professional opinion about such choices. 
More specifically, consider the physician's social stature and consequent 
influence in the context of physician-assisted suicide.  Several studies indicate that a 
person’s desire for suicide may be inspired by a role model who favors the practice, even 
though the role model has not committed suicide.40  Given the role-model status of 
physicians, these results suggest that, as support for physician-assisted suicide grows 
among physicians, and as public awareness of their support increases, doctors may 
unwittingly influence the patient who is considering physician-assisted suicide.  In some 
cases, physician-support of physician-assisted suicide may distort or perhaps unduly 
influence the patient's choice in that regard.  To the extent that the patient's choice stems  
from such influence rather than from a careful consideration of the evidence, that choice 
relies on emotion and desire as opposed to sound reasoning.  In such cases, the 
physician's agreement to assist also relies on emotion and desire.  To the extent that 
physician-assisted suicide functions on emotion and desire rather than rational analysis, 
all else being equal, that practice is incompatible with the goals of medicine, and makes 
for bad medicine and poor social policy.41 
On a more positive note, Freud's recommended chemical and meditative treatment 
methods that alter the perception of physical pain and mental angst may have practical 
value in the clinical setting.  As one commentator remarks, the immediate aim of either 
approach recommended by Freud is relief of suffering, while the long-term goal is the 
                                                 
40Livingston, Paisley (1992). Models of Desire. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. xvi. 
41Cassell (1991), p. 22.  
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development of a stronger sense of self and greater meaning to life.42  This suggests that 
the value of suffering is largely a subjective determination that depends on the patient's 
self-esteem, emotional disposition, and the transformational consequences posed for that 
individual.  Such insight can aid the caregiver who must guide and assist the patient who 
struggles to resolve her suffering. 
B.  David Bakan. 
1.  Bakan's theory of suffering. 
In his book, Disease, Pain, and Sacrifice: Toward a Psychology of Suffering, 
Bakan elaborates Freud's thesis that human suffering is an aspect of normal ego 
functioning with the claim that suffering itself is an affective response to the perception 
that one's biological or personal integrity is in doubt.  The substance of his account is that 
disease, pain, and psychological disorders are the major factors that give rise to such a 
doubt about functioning or continued existence.43  In his view, such doubt often leads to 
a state of mental anguish primarily in the form of anxiety and agony.  The intensity and 
duration of such emotional pain depend on the circumstances, while its relief comes 
about either by repairing the loss of integrity or by sacrificing the offending part, which 
paradoxically might include the entire organism.  Awareness of the latter possibility adds 
a degree of agony to physical or psychological disorders that often gives rise to a 
question about the meaning of life itself, which inevitably transforms the emotional pain 
of suffering into spiritual pain.   
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To explain, Bakan develops his theory of human suffering around the fundamental 
notion that every living organism exists and functions by virtue of certain biological, 
psychological and sociological processes and influences, which he designates with the term 
"telos".  In its widest sense, "telos" refers to any level of goal-directed organization, 
system, or activity, regardless of its ultimate form.44  Within an individual organism, for 
example, "telos" might refer to individual cells and their functioning, or to various bodily 
organs individually or collectively, or to the human psyche.  It also refers to categories of 
organisms, such as the social unit to which humans belong.  In all cases, however, it simply 
refers to that influence which determines form and function.     
 According to Bakan, the composition of biological entities consists in various levels 
of organization, or tele, arranged in a hierarchical order.45  In any healthy organism, for 
instance, a dominant telos coordinates and manages the function of all lower level tele 
according to their form and function.  To achieve that purpose, the dominant telos at a 
particular level of organization relies on a kind of communication with subordinate, lower 
level tele.  As long as this relationship among the various tele remains intact, the system 
functions properly and the organism enjoys a state of equilibrium. 
Bakan describes telic functioning in terms of an automatic, dynamic process that 
unfolds on an unconscious level, and is thus extraneous to a conscious mind and deliberate 
intervention.  This qualification includes the conscious telos, or ego, which functions 
according to unconscious influences in addition to its deliberate purposes, as Freud 
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explained in his analysis of desire.46  According to Bakan, telic functioning is a continual 
reciprocal process of substances coming together at various levels and intervals into ever-
larger organic unities, and then splitting apart again.  He denotes the fusion process with 
the term "telic centralization" and the fission process with the term "telic decentralization".  
Bakan argues that telic decentralization is essentially a loss of control by the dominant telos 
at a particular level of organization over lower tele within that system, which then function 
in a mechanical, uncontrolled manner that opposes the good of the whole.47  Nevertheless, 
in a sense, all lower level tele remain in a constant state of decentralization to the extent 
that they remain subordinate to the dominant telos.  Without a degree of constant instability 
within a particular biological organism, change would not be possible, nor could its 
systems function effectively as part of the total organism.48  In a positive sense, then, telic 
decentralization is simply a normal adaptive process by which an organism functions, 
survives, grows, develops, or reproduces.   
 From a biological standpoint, however, telic decentralization does not always yield 
positive results.  Because telic decentralization is a disruption in an organism's 
biochemistry, it can also manifest itself in a negative sense as disease and even death.49  
Cancer is an example of negative telic decentralization on a cellular level, while repression 
is an example of negative telic decentralization on a psychological level.50  When telic 
decentralization manifests itself as disease, the resulting stress on the organism constitutes 
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a basic threat to the biological and personal integrity of an organism.51  In other words, by 
its very nature, disease can raise a doubt about an organism's continued functioning or 
existence. 
 From a psychological standpoint, telic decentralization also manifests itself as pain, 
which is "among the most salient of human experiences [and] often precipitates questions 
about the meaning of life itself."52  Because pain is frequently a significant and 
unavoidable facet of survival, growth, development, reproduction, disease and death, it is 
ordinarily viewed as a physical phenomenon with collateral psychological aspects.  Bakan 
alters this ordinary view by arguing that, because pain has no other locus than a conscious 
ego, it is fundamentally a purely psychological phenomenon.53  With this alteration, he 
attempts to explain the demand for attention and interpretation that pain extracts from the 
ego, which is a subjective determination that becomes most urgent when pain is intense, 
intractable, and its cause obscure.54  
 Not only must the ego assess the meaning of pain, it also must complete the task 
that pain imposes, namely, "to work to bring the decentralized part back into the unity of 
the organism."55  A crucial step in that process is the psychological alienation of pain that 
transfers its locus "outside of me".56  With this strategy, the ego regards the injured "part" 
as alien to itself, which is a psychological precondition that enables the subsequent repair 
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or elimination of the injurious part, as appropriate, thereby reducing further injury.57  In 
other words, should the need arise, the damaged part that has been rendered "not me" can 
be sacrificed without further damage to the "me" that remains.58   
 Paradoxically, the "part" in need of sacrifice might be the entire organism.  As 
Bakan explains it, there is an innate set of biological factors or conditions that triggers a 
complete surrender to decentralization by the dominant telos.  When those conditions are 
met, change simply overwhelms the organism and it dies.  In this sense, death is a kind of 
biological self-sacrifice that Freud explains in terms of a death instinct, while Bakan 
views it as the natural culmination of telic functioning for the sake of the larger biological 
telos to which the organism belongs.  According to Bakan, death is an essential "genetic 
characteristic of each living organism" that serves the good of the species.59  Moreover, 
he suggests that the illusion of personal immortality is perhaps the ultimate psychological 
ground for a sacrifice of the entire organism.60     
 Ordinarily, a general awareness of one's own death as an inevitability causes no 
distress and is indeed crucial to survival and growth.  On the other hand, a subjective  
interpretation of pain or disease as an immediate concern about continued functioning or 
existence can lead to an intense state of anxiety and agony.61  Such emotional pain is the 
substance of human suffering as described by Bakan.  Nevertheless, there is an implied 
extension to his line of reasoning.  In claiming that a perceived threat to biological and 
personal integrity often yields a mental anguish that is worsened by a simultaneous and 
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related concern about the meaning of life, Bakan implies that the true character of human 
suffering is intense spiritual pain.62    
  The following account of suffering given by Daniel Day Williams affords a way to 
summarize Bakan's own analysis in that regard. 
 We recognize suffering wherever living things or persons are shaped by something 
which moves them from their present state.  Within this broad meaning of suffering, 
however, we have the experience of being acted upon in such a way that we know pain of 
body or mind.  We ordinarily mean by suffering an anguish which we experience, not only 
as a pressure to change, but as a threat to our composure, our integrity, and the fulfillment 
of our intentions.  All acute suffering has this character of threatening our self-direction, 
and therefore, implicitly, our being...In Heideggerian language, all acute suffering has the 
aspect of the threat of non-being.63 
 
2.  Assessment of Bakan's theory. 
Like Freud, Bakan grapples with suffering at its biological, psychological, and 
existential roots to discover and understand its causes as well as its value in human 
experience.  While Freud identifies the major causes of suffering as a loss of physical or 
psychological status, Bakan identifies its primary cause as a threat to self posed by pain 
and disease.  He also gives pain broader definition by adopting Freud's theme that human 
suffering is emotional and spiritual pain.  Although on this view suffering can have both 
physical and psychological components, it is principally psychic in origin, and thus an 
experience that Bakan reserves to a conscious ego.   
 A consequence of this limitation is that patients who lack consciousness, such as 
those in a coma or vegetative state, do not suffer, at least in an ordinary sense.  Although 
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such patients clearly have medical needs, their suffering might be described more 
fittingly with some other term.  In any case, "suffering" is the appropriate descriptive 
term insofar as it indicates that a condition resulting in unconsciousness is inconsistent 
with a satisfactory quality of life for the ordinary person.  Such conditions often elicit a 
compassionate response by the observer, who by the nature of that response "suffers" 
with and for the patient.  In such cases, depending on the degree of compassion, perhaps 
"suffering" is a term that aptly describes the observer's condition as well as the patient's.  
 Given Bakan's view that suffering stems from a threat to self posed by disease and 
pain, it follows that those who lose their sense of self also lose the necessary cognitive 
basis for suffering, even though they may not lose consciousness.  Some cases of 
Alzheimer's disease might provide an example.  In such cases, when these persons lose 
their sense of an historical self due to memory loss, there is no longer a basis for 
perceiving the sort of threat that would give rise to suffering.  At that point, it seems that 
"suffering" is a term that more accurately describes the patient's condition from an 
observer's standpoint, rather than the patient's perception and interpretation of pain or 
disease.  Nevertheless, the traditional clinical imperative should remain focused on curing 
or relieving the patient's medical condition.   
 In regard to treatment modalities, the clinical value of Bakan's analysis concerns 
the explanation that he provides about the combined healing power of the human psyche 
and body.  In his view, these aspects of human nature work in conjunction to combat the 
effects of disease and pain.  With this approach, Bakan offers a model of healing that 
differs from traditional models of patient care, which tend to be mechanistic and 
reductive in structure.  Due to their reliance on scientific data, traditional models also 
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tend to marginalize the subjective aspects of pain and disease in favor of the physical 
aspects that are readily available and easily measured.64   
 The limits of a traditional approach to patient care surface most often when 
caregivers must confront the subjective, experiential nature of illness in the form of 
suffering.  One such limit stems from the view that suffering is essentially a physical 
phenomenon and by-product of pain and disease.  By contrast, Bakan's analysis offers a 
more comprehensive view of suffering as a psychological mode of coping with the 
subjective interpretation of pain and disease, regardless of origin.  More specifically, he 
defines suffering as a means of coping with trauma related to the self, which highlights 
the psychological value of suffering.  With an additional emphasis on suffering as a 
necessary aspect of species survival, he also underscores its biological value. 
 Despite the advantage that Bakan's approach has over traditional models of 
patient care, he tends to generalize the value of suffering in a way that ignores the 
question about its value for particular persons.  His claim that suffering is a natural way 
to cope with the subjective interpretation of pain and disease, and that death itself has an 
overall beneficial effect for a particular species, is an abstraction with little consolation 
for dying patients in the real world.  Consider a young mother with terminal cancer, 
whose suffering stems not from her disease, but from the knowledge that her imminent 
death will devastate her small children and husband.  In light of Bakan's goal to 
understand suffering from an existential perspective, his focus on the general at the 
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expense of the individual leaves a serious, though perhaps unintentional, theoretical gap 
in his analysis.   
 Applying Bakan's analysis to the question of physician-assisted suicide reveals 
yet another theoretical gap.  Although he does not address the issue of assisted suicide, he 
evaluates the practice of suicide as a way to avoid unwanted suffering.  Bakan objects to 
that practice on the premise that death is an innate characteristic of human nature that 
suicide arrogates to the will.  Because suicide lacks psychological warrant, so too assisted 
suicide, which renders the physician's agreement unethical.    
 From a biological standpoint, however, it is not clear that Bakan's analysis 
prohibits such agreement.  Consider his claim that, although pain and disease can be the 
immediate motivating factors in suicide, another factor can be the basic intuition that a 
biological inevitability currently unfolding on a subconscious level will soon culminate in 
death.  Since patients who request assisted suicide may have a similar intuition, their 
requests might reflect no more than a resignation and voluntary surrender to the 
inevitable.  Without some other reason to prolong the dying process, assisted suicide then 
becomes a biological issue related to the fatal consequences of pain and disease, rather 
than a moral issue about hastening death.  The supporting argument then might be that 
the physician who complies with a patient's request for assisted suicide merely advances 
the natural process of dying, just as physicians often advance the natural process of 
giving birth. 
 As it now stands, Bakan's theoretical analysis of suffering does not provide a 
resolution of this conflict in application.  Such a void raises another question as to how a 
patient might respond to imminent death in a less drastic but effective manner, were the 
 67
clinician to offer assistance of a different kind.  The need to consider alternative 
approaches stems from the fact that imminence alone is not a sufficient reason to hasten 
death.  In that case, a physician's agreement to assist a patient's suicide requires another 
kind of justification, which Bakan does not provide. 
C.  Eric Cassell. 
1.  Cassell's theory of suffering. 
The dilemma that physician-assisted suicide poses for the physician is also 
beyond the scope of Cassell's analysis of human suffering.  He focuses on the patient's 
experience of suffering in a medical context, and explains the nature and meaning of that 
experience as rooted in our biology and inextricably linked to personhood.  With this 
approach, Cassell follows both Freud and Bakan in rejecting the idea that disease and 
pain are more real and more important than the person who suffers due to such 
conditions.  According to Cassell, the dependence of modern medicine on science and 
technology has led some physicians to make this sort of separation, which in his view is 
"one of the strange intellectual paradoxes of our times."65  To counter that error, he 
explains the cause of suffering as a threat to personhood, which renders the experience 
itself a matter of subjective determination that does not lend itself to quantitative 
measure.   
 To explain the relationship between personhood and suffering, Cassell defines  
"person" as a "self-knowing identity that endures through time and is characterized in 
addition by aims and purposes, one of which is the preservation of the self that demands a 
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knowledge of a surrounding world that includes others."66  Indeed, without others, there 
is no self.  Despite this emphasis, however, Cassell argues that "self" is not synonymous  
with either mind or personhood itself.  Rather, "self" is an aspect of "person" that 
involves a relationship with oneself, while different aspects involve relations with others 
and the surrounding world.  In any case, an individual must wish to sustain a sense of 
personal identity over time, for without such desire and hope, a "threat to personhood" is 
devoid of all meaning.67  
 In addition, Cassell holds the view that personhood evolves through a dynamic 
process in which both past experiences and plans for the future shape and define an 
individual's personality and character.68  The ordinary setting for such development is the 
family, which lives in a particular community with its own social and cultural 
environment.  Such an arrangement allows for a wide range of human experiences, 
including sex, love, happiness, and even suffering itself.  In this setting, a healthy person 
functions in a fairly routine, predictable manner through a variety of roles, such as father, 
mother, brother, friend, doctor, and teacher.  Lastly, to account for the human need to 
bond into groups and to pursue certain ideals and ideas larger than the person, Cassell 
notes the transcendent, spiritual dimension of personhood.     
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 Cassell concludes that all aspects of personhood are susceptible to damage or loss, 
and thus can be the locus of suffering.69  As a result, the specific causes of suffering vary 
and include "the death or suffering of loved ones, powerlessness, helplessness,  
hopelessness, torture, the loss of a life's work, deep betrayal, physical agony, isolation, 
homelessness, memory failure, and unremitting fear.  Each [kind of experience] is both 
universal and individual.  Each touches features common to us all, yet each contains 
features that must be defined in terms of a specific person at a specific time."70  In 
Cassell's view, suffering is a mental response to the perceived loss or threat of loss in the 
physical, emotional, social, familial, or private realms of life.  Sustaining such a loss 
brings about a radical and permanent disruption or unwanted changes in various realms 
of life.71    
 In describing the typical response to such changes, Cassell adopts a line of 
reasoning similar to Bakan's, and explains this response as suffering.  As he explains it, 
suffering is a state of severe mental distress caused "by the actual or perceived impending 
threat to the integrity or continued existence of the whole person."72  With this focus on 
personhood, Cassell does not restrict the causes of suffering to the biological organism, 
"for persons...cannot be whole in body alone."73  This expanded view allows Cassell to 
distinguish between suffering per se and physical pain.  He claims that "there can be pain 
(or other dire symptoms) without suffering and suffering without such symptoms."74 
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 Cassell adds to this description by explaining that suffering is a mental anguish 
involving a conflict between the emotions of hope and despair.  He notes that, "In 
suffering, what can be seen is the loss of central purpose, marked by an aimlessness of 
behavior or reversion to behaviors that are primarily responses to immediate needs...  
Purposefulness, necessarily cohesive, fades.  Suffering is the enemy of purpose, and the 
loss of central purpose is frequently seen in the suffering individual."75  Since "purpose"  
implies a future and a corresponding hope in that regard, loss of purpose and loss of hope 
are dual aspects of the same psychological experience of suffering.   
 In this respect, Cassell agrees with the reflections of MacIntyre, who suggests 
that, "Hope is in place precisely in the face of evil that tempts us to despair, and more 
especially that evil that belongs specifically to our own age and condition...The 
presupposition of hope is, therefore, belief in a reality that transcends what is available as 
evidence".76  Cassell blends MacIntyre's observations with his own by explaining 
suffering as a subjective response to a serious disruption or change in personal matters.  
In his view, "no one has ever questioned the suffering that attends the loss of hope."77  
Because this sort of disruption threatens to dissolve all hope regarding future plans, it 
inevitably raises the possibility of despair.  For Cassell, this conflict between hope and 
despair, caused by the perception of an unwanted, radically changed future self, gives rise 
to a mental anguish that is the essence of suffering.78  
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2.  Assessment of Cassell's theory. 
 Cassell continues Bakan's theme that suffering is a state of intense emotion 
involving a conflict between hope and despair, but adds a special emphasis on the role of 
personhood in that experience.  Cassell explains personhood along the lines of Bennett, 
who argues that personhood is "actively formed rather than passively received...Unlike 
objects, which apparently can exist passively, persons must achieve their being..."79  In 
Bennet's view, "there is more to being a person than simply being a living organism...[we 
humans] only become fully individuated persons in time, by means of social input and 
individual initiative--a process that is both relational and durational."80    
 Because developing personhood is a dynamic process that involves both 
controllable and uncontrollable variables, the outcome is uncertain.  Some uncontrollable 
variables include the surrounding circumstances and the role that others have in 
individual development.  The competitive interplay between hope and despair as an 
inextricable part of such development adds to this uncertainty.  Hope is a fundamental 
motivational force that drives human development, while a derailment in that process 
carries with it the possibility of despair.  According to Cassell, the nature of this 
derailment is a perceived threat to the intactness or integrity of the person, which means 
that the possibility of suffering always looms in the background of human existence.   
 Yet, there are cases where a perceived threat to one's person does not result in 
suffering.  For example, consider skydiving and car racing.  By their very nature, 
participating in these sports constitutes a threat to self, which appears to meet the 
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conditions of suffering outlined by Cassell.  The participants, however, more than likely 
would describe their experience as thrilling and not as suffering.  It seems that those who 
participate in such sports do not perceive the threat to self as a radical, unwanted change 
in living.  Instead, they either downplay the danger or actively court it, which enlivens the 
experience and enhances their sense of self.   
 Such consequences suggest that suffering is strictly a matter of subjective 
determination, which may have unwanted consequences in the clinical setting.  Given 
that suffering stems from perception, which has an element of self-control, the 
assumption in the clinical setting might be that patients can reduce or eliminate their own 
suffering to a certain extent merely by changing their perception.  Patients who do not 
take advantage of this option, despite the difficulty involved, may be held responsible for 
their own suffering by the caregiver, who may find it hard to resist the temptation to 
blame such patients.81    
 Blaming patients for their own condition is not exceptional among caregivers.  
The tendency to do so perhaps stems from a perceived connection between life style and 
ill health.  Consider the connection between life style and alcoholism or drug abuse, a 
sedentary life style and coronary artery disease, unprotected sex and AIDS, smoking and 
lung cancer, overeating and obesity, and so forth.  It is easy to understand how these 
perceived connections and others lure caregivers into blaming patients for their own 
illness.82  The primary motivation may be to lessen a sense of professional responsibility 
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and to ease feelings of frustration or perhaps guilt, should the care provided fall short of 
its intended relief.      
 Blaming patients for their own condition can lead to worse consequences.  
Consider this tendency in the context of legalized physician-assisted suicide.  One likely 
consequence of legalization is the acceptance of physician-assisted suicide as standard 
medical practice.  The assumption that, in some cases, hastening death by suicide is an 
effective way to relieve suffering will foster such acceptance.  Also fostering and  
reinforcing such acceptance will be the likely increase in patients' requests for assisted 
suicide following its legalization.  In light of the caregiver's tendency to blame patients 
for their own condition, there is another likely consequence.   
 The suffering patient, who desperately wants relief from her suffering, but refuses 
the physician's offer of assisted-suicide, might be blamed for her own suffering.  After 
all, by refusing an offer of standard medical care, albeit in the form of assisted suicide, 
“does not [the patient's] continued pain and suffering become her own decision and her 
own responsibility?”83  The resulting psychological pressure brought on by this offer by 
the physician can unduly influence the patient's acceptance, more so when continued 
living creates greater hardship for her family or significant others that an earlier death 
would prevent.  To the extent that such pressure coerces the patient's decision, her 
acceptance is less than voluntary, which renders both the offer and the assistance 
provided unethical.   
 For this reason alone, blaming the patient for her own illness, pain, or suffering is 
incompatible with the physician's professional goals of "promoting health, treating 
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disease, and relieving suffering"84  Blaming the patient also relies on a faulty assumption 
that risk-taking and bad health is strictly a matter of personal choice, rather than "the 
product of social and economic forces over which the [patient] may possess little 
knowledge, let alone control."85  A multitude of factors, such as genetics, the 
environment, culture, and natural disposition, shape and inform our choices in both 
conscious and unconscious ways.  To suggest that choices by definition are free from the 
influence of such factors is to misunderstand the human psychology of decision-making.  
Under these conditions, suffering is not an optional psychological state that the patient 
chooses.  Rather, suffering is a natural response to threats involving the self that serves to 
motivate a defense in that regard.  Suffering is a condition in need of resolution and not a 
reason to blame. 
   Although Cassell does not address the resolution or treatment of suffering in the 
clinical setting, his theory suggests that a theoretical understanding of emotion itself 
could provide the basis of an effective treatment plan aimed at relief of suffering.  In a 
fundamental sense, all emotions are evolutionary coping mechanisms that provide 
subjective information "instrumental in guiding behavior required for self-preservation 
and preservation of the species."86  Emotions are either positive or negative experiences, 
and always arise in connection with a disruption in goal-directed activity.87  One very 
useful emotion that arises in connection with trauma involving the self is fear, because it 
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fosters adaptation and survival.  Given Cassell's view that suffering involves fear about 
the self, the appropriate clinical response to suffering must address such fear by 
identifying those coping strategies proven effective in protecting the patient's sense of 
self.         
 To that end, some empirical findings show that counterfactual thinking is a 
common response to unfavorable or traumatic events involving the self that can be 
effective in yielding positive results.88  Such thinking involves a repeated mental review 
of the actual event, along with the visualization of alternative outcomes for comparative 
purposes.  One kind of visualization is an upward comparison, which reflects ways in 
which the actual event "could have been better."  The purpose is to prevent similar results 
in the future, which helps the sufferer feel more in charge and self-confident despite the 
negative event.  Another kind of visualization is a "downward comparison" that yields a 
different outcome that reflects ways in which the actual outcome "could have been 
worse."  The imagined results boost the sufferer's self-image and attitude about the actual 
outcome. 
 To illustrate the latter kind of comparison, a woman who has a breast removed 
due to cancer often compares herself with other women who have had both breasts 
removed for the same reason.  Such comparisons are a mild form of "downward 
comparison" that promotes acceptance of the situation.  Although some might view this 
strategy as a way to find satisfaction in the suffering of others who are worse off, such an 
interpretation misses the point.  The purpose of this comparison is not to delight in the 
misery of others, but to resolve unfavorable changes of the self by imagining how things 
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could have been worse.  The condition of those who are indeed worse off acts as the 
catalyst for a positive modification in her initial response to her own trauma.  The results 
of imagining worse case scenarios may serve to "bolster self-esteem, minimize emotional 
distress, and thus facilitate mental health and adjustment."89         
 Regardless of which comparison the sufferer makes, however, these same studies 
also show that effectively coping with trauma related to the self, such as serious illness or 
job loss, depends on self-image.  Those with high self-esteem tend to benefit from 
counterfactual thinking, while such thinking provides little relief for those with low self-
esteem.  Because those with high self-esteem tend to focus on their ability to bring about 
favorable outcomes, that approach serves to strengthen the ego and produce an overall 
positive attitude about the trauma.  On the other hand, those with low self-esteem tend to 
focus on the part they had in causing the event, which often leads to feelings of regret and  
self-blame, especially in situations involving shame.  This suggests that, because 
suffering is a complex phenomenon related to fears about the self, it requires 
individualized treatment that gives special attention to the patient's level of self-esteem.  
 An additional factor in resolving traumatic events involving the self concerns the 
sufferer's experience in such matters.  In true Freudian style, for example, psychologist 
Erik Erikson claims that managing such events is an essential and inescapable part of ego 
development.  In Erikson's view, ego development is a dynamic process that spans the 
entire life cycle, and follows an ordered sequence that roughly corresponds to specific 
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age periods.90  The physiological maturation and accompanying psychosocial demands of 
each period give rise to a 'crisis' of ego, or turning point in life.  The manner of resolving 
such a crisis at one stage shapes and determines the manner of resolution at future stages.  
A positive resolution at one stage strengthens the ego and increases the likelihood of a 
positive resolution at the next stage, and vice versa.  Hence, the key to an effective 
resolution of a current experience of suffering may require confronting and resolving 
buried issues of self-esteem. 
 Given the extent to which one's sense of self and suffering are inextricably 
related, the actual or potential kind of loss related to the self also may affect the quality of 
suffering.  Regarding those kinds, Peretz identifies four types of loss involving the self 
that can be either permanent or temporary losses.91  First is the loss of a loved one or 
significant other through physical separation, divorce, or death.  The second kind 
includes physical, social, financial, and role-related losses.  The third category concerns 
loss of external objects, such as money and personal property.  The final category 
includes developmental losses that are an aspect of maturation and aging.  Whether the 
suffering associated with each kind of these losses is of a different quality warrants 
further research.   
 In the interim, there is evidence to suggest that a common response to losses 
involving the self is grief.92  In such cases, a clinical strategy that aims at relief of 
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suffering ought to rely on the view that suffering is a kind of grief.  According to Freud, 
grief itself is a psychological process of separation through which the bereaved person 
gradually withdraws emotional attachment from the lost object or deceased loved one.93  
In a similar vein, Kubler-Ross explains the grief of terminally ill patients as a mode of 
expression in advance of the loss.94  In her view, such grief is an integrative process by 
virtue of which an individual psychologically adapts to an anticipated loss.  She describes 
one aspect of this adaptive process as “preparatory grief”, which unfolds in stages, 
beginning with denial, eventually progressing to anger, then on to bargaining, depression, 
and finally acceptance.   
   Other research adds to Kubler-Ross' theory of adaptation to loss and suffering.  
One such study uses a definition of suffering as "a highly emotional response to that 
which was endured, to the changed present, or to anticipating the altered future..." due to 
illness and injury, and identifies a common, five-step response to such threats involving 
the self.95  According to the results of this study, a feeling of having to endure the injury 
is characteristic of the first three stages, while a feeling of suffering due to the injury is 
characteristic of the last two stages.   
 At the onset of illness or injury, the injured person becomes keenly vigilant about 
that which has happened, observing the consequences, feeling overwhelmed, struggling 
to maintain emotional control, and readily accepting assistance from others to ward off 
the danger.  During the second stage, however, depending on the seriousness of the injury 
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or illness, such persons begin to lose their hold on reality and perceive the world as 
changed and hostile.  Their perception often motivates a desire to "anchor" onto a 
significant other, who can act as a buffer and provide a sense of protection.  At this stage, 
such persons often describe their experience as having to endure the trauma, rather than 
as an experience of suffering, which gives rise to a determination to survive.  Injured 
persons enter the third stage of adaptation as they develop goals beyond the level of 
endurance and mere survival.  Once the injured person grasps the implications of the 
physical changes and loss of function, such persons still experience the need to endure 
their trauma, but they begin to fear the isolation that injury can produce.  Such 
recognition can signal the beginning of acceptance, which can lead to a renewed desire 
for living and eventual restoration of the damaged self.  
  While this study shows that, during the first three stages of adaptation, injured 
persons often interpret their injury as an endurance test, it shows that, during the fourth 
phase, they begin to interpret their injury primarily as an experience of suffering, which 
they express as grief over the loss sustained.  This interpretation leads to a deeper 
appreciation of reality, which sets the stage for a resolution of guilt feelings that injured 
persons may experience in relation to the cause of their injury.  Such frank appraisal 
indicates that the personal aspect of healing has begun.  As a result, the primary focus 
during this fourth phase is on piecing reality together in a way that allows such patients to 
regain their integrity of self.   
 For some individuals, progressing to the fifth and final stage of adaptation does 
not occur until a certain amount of suffering has been endured.  According to the study 
above, once these individuals perceived that they had "suffered enough and were able to 
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accept their changed reality, they left suffering and gained new insights and appreciation 
for life as a reformulated self."96  Their subjective determination about the necessary 
length of their suffering marked the beginning of the final stage of adaptation, where the 
injured person learns to live with an altered view of self.  
 It would be a mistake to interpret such results as though progression from one 
stage to the next comes about simply with the passage of time, and that achieving 
acceptance and a renewed sense of self is a given or happens to everybody.  Adapting to 
loss and resolving the associated suffering depends on many factors, including the extent 
of the loss, an ability to provide self-comfort, and the role of others, especially the 
caregiver.97  The caregiver fosters adaptation primarily by cultivating the injured person's 
trust and confidence, which is an additional demand of providing comfort and skilled 
care.  Because suffering is a complex form of grief, especially in a case of terminal illness 
or injury, its resolution is not always possible. 
 Despite such uncertainty, suffering is a phenomenon that lends itself to 
strategizing and intervention in the clinical setting.98  One method of patient care that 
aims at helping patients and their families come to terms with grief is the Wright, 
Watson, and Bell model of Advanced Family Systems Nursing Practice.99  This model 
functions on the premise that, although certain aspects of grief can end, others remain, 
because a sustained loss becomes an ever-present part of the sufferer's life.  Given this 
premise, the goal for the patient and family is not to be rid of grief, but to develop a 
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relationship with that grief and the loss that spawned it.  Based on an interconnection 
between beliefs, stories, and illness, one of the ways in which the caregiver aids the 
patient in this way is by opening a communication context that frees the patient to 
identify, challenge and modify the beliefs that constrain and hinder adjustment to the 
consequences of loss.100  With this approach by the clinician, "[patients] who are 
suffering in loss...can be guided into finding a fitting place in their lives for a relationship 
with grief."101   
 In acknowledging a clinical need to facilitate candid communication between 
caregiver and patient, it is as though the Wright-Watson-Bell model of patient care 
accepted as its motivating principle Arthur Frank's claim that the suffering endured by 
patients in the clinical setting resists articulation.  With its focus on communication, this 
model seeks a level of understanding between patient and caregiver that addresses 
Frank's major concern.  Frank argues that an effective response to suffering demands an 
understanding that goes beyond the level of concept to that of lived reality.  In his view, 
achieving that kind of understanding enables the caregiver to avoid worsening the 
patient's suffering. 
 Reflecting a similar concern, another clinical approach to suffering operates on 
the premise that coping with grief and regaining integrity of self is an oscillating process, 
"whereby the grieving individual at times confronts, [and] at other times, avoids the 
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different tasks of grieving."102  In this sense, grieving is a necessary part of adaptation to 
loss, and does not have to be managed in a relentless manner "at the expense of attending 
to other tasks that are concomitant with loss."103  On this approach, the resolution of 
suffering becomes a mutual challenge for both patient and caregiver that in part depends 
on the meaning and value of suffering.  The theories discussed above suggest that, as a 
state of emotion involving hope and despair, suffering has a specific content and purpose, 
and thus always has meaning.  The patient's challenge, however, is to specify the 
meaning and value of her own suffering, while the caregiver's challenge is to assist the 
patient in achieving that goal.        
III.  The meaning and value of suffering. 
The results of recent studies in the area of human behavior suggest that finding 
meaning for a loss that challenges an individual’s sense of self is part of a dynamic 
process of coping and adjustment that involves not one but two significant issues.104  
One issue is the need to make sense of the loss, while the other issue is the need to find 
some benefit to the loss.  Although related, these issues are distinct and independent such 
that the resolution of one does not necessarily result in a resolution of the other.  One 
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experience satisfaction and relief by finding some benefit to their loss, most commonly a 
“growth in character, a gain in perspective, and a strengthening of relationships.”105  The 
results of other research suggest that, although some people may not find any such 
benefit, they can readily make sense of a loss when it is predictable, that is, “a logical 
consequence to some set of behaviors or factors,” as when a family member dies of old 
age.106  These results also indicate that making sense of a loss is more likely when it is 
consistent with the sufferer’s worldview or perspective on life, or when the individual’s 
religious or spiritual beliefs provide a reason for the loss that science and logic cannot 
explain.107  
The religious and spiritual aspect of suffering is also a chief concern for Engelhardt, 
who claims that secular bioethics is "imprisoned" in the world of human experience in 
healthcare, and is thus unable to address metaphysical questions about the ultimate 
meaning and value of suffering.108  He argues that secular bioethics cannot give any 
transcendent meaning to suffering because it lacks a metaphysical perspective.  Without 
that perspective, Engelhardt concludes, modern secular bioethics at best concerns itself 
only with the various options of confrontation and the mechanics of endurance.  Beyond 
the essential characteristics of those options and mechanics, secular bioethics has nothing 
normative to say about the meaning and treatment of suffering.  Because this deficiency 
leaves a silent void in the secular world, Engelhardt relies on a religious context to find 
the meaning and value of human suffering. 
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 In that same vein, the story of Job is a familiar example of how to understand 
gratuitous suffering and the struggle between innocence and power, virtue and 
injustice.109  According to the Biblical narrator, Satan complains to God that Job's  
morally upright behavior is nothing but a shallow expression of his wealthy 
extravagance.  Satan suggests that, should God strip Job of his possessions and children, 
inflict him with an incurable disease and untreatable sores, and torment him with 
isolation and abandonment, Job will curse God.   
 God indulges Satan's challenge and allows Satan to inflict Job with these and 
other losses that eventually plunge Job into bitter suffering.  Out of his innocence and 
virtue, Job protests to God that his suffering is undeserved, and furiously demands an 
accounting from God for such an injustice.  After Job repeatedly asserts this demand, 
God finally replies in a way that enables Job to understand that God cannot be held to our 
standards of justice.  For the modern reader, Job imparts the lesson that suffering is a 
mystery whose meaning cannot always be discerned. 
 For this reason, Pope John Paul II focuses on the mysterious nature of suffering in 
his encyclical, "On the Christian Meaning of Suffering," and claims that we can pierce 
some of that mystery by finding meaning and value in suffering.110  In John Paul’s view, 
when we symbolically unite our suffering to the suffering of Christ out of love, our self-
consecration makes each of us like Christ, by virtue of which we participate in his on-
going salvific mission.  In other words, human suffering has meaning and value because 
it can be redemptive.  In defending his thesis about the value of vicarious human 
                                                 
109Ozick, Cynthia (1998), The Book of Job. New York, Vintage Books, p. xv. 
110John Paul II (1984), "On the Christian Meaning of Suffering."  Vatican City. 
 85
suffering, John Paul defines suffering itself as the deprivation of a good in which we 
ought to share, regardless of whether we cause our own deprivation or are innocent in 
that regard.  For example, health is the good and disease the deprivation; companionship 
the good and loneliness the deprivation.  He mentions many other causes of suffering, 
including death, persecution, hostility, abandonment, remorse, nostalgia, mockery, scorn, 
unfaithfulness, ingratitude, natural disasters, epidemics, catastrophe, upheaval, war, 
famine, and so on.  Although we experience suffering as physical or spiritual pain, 
sometimes the experience itself makes the two indistinguishable.   
 John Paul concedes that, in view of God's creative power and fatherly love, 
suffering raises important questions about God's relationship to his children on earth.  
Although some theodicies explain human suffering as God’s just punishment for sins, 
John Paul argues that the Book of Job challenges such a notion by showing that God is 
the creator of all that is good and not the source of evil.  Thus, God is not the source of 
suffering.  While John Paul acknowledges that suffering connected with a fault often has 
meaning and value as punishment to convert and strengthen the transgressor, he also 
notes that much suffering is innocent.  For this reason, he claims that Jesus Christ, who 
overcame undeserved suffering through love in his divine mission of salvation, is the best 
model for understanding suffering alongside an omnipotent and loving God.  
 For John Paul, Christ gives meaning and value to suffering in two ways.  One is 
by giving us hope of eternal life through his own personal suffering, while the other is by 
initiating the eventual obliteration of all suffering, especially death.  In carrying out his 
mission, Jesus also shows us the fitting response to suffering through his love and 
compassion for the suffering of others.  By virtue of his own compassion, Jesus healed 
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the sick, consoled the afflicted, fed the hungry, cured the blind and deaf, and three times, 
restored the dead to life.  John Paul argues that, through such compassion, Christ raised 
human suffering to the level of redemption.   
 Consequently, through a loving union of our suffering with that of Christ by an 
act of our wills, we share in his redemptive mission.  Although John Paul acknowledges 
that Christ has already accomplished redemption, in the realm of love, redemption is 
constantly being accomplished.  On this view, Christ achieved redemption completely 
and to the limit, but did not bring it to a close.  According to John Paul, Christ 
paradoxically continually opens himself to every human suffering, which provides us 
opportunity to unite our sufferings with love to him and thus to his redemptive work. 
 Although he explains human suffering in terms of its redemptive value only, John 
Paul makes it clear that we should neither seek out suffering, nor be passive toward the 
suffering of others.  Rather, he claims that we must see the face of Christ in the sufferer, 
even in those whom we think deserve their suffering.  In his view, our commitment to 
Christ compels us to respond to suffering with love, which has no place for self-
righteousness in regard to the suffering of our neighbor.  We, the 20th century Samaritan, 
stop by the side of the road, not out of curiosity, but out of availability, sensitivity, and 
willingness to be effective in our help.  According to John Paul, the purpose of suffering 
in the world is to release love, to give birth to works of love, and to transform both the 
giver and the sufferer into a civilization of love.  Because of our mutual need for care and 
understanding, there is solidarity among those who suffer.  Because of Christ’s constant 
concern and love for each of us, there is also solidarity with him, who suffers with us 
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each time we suffer.  For this reason, John Paul claims that all suffering is holy and 
deserves reverence.   
 From this perspective, suffering calls forth the virtue of perseverance in whatever 
disturbs us, just as Christ bore his sufferings.  John Paul claims that the image of Christ 
as obediently accepting his own suffering, which led to his eventual triumph, is reason 
enough for those who wish to imitate Christ to believe that suffering will not get the 
better of us nor deprive us of our dignity.  He also claims that our immediate response to 
suffering is invariably one of protest, but our love both for Christ and for others compels 
us to discover anew the meaning to suffering, not on a human level, but on the level of 
Christ.  On that level, suffering in the world unceasingly calls for the response of love as 
the most effective antidote to hatred, violence, cruelty, contempt for others, and 
insensitivity.  In short, through his own life and love, Christ taught us both to do good 
with our own suffering and to do good to those who suffer.  In this double respect, 
according to John Paul, Christ completely reveals the meaning and value of suffering. 
 Those who reject John Paul’s theological approach to human suffering might 
suggest that his interpretation does not address the personal dimension of suffering.111  
By assigning a supernatural meaning to suffering, he implies that individuals suffer 
primarily for the benefit of others, regardless of whether they acknowledge that 
substitution.  Such a critique seems a bit extreme, however, and inconsistent with John 
Paul’s meaning.  Despite the limited appeal that his interpretation of human affliction 
might have, he merely claims that suffering can be understood in a Christian sense as 
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redemptive, provided those who intend to make reparation for others in this way 
voluntarily embrace their suffering.  On this view, “Obedient submission to suffering, 
rather than the suffering itself, is the redemptive act, in imitation of Christ’s acceptance 
of God’s will.”112  In claiming that voluntary obedience enables one to make amends for 
one’s own sins as well as the sins of others, John Paul underscores the individual’s search 
for God and meaning itself in the experience of suffering, and offers a way to understand 
that experience so as to discover both.113        
 To elaborate on John Paul's claim that some persons experience suffering as 
spiritual pain, one hospital chaplain observes that some patients describe their spiritual 
pain to him as a sense of shame, of having been found out, of having been exposed.  As 
this chaplain notes, such patients conclude, "through their own self-judgments, that there 
is something wrong with them at their core."114  Such an observation is consistent with a 
“standard philosophical analysis of shame as an emotion of reflected self-assessment.  
According to this analysis, the subject of shame thinks less of himself at the thought of 
how he is seen by others.”115  In other words, the person who feels shame views herself 
and the mistake as one and the same, whereas feeling guilty implies only that one has 
made a mistake.   
For example, Sartre claims that shame often accompanies the recognition that “I am 
as the Other sees me,” by virtue of which, “I am put in a position of passing judgment on 
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myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other.”116  For Sartre, 
becoming an object for another undermines one’s ability to freely engage in self-
definition, and results in a negative self-assessment based on an assumed character flaw 
that may or may not be the case. 
Bernard Williams develops the concept of shame with a slightly different emphasis 
than Sartre by claiming that “the root of shame lies in exposure…in being at a 
disadvantage [due to] a loss of power.”117  The nature of this exposure is a sense of 
having revealed to others an inconsistency between our inward, private self and the 
outward, public self.  For one to feel shame in such circumstances, however, the exposure 
must be unintentional.  Such an unintentional exposure is a failure to manage our private 
matters in a way that compromises our ability to maintain our public persona, the 
consequence of which is a loss of personal power and control that puts us in a socially 
untenable position.118  This interpretation of shame suggests that some patients, who 
have been stripped of their accustomed social standing by disease, pain, or illness, might 
perceive their revised medical status as a loss of control and an occasion for feeling 
shame.  To borrow from Sartre, perhaps these patients view their own medical status as 
an unintentional public “confession” of an inability to be the person they intend and want 
to be, which causes them to feel “ashamed of themselves.”119  This might account for the 
chaplain’s observation that some patients describe their spiritual pain as a feeling that 
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“there is something globally wrong with them, as opposed to their doing some specific 
thing wrong.”120       
 Perhaps the antidote for such spiritual pain is unconditional love, which 
acknowledges the sufferer's worthiness despite her perceived shamefulness.  Such a 
suggestion seems plausible in light of several studies that show “people who appear to be 
ashamed of themselves and to feel deficient are seeing themselves as worse off than 
others.”121  Still others suggest that the most effective antidote to shame is humility, 
which “preempts this sense of being compromised by deflating our pretensions and 
thereby rendering our [public persona] consistent with the criticism that we face.  Feeling 
humbled is thus an alternative to, and incompatible with, feeling humiliated or 
ashamed.”122  In short, perhaps the best defense against the perceived shame of disease, 
pain, or illness consists in accepting a revised sense of self, which may restore a sense of 
personal control and power. 
 Nevertheless, “shame itself is far more limited in its unique association with 
psychological distress” than feelings of guilt.123  For example, patients often interpret 
suffering due to their medical condition as religious pain, which usually means that the 
patient feels "guilty over the violation of the moral codes and values of his or her 
religious tradition."124  This description is consistent with both an ordinary and a clinical 
definition of guilt as “the dysphoric feeling associated with the recognition that one has 
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violated a personally relevant moral or social standard.”125  Whether the transgression is 
egregious or minor, recent or remote, the person who feels guilty often perceives her 
behavior as disappointing to God or some higher being.  In these circumstances, the 
emotion that most closely characterizes religious pain is fear, which arises in anticipation 
of the punishment to be meted out at the moment of reckoning.126  A feeling of guilt and 
the need to make restitution for moral wrongdoing may explain why some patients feel 
the need to suffer for a time before moving on to the resolution stage.  Perhaps the 
sensitive caregiver can help such patients find a quicker resolution of their guilt feelings, 
which should facilitate their recovery and ability to cope with their medical condition.   
 However that may be, Viktor Frankl argues that each of us must determine the 
meaning and value of our own suffering.  In his view, not all suffering is pathological, 
and at a fundamental level, it may be a sign of mental health.  He claims that "suffering 
may well be a human achievement, especially if the suffering grows out of existential 
frustration."127  On this view, a person's "concern, even his despair, over the 
worthwhileness of life is a spiritual distress but by no means a mental disease."128   
 According to Frankl, we resolve spiritual distress by finding meaning and value to 
life, which in turn, gives meaning and value to suffering, but not the reverse.  Life does 
not have meaning and value because we assign meaning and value to suffering.  
Nevertheless, “we may well find meaning through suffering, and its even possible that we 
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would not have found it otherwise.”129  Unlike some existentialist philosophers, 
however, such as Sartre, who claim that the challenge of life is to endure its 
meaninglessness and absurdity, Frankl claims that the main challenge of life is "to bear 
[one's] incapacity to grasp its unconditional meaningfulness in rational terms."130  Thus, 
we can understand the meaning of our own suffering only to the extent that we 
understand the meaning of our lives.  Frankl concludes that, for better or for worse and at 
any moment, we must decide the meaning of our lives.131           
IV.  Conclusion. 
 As the above analysis shows, suffering is a psychological rather than a physical 
phenomenon.  Although suffering may be the effect of physical pain, suffering and pain 
are distinct experiences.  Suffering itself is a state of emotion that consists in an 
unrelenting and oppressive tension between hope and despair.  There are many specific 
reasons in the clinical situation why persons suffer, including pain, loss of function, 
disability, chronic illness, failure to find symptomatic relief, the complexity of a 
particular treatment modality, an unfavorable prognosis, the financial cost of treatment, 
and the effects of disease, to name a few.  In this sense, suffering is an experience of grief 
over an actual or anticipated loss of self, while the feeling of personal disintegration 
varies with the magnitude of the loss and the disposition of the sufferer.  The ultimate 
cause of all suffering, however, is the distress that arises in connection with a disruption 
in the way important personal matters are perceived to be the moment as compared to 
how it is perceived that such matters ought to be.  From this individual perspective, 
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Frankl claims that a crucial step in resolving such a disruption is the meaning and value 
that each must give to her own experience of suffering.   
 From the caregiver's perspective, on the other hand, Cassell claims that there are 
two primary ways to relieve suffering in the clinical setting.  One is to guide the patient to 
assign meaning to the patient's medical condition, which often resolves the suffering  
associated with that condition.  The other is to assist the patient in developing a sense of 
transcendence, which is most effective in restoring a sense of wholeness after injury to an  
individual's personhood.  To that end, he offers three specific goals of patient care that 
aim at reducing or minimizing the patient's suffering.132  The first goal is to define all 
diagnostic or therapeutic plans in terms of the sick person, rather than in terms of a 
disease.  The second goal is to maximize the patient's function and not necessarily the 
patient's length of life.  The third goal is to minimize the family's suffering as well as the 
patient's suffering, although Cassell offers no discussion of how to resolve a conflict 
between these two goals.   
 The fundamental notion behind Cassell's approach is that physicians and other 
caregivers must focus on fostering the best interests of the sick person rather than on 
merely treating a disease.  Sick persons usually know better than others what their best 
interests are, what aspects of function matter most to them, and when they are suffering.  
Cassell's approach acknowledges the clinical need to include such knowledge as a vital 
element in treating the patient's suffering.  Doing so requires working more closely with 
patients and their families than is customary in traditional medical practice.  Cassell's 
holistic approach is an alternative that seeks to minimize such a limitation. 
                                                 
132Cassell (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, p. 241. 
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 In light of Frankl's claim that patients must decide the meaning to their own 
suffering in terms of the meaning to their lives, a holistic approach to patient care raises a 
question about the appropriateness of physician-assisted suicide as a form of medical 
care.  Chapter 3 discusses that issue from the physician’s perspective, while Chapter 4 






































Physician-assisted Suicide and  
Proportionate Medical Care 
 
 
In our time...it is the physician who exercises the cure of souls. 
        Soren Kierkegaard 
        Judge for Yourselves  
I.  Introduction. 
According to the discussion developed in Chapter 2, suffering itself is a state of 
emotion involving an unrelenting tension between hope for "what should be" and 
possible despair over "what is", while its relief comes from an elimination or reduction in 
that tension.  It follows that there are two avenues of relief.  On the one hand, relief 
corresponds to the realization of a desired outcome that represents fulfillment of the 
sufferer's hope.  On the other hand, relief also corresponds to a change in the tension 
between hope and despair that reflects the sufferer's acceptance of the situation.  In 
acceptance, the gap between the "what is" and the "what should be" closes because the 
sufferer relinquishes or modifies the desire and belief about a certain kind of outcome.  In 
place of the originally desired outcome, she accepts an alternative view such that a gap in 
her expectations no longer exists.  In either case, however, because the sufferer no longer 
perceives a gap between the "what is" and the "what should be", she experiences relief.1 
 Acceptance is not to be confused with giving in to despair, which does not bring 
relief.  In despairing, the sufferer merely gives up the belief that "what should be" is 
attainable without giving up the desire for that outcome.2  Confusing acceptance with 
despair is due primarily to the manner in which acceptance can have either positive or 
                                                 
1Frankl, V., M.D., Ph.D. (1986). The Doctor and the Soul. New York, Vintage Books, p. 108. 
2Frankl (1986), pp. 108, 112. 
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negative results for the sufferer.  Positive results occur when acceptance derives from 
courage and self-determination, which can lead to wisdom and peace.  Negative results 
occur when tolerating a particular situation or outcome derives from indolent or cringing 
resignation, which can lead to resentment and bitterness.  Such an attitude is often 
perceived and described in terms of despair, when a more accurate description would be 
as a different form of acceptance.  In any case, relief of suffering follows either from 
having hope fulfilled or from acceptance, but never follows despair. 
 Regardless of how one finds relief, suffering itself remains an inescapable part of 
the human condition, and in some cases, is nothing less than unmitigated misery.  
Compassion for those who must endure such misery often motivates efforts to help them 
find relief.  Such a response by the observer at times can become a natural duty based on 
the dignity of human beings:  "We have only to imagine ourselves the victims of severe 
cold, hunger, or thirst to believe suffering of that kind should be eradicated."3  The 
medical profession itself long ago expressed this kind of compassionate regard for others 
in adopting the relief of patient suffering related to disease and illness as one of its 
professional goals.4  Given that ideal, compassion and a benevolent regard for others 
often motivate the individual physician to accept the healer's role and accompanying duty 
to relieve medically relevant suffering within limits.5   
 When cure is attainable in the ordinary course of medical practice, the strain on 
the healer's ability and duty to relieve suffering is manageable.  When cure or restoration 
                                                 
3James, S. (1982). “The Duty to Relieve Suffering.” Ethics 93: 4021.  
4Cassell, E. J. (1991). The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. New York and Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 31. 
5Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1983).  "The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical Medicine." The Clinical 
Encounter: The Moral Fabric of the Physician-Patient Relationship. E. A. Shelp. Boston and Dordrecht, D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, p. 163. 
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to an acceptable level of functioning is no longer possible, however, the patient and 
physician must confront a permanently altered or shortened life for the patient with 
methods of relief that aim at "amelioration, adaptation, or coping."6  In such cases, relief 
becomes a difficult challenge for both patient and physician that can intensify as the 
outcome for the patient becomes more undesirable and the associated suffering more 
unbearable.7  When all efforts fail to achieve the intended goal, despite the physician's 
technical skill, both patient and healer approach the limits of medicine to relieve human 
suffering caused by illness and disease.  Although this failure can happen any time during 
the care process, it is especially tragic at the end of life on those occasions when the 
patient suffers unbearably. 
 In such cases, poor health and impending death frequently cause some terminally 
ill patients to look beyond the confines of traditional medicine in search of alternative 
methods of relief.  In their search, some patients come to believe that hastening their own 
death by suicide is the most effective way to relieve suffering.  To fulfill their hope in this 
way, they ask their physicians for assistance in ending their lives.  In light of the 
physician's professional duty to relieve medically relevant suffering, the question arises 
as to whether that duty includes causing the patient's death, either directly, as in the case 
of active euthanasia, or indirectly, as in the case of physician-assisted suicide.  Could 
physician-assisted suicide be a "good of last resort"?  
 If the duty to relieve suffering does not extend as far as causing or hastening 
death, what alternative methods of relief are available?  Which ones, if any, should the 
                                                 
6Zaner, R. (1990). “Medicine and Dialogue.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (3), p.311. 
7Thomasma, D. C. and Graber, G. C. (1990). Euthanasia: Toward an Ethical Social Policy. New York, The Continuum 
Publishing Company, p. 193. 
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physician offer to the terminally ill patient who has requested assisted suicide, and in 
what circumstances?  Would such an offer represent an acceptable or an offensive kind of 
paternalism?  If the duty to relieve suffering includes causing the patient's death, then, 
from within the traditional medical model where the ethical focus is on patient welfare, 
on what grounds would a physician refuse a patient's voluntary request for assisted 
suicide? 
 The difficulty in answering such questions highlights the moral complexity 
surrounding the issue of causing a patient's death, either directly or indirectly.  To some, 
a physician's refusal to provide such assistance, particularly in the case of physician-
assisted suicide, might seem ethically indefensible, inasmuch as relief of medically 
relevant suffering is a traditional goal of medicine and death is presumed to end all 
suffering.  Such difficulty intensifies when the goal of relieving suffering conflicts with 
the goal of relieving pain and extending life.  In such cases, since acting in the patient's 
best interest includes honoring her right to self-determination, it might appear that the 
physician has the option, if not a duty, to comply with a patient's request for assisted 
suicide.  Proponents of causing the patient's death often employ this line of reasoning in 
two different but connected arguments to support their position.  One is the argument 
from autonomy, and the other is the argument from mercy.8   
 According to the argument from autonomy, the right to self-determination extends 
to the process of dying as well.  On this view, "if a terminally ill person seeks assistance 
in suicide from a physician, the physician ought…to provide it," on condition that the 
                                                 
8Battin, Margaret P. (2000), “On the Structure of the Euthanasia Debate: Observations Provoked by a Near-Perfect 
For-and-Against Book.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 25(2): 415-430.  
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request is voluntary and rational.9  Similarly, according to the argument from mercy, "No 
person should have to endure pointless terminal suffering.  If the physician is unable to 
relieve the patient's suffering in other ways acceptable to the patient and the only way to 
avoid such suffering is by death, then death may be brought about."10  Based on such 
reasoning, proponents of physician-assisted suicide claim that a fundamental respect for 
patient autonomy and the demands of beneficence justify the physician's participation in 
assisting a patient's intentional death. 
 On an alternative view, however, neither respect for patient autonomy nor 
beneficence justifies assisting a patient's suicide.  The alternative view is that physician-
assisted suicide is a disproportionate and unethical medical response to a patient's 
suffering, and as such, must be rejected by the physician.  As the following analysis 
shows, this conclusion relies on a classical and a modern interpretation of proportionality.  
Both interpretations originated in the context of double effect reasoning as a way to 
resolve certain kinds of moral conflicts.  Thomas Aquinas provides the basis for a 
classical interpretation of proportionate reason, while the works of Jean Pierre Gury and 
Peter Knauer take on that role in regard to a modern interpretation. 
 Although proportionate reason is a common element in both a classical and a 
modern account, it has a very different meaning in each.  According to the classical view 
as originated by Aquinas, proportionality expresses a relationship between an act and its 
end, or the reason for acting.11  On this view, however, the end does not justify the 
                                                 
9Battin (2000), p. 417. 
10Battin (2000), p. 417. 
11Johnstone, B. V., C.SS.R. (1985), “The Meaning of Proportionate Reason in Contemporary Moral Theology.” 
Thomist 49(2), p. 228.  Aside from the controversy over the meaning of proportionate reason, the principle of double 
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means.  For Aquinas, the moral status of any act is a measure of how well it promotes our 
ultimate destiny, which he defines in spiritual terms.  In his view, those acts that promote 
our spiritual destiny are obligatory, while those that are neutral with respect to that 
destiny are permissible, and those that oppose our spiritual destiny and welfare are 
morally impermissible.  Ultimately, Aquinas argues that acts are "proportioned to the 
end" in this spiritual sense to the extent that they conform to the requirements of charity, 
which is the overarching principle of all human affairs.12     
 By contrast, both Gury and Knauer define proportionality in terms of a net gain in 
values over disvalues, or evil, in the outcome.13  On a modern view, proportionality 
means that the good effect must be "important enough to justify the bad upshot."14  
Hence, in some cases, the end can justify the means.  With a focus on "outcome" as the 
basic unit for moral evaluation, modern interpretations of proportionality have evolved 
into a distinct moral theory known as proportionalism, which is fundamentally 
incompatible with the meaning that Aquinas developed for that term.15  Such 
incompatibility stems in part from the fact that modern proportionalism does not 
recognize exceptionless norms, whereas classical proportionalism does recognize such 
norms.  
 Despite this general contrast, the following analysis shows that physician-assisted 
suicide is a disproportionate medical response to patient suffering on either a classical or 
                                                                                                                                                 
effect itself is not without controversy.  For example, see Graber, Glenn C. (1979). “Some Questions About Double 
Effect.” Ethics in Science and Medicine 6: 65-84; cf. Boyle, J. M., Jr. (1991), “Who is Entitled to Double Effect.” The 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16. 
12Johnstone (1985), p. 230. 
13Johnstone (1985), p. 228. 
14Quinn, Warren S. (1989), “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect.” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 18(4), p. 334. 
15Finnis, John (1998), Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 139. 
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modern interpretation of proportionality.  Based on a classical view, the physician's 
agreement to assist a patient's suicide is morally impermissible for three reasons.  First, 
not only does such assistance contribute to the killing of an innocent person--a moral 
wrong in itself--it also violates the healer's duty to care for human life with medically 
appropriate care relevant to the patient's quality of life and medical condition.  Second, 
the physician's participation establishes physician-assisted suicide as a medically 
acceptable social practice, which, due to its inherent and unavoidable potential for abuse, 
perpetuates harm to the common good.  Third, despite the autonomous nature of a 
patient's request for assisted suicide, the physician's agreement relies on her own 
subjective evaluation of that patient's quality of life as warrant for her professional 
decision to provide that assistance, which exceeds the physician's expertise and abandons 
the virtuous practice of medicine. 
 Based on a modern interpretation of proportionality consistent with Gury's 
account, physician-assisted suicide is morally impermissible because a predominance of 
good in the immediate outcome is unknown and incalculable.  The net effect of death in 
relation to patient suffering is unknown, because no one, including the physician, knows 
what happens after death, except possibly the patient, after death.  From the physician's 
perspective, this lack of knowledge rules out the possibility of calculating the immediate 
net effect of physician-assisted suicide, which eliminates the clinical basis of physician-
assisted suicide as an alleged way to relieve suffering.   
 Lastly, based on Knauer's account, physician-assisted suicide fails as a 
proportionate medical response for two reasons.  First, the long-term consequences of 
causing an intentional death are self-defeating in terms of a right to self-determination.  
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Physician-assisted suicide carries an inherent and unavoidable potential for abuse with 
respect to vulnerable members of society, especially during terminal illness, which often 
intensifies vulnerability in the extreme.  Given a general vulnerability of all members of 
society, physician-assisted suicide in the long and on the whole serves to undermine 
rather than ensure a right to self-determination.  Second, there is a less onerous method of 
relief available, namely, acceptance.  Although difficult to achieve for some patients, 
acceptance is more likely to occur when the physician's efforts in that regard center on 
treating the whole person with holistic medical care.  
 To defend this line of reasoning, the following analysis relies on the premise that 
double effect reasoning is a long-standing tradition in clinical practice that has particular 
relevance to the care of terminally ill patients.  Care at the end of life often raises issues 
concerning relief of suffering, unavoidable harm, and conflicts between the principles of 
beneficence and respect for patient autonomy.  Resolving such conflicts often calls for 
double effect reasoning, which easily lends itself to the question at hand about physician-
assisted suicide.  In making that application, the following analysis adopts the physician's 
perspective rather than the patient's, and develops in two stages.   
 The first stage is to explore proportionality in the context of medically appropriate 
care as advanced by Pellegrino and Thomasma, the results of which indicate a need to 
elaborate on their reasoning in that regard.  To that end, the second stage is to explain 
proportionality in a classical sense as posited by Aquinas, and in a modern sense as 
posited by Gury and Knauer.  During the process, the explanation shows that physician-
assisted suicide, as a medical procedure, fails to meet the requirements of either 
interpretation of proportionality.  As a by-product of this analysis, the arguments from 
 103
autonomy and from mercy fail to justify physician-assisted suicide, because neither 
considers the way in which beneficence and respect for patient autonomy must work in 
conjunction to promote the patient's best interests. 
II.  The first stage:  proportionate medical care. 
A.  Beneficence, autonomy, and a rational treatment plan. 
 From the physician's perspective, the ethics of assisted suicide as an alleged form 
of medical care that relieves suffering depends on whether physician-assisted suicide is 
appropriate medical care.  To qualify as such care, physician-assisted suicide first must 
meet certain scientific and clinical standards, just as other forms of medical care deemed 
appropriate comply with certain standards.  This technical determination occurs both 
formally and informally through a dynamic, complex process that employs a number of 
criteria derived from several sources.  Included among these sources, for example, are the 
sciences, published practice guidelines, institutional and legal standards, and an ever-
evolving professional consensus embedded in the medical tradition itself.   
 As a supplement to these sources, research and clinical case studies provide 
additional data on an on-going basis that serve to justify particular procedures and 
therapeutic modalities.  Other less direct sources include professional journals, topical 
seminars, peer review and utilization review reports, outcomes measurement studies, 
collegial communication, case consultations, professional reports, and the like.  Through 
education, training, and professional experience, physicians internalize clinical practice 
standards and criteria derived from such sources, and develop methods of applying these 
objective factors to particular patients in the form of medically appropriate care.   
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 Thomasma refers to these objective, technical factors as "medical indicators", 
which he defines as the scientific facts, statistical data, standards of medical care, and 
collegial consensus relevant to the patient's underlying condition that the physician 
combines and weighs along with the patient's preferences to form a sound clinical 
judgment.16  According to Thomasma, medical indicators evolve through a dynamic 
scientific and clinical process as a necessary component of the ethical justification for the 
practice of medicine.  As a component of the medical tradition itself, the results of this 
process are often formally tested in the legal community and other public forums and 
serve to adjudicate questions of medical malpractice.  In his view, relying on medical 
indicators enables the physician to recommend and provide appropriate medical care.   
 As a result, the physician may not arbitrarily set aside either the justificatory 
process itself or generally accepted determinations of appropriate medical care in favor of 
an idiosyncratic approach to particular patients.  Even when searching for remedies of 
last-resort, as might happen in a case of unbearable suffering at the end of life, the 
physician still must recommend care that has the support of scientific and clinical data.  
Experimental medicine is no exception in this regard.  Although the benefits of 
experimental medicine may be hypothetical and risks to the human research subject 
minimal, ethical procedures and guidelines limit an investigator's curiosity to ensure 
safety and professional accountability.  Thus, patient care that lacks clinical and scientific 
support also lacks ethical justification and amounts to no more than a-shot-in-the-dark 
medicine.  
                                                 
16Thomasma, David C. (1986), “Philosophical Reflections on a Rational Treatment Plan.” The Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 11: 157-165.  
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 On the other hand, a plan of treatment that combines medical facts and patient 
preference is medicine-as-art circumscribed by medicine-as-science.  When combined in 
a mutual fashion by patient and physician, these factors form the basic structure of what 
Thomasma refers to as a rational treatment plan.  In other words, a rational treatment plan 
combines the relevant medical science with the patient's preferences to specify the 
proportionate means by which to promote the patient's welfare in an ethically and 
professionally sound manner.17  Proportionate care in this sense reflects two 
fundamentally different but interrelated perspectives.18   
 From the physician's perspective, proportionate care is a function of the 
physician's clinical judgment about the patient's quality of life in physiological terms.  As 
determined from the patient's perspective, on the other hand, proportionate care is a 
function of the patient's personal judgment about her own quality of life in terms of its 
overall value to her, including her current physiological condition as one factor.  In other 
words, a rational treatment plan depends on the physician's clinical judgment about the 
physiological benefits of intervention, in light of the patient's personal preferences about 
continued living in her present condition.19  In this light, "good for the patient" means 
that appropriate medical care is delivered in a proportionate manner that accords with the 
patient's preferences and consent.20  Thomasma summarizes his view of a rational 
treatment plan in the following way:  
                                                 
17Thomasma (1986), p. 157.   
18Cassell, Eric (1976), “Healing.” Hospital Physician 12: 28-29.  
19Thomasma (1986), p. 162. 
20Consider the emotional and legal turmoil that frequently arises in situations where physicians provide medical care 
that has no physiological benefit for the patient.  For a discussion of futile care, see Rubin, S. B. (1998). When Doctors 
Say No. Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press.   
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A rational treatment plan combines scientific standards, collegial consensus, 
preferential indications by the patient or guardian, and the burdens/benefits calculus, 
including a judgment of the proportion between the proposed intervention and the current 
condition of the patient...through which a consensus [between patient and physician] is 
reached about interventions to affect the course of a disease process.21 
  
Thomasma admits that proportionality is a key but “tricky" term that involves a 
“benefits versus burdens” calculus in terms of the patient's values.22  For Pellegrino, the 
fundamental value at stake in any clinical encounter is the personhood of the patient.  In 
this light, medically appropriate care is morally defensible medicine when it reflects more 
than a mutual agreement between patient and physician about what will be good for the 
patient.  Morally defensible medicine is both technically right and morally good.23  
 Technically right medicine conforms to the best available scientific and clinical 
information, as applied to a particular patient with specific facets and characteristics, such 
as gender, age, race, occupation, and who lives in a concrete socioeconomic and cultural 
situation and has certain personal aspirations.  Morally good care, on the other hand, is 
technically right medicine that aims at healing the patient as multi-faceted person.  For 
Pellegrino, healing in this sense is a process by which the patient as person becomes 
whole again in the fullest possible physiological and psychological sense.24  What the 
sick person seeks from the physician in this regard is "restoration to his or her definition 
of wholeness.  If full restoration is not possible, then amelioration of suffering, 
adaptation, or coping with chronic or fatal illness" become the goals of the physician as 
                                                 
21Thomasma (1986), p. 162. 
22Thomasma (1986), p. 160. 
23Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1983), p. 158. 
24Pellegrino, E. D., M.D. (1987), “Toward a Reconstruction of Medical Morality.” The Journal of Medical Humanities 
and Bioethics 8(1), pp. 7-18. 
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healer.25  The physician's obligation with respect to achieving these goals must begin 
with an agreement to offer technically correct medicine.  Such medicine aims at healing 
in a manner consistent with how "the patient wishes to spend her life...even when the 
patient's choice flies in the face of what the physician or even a rational bystander might 
dictate.  The patient is the one who must balance his vision of the good life with the 
realities illness forces upon him."26  In Pellegrino's view, evaluating the worth of 
continued living belongs strictly to the patient.   
 In defining the goals of morally defensible medicine in terms of healing the whole 
person, Pellegrino gives moral prominence to personhood in the context of personal 
suffering.  Although he offers no specific view of personhood beyond suffering-patient, 
the sketch that he offers coincides with the views of Eric Cassell, who states: "Doctors do 
not deal with suffering in the abstract--they treat persons who are afflicted by something 
that leads to the suffering."27  Cassell describes personhood in terms of characteristics, 
such as personality, character, memory, relationships, culture, and so forth.28  For him, 
personhood is not a static goal attained once and for all, but a dynamic, creative process 
of transformation that continually unfolds in and through the experience of daily living.  
Although such a process clearly involves factors not entirely within the range of 
individual control, there is a substantial element of personal responsibility in the sense 
that "people not only become persons; they make themselves into persons."29   
                                                 
25Pellegrino (1983), p. 163. 
26Pellegrino (1983), p. 165. 
27Cassell (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, p. ix. 
28Cassell (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, pp. 37-43. 
29Bakan, D. (1996), “Origination, Self-Determination, and Psychology.” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 36(1): 9-
20. 
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 This process of transformation, however, is never quite complete nor is it certain, 
since it depends on heredity, environment, and chance, as well as the will, imagination, 
and personal competence of the individual to confront and overcome the vicissitudes and 
challenges of living in the world.  For the most part, the development and refinement of 
personhood is ordinary and unremarkable.  It consists in the acquisition of habits and 
thought patterns about the self by living within a particular social and cultural milieu 
comprised of relationships, personal projects, interests, aspirations, and a myriad of 
choices made spontaneously as well as in reflective deliberation.30  On this view, 
personhood does not develop as a series of parts, one of which is suffering, but is a 
seamless whole that continually evolves and, at times, stands in special need of healing.   
B.  Elaborating the concept of proportionality. 
 According to Pellegrino and Thomasma, healing the person in a clinical setting 
commences most concretely when the physician's professional judgment and the patient's 
preferences merge in a rational treatment plan that seeks the patient's good.  In their view, 
a rational treatment plan partly depends on a principle of proportionality that enables 
physicians to better fulfill their professional obligations of beneficence in an ethically 
sound manner and in a way that demonstrates respect for patient autonomy.  Because 
Pellegrino and Thomasma do not specify the parameters of such a principle, however, its 
application in any sort of care situation is not very clear.   
 Given that ambiguity, how can a principle of proportionality help resolve end-of-
life care issues involving physician-assisted suicide?  To illustrate the troubling aspects of 
this question, consider a terminally ill, competent patient whose personhood is so 
                                                 
30Agich, George J. (1990), “Reassessing Autonomy in Long-term Care.” Hastings Center Report (Nov/Dec): 12-17. 
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diminished by suffering (or by pain) that she requests physician-assisted suicide.  
Ordinarily, the physician's desire to relieve such unbearable suffering (or unbearable 
pain) is a laudable and traditional goal of medicine.  Given the extent of the patient's 
suffering and her perception that the benefits of death outweigh any potential harm, the 
question arises as to whether assisting the patient's suicide would be an appropriate 
medical response.  According to the reasoning of Pellegrino and Thomasma, the answer 
depends not only on whether the personhood of the patient has been seriously and 
irreversibly diminished by unbearable suffering, but also on whether physician-assisted 
suicide is a proportionate medical response.  In other words, is physician-assisted suicide 
appropriate medical care?  The answer requires a more precise explication of 
proportionality than Pellegrino and Thomasma provide. 
III.  The second stage:  two versions of proportionality.  
 There are many occasions in clinical practice when the anticipated benefits of 
treatment for a particular patient must be weighed against the likely harms to determine 
the best course to follow.  Although many persons, especially the attending physician, 
become involved in this process, a final determination of "proportionate benefits and 
burdens of treatment...[should be]...left to the individual patient or to those qualified to 
speak on behalf of the sick person."31  A determination of proportionate treatment 
depends on many factors, including  "the type of treatment to be used, its degree of 
complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using it, and comparing these elements 
                                                 
31Sacred Congregation for Faith (1980), Declaration on Euthanasia. Vatican City, p. 9. 
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with the result that can be expected, taking into account the state of the sick person and 
his or her physical and moral resources."32      
 In some cases, this process of weighing benefits and burdens of treatment yields a 
dilemma in the sense that, whatever course is followed, the outcome will include 
unwanted side effects.  Such cases are classic examples of double effect, where the good 
sought by patient and physician alike involves good as well as unavoidable and harmful 
side effects.  The current justification usually centers on whether there is a 
proportionately grave reason for allowing the bad effects to occur.  This sort of 
justification is consistent with a modern interpretation of proportionality as proposed by 
Gury and Knauer, but not necessarily with the classical view posited by Aquinas. 
A.  Classical proportionality and Thomas Aquinas. 
1.  Aquinas’ version of proportionality. 
 Aquinas does not use the modern term "proportionate reason" in discussing the 
principle of double effect.  Instead, he uses the phrase "proportioned to the end" in 
questioning whether an act that produces both good and evil consequences should be 
carried out.33  Using self-defense as the example that illustrates a correct resolution of 
such conflicts, Aquinas holds that the morally right thing to do depends on the agent's 
intention, the purpose for which the act is carried out, and the surrounding circumstances, 
including the means.  For Aquinas, the moral status of the means as an act depends on 
whether such means are morally acceptable in and of themselves and whether they are 
                                                 
32Sacred Congregation for Faith (1980), p. 9. 
33Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 64, a. 7 in corpus.  As double effect reasoning developed, modern versions of this 
principle articulate this last criterion in terms of a proportionately grave reason for permitting or allowing the evil 
effect.  Since this reformulation has a different connotation than Aquinas intended, it has contributed to a basic 
incompatibility between the modern and classical interpretations of proportionality.  See Johnstone (1985) p. 225. 
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proportioned to the end.  In this sense, the means chosen must not exceed what is 
necessary to accomplish the intended goal.   
 Aquinas offers the following criteria as a measure of the morally right thing to do 
with respect to acts that have double effects:     
 1.  The end or effect sought must be good in itself or at least indifferent. 
 2.  The good effect and not the evil effect must be intended. 
 3.  The good effect must not be produced by means of the evil effect. 
 4.  The act must be proportioned to the end. 
 
In the example case of self-defense, Aquinas argues that preserving one's life satisfies the 
first criterion insofar as preserving one's life is a purpose good (or at least neutral) in 
itself.34  He also reasons that, as long as this legitimate purpose maps back to the 
defender's intended purpose, the act satisfies the second criterion.  In this way, Aquinas  
gives intention a pivotal psychological role, such that a good intention makes for a good 
act, while a bad intention makes for a bad act.35  Intention alone, however, is not a 
sufficient moral justification.  Analytically, the kind of act in question stands on its own 
merits, apart from the actor's intention.  For example, killing an innocent person as the 
means to an end is morally impermissible, irrespective of the moral status of that 
purpose.36     
 To provide for a separate analysis of the means, Aquinas offers the third criterion, 
which specifies that the chosen means must not be evil.  Aquinas illustrates this 
qualification by noting that the use of force in self-defense is not an evil means in and of 
                                                 
34Johnstone (1985), p. 228. 
35Janssens, L. (1982), “Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Question of Proportionality.” Louvain Studies 9: 26-46.  
36Kenny, Anthony J. (1973),  "The History of Intention in Ethics." Anatomy of the Soul. Oxford, England, Basil 
Blackwell: appendix. 
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itself, since repelling force with force is morally permissible.  The reason behind such 
force, however, always must be to preserve life and never to kill the attacker.37     
 Aquinas further qualifies the means with a proviso in the fourth criterion, which 
he explains in terms of moderation.  According to this proviso, even when using means 
that are otherwise morally acceptable, such means must be proportioned to the end.  For 
example, in the case of self-defense, the force used must remain equal to or less than the 
attacking force, which is an amount necessary to preserve life, but no more.38  Together 
with the previous criterion, this last criterion limits the amount of force to a systematic, 
reasonable level that ideally matches the amount of force used by the attacker.  In this 
theoretical sense, morally defensible force exists on a continuum that gradually may 
increase to an amount sufficient to kill the attacker.  At that fatal point, causing the 
attacker's death is a foreseen but unintended consequence that stems from the attacker's 
use of a potentially lethal amount of force.  Killing the attacker is morally permissible if 
and only if preserving life remains the intended goal throughout.  With this explanation, 
Aquinas equates psychological attitude with moral intention, which must reflect 
moderation regarding the choice of means.    
 By contrast, using more force than is necessary in repelling an attack stems from a 
psychological shift, however subtle, in the defender's intended purpose, which renders 
such means morally impermissible.39  In that case, the act of defense simply becomes an 
act designed to kill the attacker.  Aquinas states this psychological qualification in the 
                                                 
37Kaczor, C. (1998), “Double-Effect Reasoning From Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer.” Theological Studies 59(2): 
297-316.  Aquinas considers self-defense permissible, but not obligatory.  It is permissible, because life is a basic but 
not an absolute good.  If life were an absolute good, self-defense would be obligatory. 
38Kaczor (1998), p. 300. 
39Johnstone (1985), p. 228. 
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following way: "Therefore, if some one in defending his own life uses greater violence 
than is necessary, it will be unlawful.  But if he repels the violence with moderation it 
will be a licit defense..."40  In this sense, Aquinas explains "proportionate reason" as a 
relationship between an act and an intended purpose. 
 For a determination of whether an act remains proportioned to the end, Aquinas 
appeals to the requirements of charity, which centers on a person's spiritual and physical 
good.  In his view, charity is more than mere kindness or sensitivity to the needs of 
others.  Rather, it is a special kind of love that grows out of and expresses a friendship 
with God.41  By friendship, Aquinas means a mutual relationship wherein the partners 
sustain a benevolent regard toward each other for the other's sake and not for the 
benefactor's advantage.  In this sense, benevolence entails an efficacious regard for the 
good of the other, the full realization of which leads to complete happiness and occurs 
only in the spiritual realm.  For Aquinas, charity is the overarching principle of human 
acts such that individual acts are good to the extent that they harmonize with the good of 
the whole person in both a spiritual and physical sense.42  As a result, the choice of means 
in any sort of moral dilemma must accord with the principle of charity, which is a point 
that Gury also emphasizes in his explication of proportionate reason.    
 In sum, Aquinas interprets proportionality in the context of double effect 
reasoning, not as a new principle of human behavior, but as an application of such 
                                                 
40Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 64, a. 7 in corpus. 
41Clark, M. T., Ed. (1972), An Aquinas Reader: Selections from the Writings of Thomas Aquinas. Garden City, New 
York, Image Books, p. 406. 
42Cessario, R., O.P. (2001), “Towards an Adequate Method for Catholic Bioethics.” The National Catholic Bioethics 
Quarterly 1(1): 51-62. 
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principles.43  For him, proportionality expresses a relationship between the chosen means 
and the intended purpose.  On this view, proportionality helps answer the question of 
whether, in light of the present circumstances, the chosen means are within reasonable 
limits.44  The answer itself is part of a more comprehensive process of deliberation and 
choice, which must be guided by the principle of charity.   
 Analytically, the moral status of a particular act, including those with double 
effects, depends on three specific features, namely, the kind of act involved, the 
surrounding circumstances, and the intended purpose.45  Evaluating the moral status of an 
act in this general sense is an all-or-nothing proposition.  An act is morally permissible if 
and only if each morally relevant feature complies with the demands of charity as 
revealed by reason, while a failure of any one feature in that regard renders that act 
morally impermissible.  On this view, although acts of a certain kind are intrinsically 
wrong, such as taking what belongs to another person,46 the moral status of a particular 
act also depends on the surrounding circumstances, including time, place, manner of 
acting, what was done, who did it, and by what means it was done.47  Aquinas also claims 
that the means chosen must be proportioned to the end, or intended purpose.  In this 
sense, the means must reflect a reasonable degree of moderation with respect to their 
anticipated effects.   
                                                 
43Kaczor (1998), p. 298. 
44Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 64, a. 7 in corpus. 
45Marshner, William H. (1995), “Aquinas on the Evaluation of Human Actions.” Thomist 59(3), p. 357 
46Clark (1972), p. 345.  Not all moral rules are absolute for Aquinas.  Only those that represent primary principles.  
Secondary and tertiary principles, which derive from primary principles, can be altered after due reflection and in some 
circumstances.  For a discussion on this point, see Black, Peter, C.Ss.R. (1999), “Do Circumstances Ever Justify 
Capital Punishment?” Theological Studies 60: 338-345. 
47Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 7, a. 3, c, a. 4, c 
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In regard to those acts having double effects, although consequences matter 
insofar as expected outcomes contribute to the formation of intention and choice of 
means, achieving a net balance of values in the outcome is not the moral norm to apply in 
determining which course to follow.  Rather, for Aquinas the moral norm of all human 
acts, including those with double effects, amounts to "what reasonableness requires of the 
choosing person in all the circumstances," as determined by the supreme moral principle, 
"love of neighbor as oneself."48 
2.  Classical proportionality and the effects of assisted suicide. 
Applying a classical interpretation of proportionate reason to the question at hand 
should begin by acknowledging that Aquinas did not hold a thesis regarding physician-
assisted suicide.  Had he held such a view, it most likely would have paralleled his 
rejection of suicide as contrary to human nature and our spiritual destiny.  In this respect, 
he argues that suicide stems from a desire to be rid of a life whose intrinsic value has 
been overshadowed by hardship and misery, which gives death the appearance of a 
good.49  Because life is a basic good that must be pursued within reason and death is the 
deprivation of that good, Aquinas rejects suicide as a disproportionate response to misery 
that violates the individual's obligation to preserve life, regardless of how diminished its 
value might appear to that person.50  On this view, suicide is a disproportionate means of 
relief because it seeks the deprivation of good, which is contrary to reason.     
                                                 
48Finnis (1998), op. cit., pp. 138-9.  
49Novak, David (1975),  "Suicide and Human Nature in Aquinas." Suicide and Morality. New York, Scholars Studies 
Press, Inc., p. 50.  Novak claims that it is not clear whether Aquinas perceived this as the only motivation for suicide.   
50Novak (1975), p. 48.  There is no conflict between this conclusion and the permissibility of martyrdom, since 
fending off a lethal attack is not obligatory.  Aquinas also would see no conflict with the removal of life support, when 
its continuation is unreasonable, since physical life is a basic good but not an absolute good. 
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 Although sympathetic to the suicidal person who is in misery, Aquinas offers 
three specific reasons as to why an individual should reject suicide as immoral.51  First, 
on a human level, suicide goes against the self-preservation instinct, and, on a moral 
level, opposes the principle of charity.  Second, suicide harms the common good, because 
the person who commits suicide thereby avoids a personal obligation to serve the 
community.  Third, suicide violates one's personal friendship with God by usurping his 
authority over life and death.  For these reasons, Aquinas rejects suicide as a 
disproportionate response to the misery and hardships of life. 
 Adapting Aquinas' line of reasoning about suicide to the question of physician-
assisted suicide requires both a change in perspectives and a change in principle.  
Aquinas adopts the subjective viewpoint in arguing against suicide, because he views the 
individual's role as decisive in that act.  Since the physician's role is uniquely vital to the 
outcome in physician-assisted suicide, it seems more appropriate to analyze the ethics of 
physician-assisted suicide from the physician's perspective, rather than from the patient's.  
The other change concerns the principle of charity, which Aquinas views as an 
overarching principle and guide for human affairs.  In the practice of medicine, however, 
there is no overarching ethical principle.  Physicians abide by several fundamental ethical 
principles and many secondary principles, any one of which might become primary in a 
given set of circumstances.   
 Nevertheless, the one principle that consistently guides physicians' behavior in 
relation to their patients is that of beneficence.  Thomasma and Pellegrino explain 
                                                 
51Aquinas discusses these reasons in Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 64, a. 5.  This section deals with the question of 
homicide. 
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beneficence as the physician's chief requirement to promote the patient's health in a 
proportionate manner with technically right and morally good medicine.  Given that 
view, the demands of beneficence map back to the demands of charity insofar as both 
principles serve a person's best interests.  In a moral context, charity ideally promotes a 
person's good character, while in a medical context, beneficence ideally promotes a 
patient's good health.  As a result, the following analysis of physician-assisted suicide as 
it relates to classical proportionality incorporates beneficence as the background principle 
and counterpart to a Thomistic principle of charity.  By adopting Aquinas' argument 
against suicide as a framework for discussion, the conclusion reached is that the medical 
community should reject physician-assisted suicide for similar reasons.  
 Since a request for physician-assisted suicide often reflects the tragic aspects of 
life, a hypothetical case might highlight the more poignant difficulties surrounding that 
procedure.  Consider the following situation: 
 Bill was paralyzed in a gymnastics accident approximately 30 years ago.  A 
quadriplegic since then, he rarely leaves the hospital because of a constant need for 24-
hour care and dependency on a respirator.  Despite these complications, Bill's life has not 
been empty.  Now in his early fifties, he has many friends and is known for his vitality, 
generosity, and sense of humor.  He often raises money for charity, and computers offer 
him a window to the outside world.  Even so, Bill has decided that 30 years of suffering 
is long enough.  In his view, to live any longer would cause undeserved and undue 
emotional, physical, and financial burdens on his family.  To avoid this, Bill wants to die 
a quick and painless death, despite objections from his family, friends, pastor, and the 
hospital staff.  Over the last several weeks, he has persistently asked his physician for a 
lethal dose of medication that will bring a quick and painless end to his suffering.52     
 
Had Bill asked for assisted suicide as a way to relieve intolerable pain instead of 
unbearable suffering, his physician might have responded by administering all the pain 
                                                 
52Anonymous (1999). “Moreover: Let Death Be My Dominion.” The Economist 353(8141): 89-92, adapted.  This kind 
of situation raises another troubling question that John Hardwig addresses, namely, whether there is in some cases a 
duty to die.  See Hardwig, John (1997), “Is There a Duty to Die?” Hastings Center Report (March-April): 34-42.  For a 
discussion of Hardwig's thesis, see Chapter 4 herein. 
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medication that Bill wants and needs, even if hastening death is the end result.53  Indeed, 
an intentional failure to relieve pain adequately in this case might constitute both a 
professional and a moral failure.  Pain relief, however, is not what Bill has asked of his 
physician.  Instead, his request is for release from thirty years of suffering that has 
become unbearable and is only going to get worse.  With the financial and emotional 
burdens on his family associated with his slow, agonizing death, Bill perceives death as 
the best alternative, rather than as a harm.  Despite the physician's compassionate 
response to his desperate plea for assisted suicide, such requests raise complex 
professional and moral issues for the physician. 
 On the one hand, the physician has a professional obligation to relieve suffering 
and pain with appropriate medical care that the patient finds acceptable and that causes 
the least harm.  On the other hand, the physician also has a moral duty to preserve life, 
despite the fact that medical science currently has no cure for quadriplegia, a primary 
cause of Bill's suffering and partly the reason he requests assisted suicide.  When the only 
kind of "care" that some patients find acceptable is assisted suicide, however, the 
professional and moral implications of the physician's involvement raise a serious 
concern as to whether a physician ought to accede to requests such as Bill’s.  
 This issue can be structured in terms of classic double effect reasoning.  Given 
relief of suffering as a traditional goal of medicine and the purpose of physician-assisted 
suicide, acceding to a patient's request in that regard seems to satisfy the first criterion 
that the end sought must be good in itself.  Although the patient's death is one of the 
                                                 
53For a comparison of palliative options of last resort, including terminal sedation, see Quill, T. E., et al. (1997). 
“Palliative Options of Last Resort.” JAMA 278(23): 2099-2105. 
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effects of pursuing that goal, in a case like Bill's, death might be viewed as a regrettable 
and unavoidable side effect that does not harm the patient.  In that case, acceding to a 
request for physician-assisted suicide also appears to satisfy the second criterion that the 
good effect and not the evil effect be the intended result.   
 The last two criteria of a classical model both address the choice of means.  The 
third criterion specifies that the good effect must not be produced by means of the evil 
effect, while the fourth requires the use of proportionate means.  Because the physician 
makes a direct contribution to the patient's suicide by introducing an original cause of 
death distinct from the underlying pathology, that contribution involves killing the 
patient.  As a result, Paul Ramsey dismisses a question about the physician's involvement 
in that suicide rather tersely with the claim that healing in the medical profession is not 
meant "to relieve the human condition of the human condition."54  In his view, because 
suffering is an inextricable part of the human condition, physicians should not kill 
patients to relieve their suffering, however willing the patient may be.   
 Although Ramsey's objection has a certain intuitive appeal, a stronger claim is 
that physician-assisted suicide is morally impermissible because the physician's part in 
killing the patient as a way to relieve suffering is a disproportionate medical response that 
fundamentally opposes the physician's duty to heal.  This objection attempts to strike a 
balance between beneficence and patient autonomy by relying on the dictum of 
Pellegrino and Thomasma.  On their view, morally defensible medicine must consist in 
proportionate care that is both technically right and morally good. 
                                                 
54Ramsey, Paul, as quoted in Campbell, Courtney S. (1990), “Religion and Moral Meaning in Bioethics.” Hastings 
Center Report 20 suppl. (July/August): 4-10.  
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 Based on a classical concept of proportionality, however, physician-assisted 
suicide is neither technically right nor morally good because it constitutes a 
disproportionate medical response to suffering for three reasons.  One, it violates the 
healer's duty to care for all human life with medically appropriate care relevant to the 
patient's quality of life.  Two, it harms the common good because it perpetuates an 
inherent potential for abuse.  Three, it opposes the virtuous practice of medicine insofar 
as the physician relies on her own subjective evaluation of the patient's quality of life as 
valid clinical support for her decision to assist the patient's suicide.  Although Aquinas' 
argument against suicide serves as a framework for the following explanation of these 
reasons, that explanation is not an argument against suicide, but an argument against the 
physician's participation in assisting a suicide. 
a.  The duty to heal.  
 With reference to Aquinas' framework, consider his first reason against suicide.  
He claims that suicide is a disproportionate response to pain and misery that violates the 
principle of charity, which requires due care for physical life, and opposes the instinct of 
self-preservation.  In the medical realm, there is a corresponding ethical requirement for 
the physician that Pellegrino and Thomasma describe in terms of seeking the patient's 
good in a proportionate manner.  Zaner interprets this requirement as beginning with the 
least irreversible method of care, which culminates at a point of optimum physiological 
and psychological health that within reason accords with patient preferences.55  Although 
limited in many respects, this ideal stops short of causing the patient's death in the sense 
                                                 
55Zaner (1990), p. 318.  See also Beauchamp, T. L. and Childress, J. F. (1994), Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4th ed. 
New York, Oxford University Press, p. 34, for a discussion of a similar "least onerous" kind of analysis with respect to 
balancing the requirements of competing ethical principles.  On their view, the infringement of one principle on another 
should be the "least possible, commensurate with achieving the primary goal of the action."   
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of either directly or indirectly killing the patient.  This is not to say that life must be 
preserved at all costs.  Rather, it merely expresses the view that human life itself is a 
basic value that requires due care in all circumstances, which bars its deliberate 
destruction.   
 Kass makes this same point by arguing that the goals of medicine define the 
physician's role in such a way that the physician must act so as to benefit the wholeness 
of the patient.  In his view, assisting the patient's suicide is morally wrong because it 
contradicts the physician's duty to heal.56  In other words, killing the patient has nothing 
to do with the physician's commitment "to use scientific knowledge and clinical 
experience in making decisions and advising patients about the prevention, diagnosis, and 
treatment of disease and the maintenance of health."57   
 Kass' point is consistent with a long-standing tradition that puts physician-assisted 
suicide outside the bounds of ethical medicine.  In assisting a patient's suicide, the 
physician provides the means, even though the patient self-administers the lethal dose.  In 
making that contribution, the physician decides against the patient's life, which 
unavoidably involves the physician in killing an innocent person.58  All patients are 
innocent from the physician's perspective, and as Aquinas put it, there is "simply no 
justification for taking the life of an innocent person."59  Although the state traditionally 
reserves a right to kill some members of society, as in war and capital punishment, the 
                                                 
56Kass, L. (1991), “Why Doctors Must Not Kill.” Commonweal 118 (August 9), p. 474. 
57Jonsen, A. R. (1988), “Beyond the Physicians' Reference--the Ethics of Active Euthanasia.” Western Journal of 
Medicine 149 (August), p. 196 
58Rhonheimer, Martin (1994), “Intrinsically Evil Acts and the Moral Viewpoint: Clarifying a Central Teaching of 
Veritas Splendor.” Thomist 58(1), p. 12. 
59Summa Theologica  II, II, Q. 64, a. 6, responsio. 
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moral justification for doing so, albeit controversial, relies in part on the assumption that 
those killed are not innocent in some respect.  Legally and morally, there are no 
exceptions to intentionally and deliberately killing innocent persons.  For this reason 
alone, the physician who becomes directly or indirectly involved in killing a patient acts 
outside the ethical and legal bounds of medicine, despite a voluntary request in that 
regard by the patient and irrespective of the physician's motive. 
 By contrast, the physician as healer acknowledges and fulfills a professional 
commitment to "care" for the patient, even when that patient has an incurable, poor 
quality of life and death is imminent.  When cure is no longer possible, the physician still 
must seek the patient's medical good, which always may be possible on some level.  To 
that end, the physician continues caring for the patient by applying her technical skills 
and professional knowledge in a way that results in the greatest comfort and least amount 
of suffering and pain.60  Although this duty to heal includes efforts to relieve suffering, 
the physician must not use her skills to destroy human life, "...either the last of it or the 
first of it.  The good physician is not a mere technician; [but] is committed by the practice 
of medicine to certain goods and to certain standards."61  Such standards reflect a long-
standing legal, medical, and moral tradition that excludes intentionally and deliberately 
killing innocent persons, which rules out the use of physician-assisted suicide.  
 Those who favor physician-assisted suicide might argue against this line of 
reasoning with the claim that innocence can be interpreted in two senses; as "free from 
                                                 
60Cf. Preston, Thomas A., M.D. (1998), “The Rule of Double Effect.” NEJM 338(19): 1389.  Preston responds to 
Quill, Dresser, and Brock on their critique of the rule of double effect. 
61Verhey, Allen (1984), "The Doctor's Oath--and a Christian Swearing it," in Respect and Care in Medical Ethics, ed. 
David Smith. New York: University Press of America. 
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blame" or as "not posing a threat".  In the first sense--free from blame--an innocent 
individual is not guilty of having committed any crime or wrong-doing, and thus does not 
deserve punishment of any kind, especially the punishment of death.  Those who favor 
physician-assisted suicide would agree that killing the patient clearly would be wrong in 
the sense that the patient does not deserve to die, given that the patient has not committed 
any crime or wrong-doing that warrants such punishment.  In any case, determining 
criminal guilt and the appropriate punishment is a right that belongs only to the state.   
 On another interpretation, however, "innocent" can mean harmless in the sense of 
"not posing a threat".  Aquinas relies on this latter sense of the term, for example, when 
he claims that the state's right to kill malefactors "is legitimate insofar as it is ordered to 
the well-being of the whole community."62  On this interpretation, a person who threatens 
a community lacks innocence by virtue of that threat.  As authorized caretaker of the 
common good, then, the state has the right to judge that threat, and subsequently may 
protect society to the extent of executing the one who poses such a threat.63 
 Lisa Sowle Cahill applies this line of reasoning about a community's right of self-
protection to the individual.64  In her view, the individual person is a kind of community 
in the sense that "person" means a unified whole, constituted by physical and spiritual 
aspects, with an ultimate spiritual destiny that determines the priorities of life.  To this 
view of a person, she factors in a "principle of totality" that allows the destruction of a 
part, as in amputating a gangrenous limb to save the person's whole life.   
                                                 
62Summa Theologica, art. 2 and art. 3, responsio. 
63Summa Theologica, art. 2 and art. 3, responsio. 
64Cahill, Lisa Sowle (1987), "A "Natural Law" Reconsideration of Euthanasia." On Moral Medicine. Stephen E. 
Lammers and Allen Verhey. Grand Rapids, MI, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing: 445-453. 
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 Cahill then applies the principle of totality to physical death, and claims that death 
is not necessarily the worst thing that can happen to a person.  In her words: "Sometimes 
continued life does not constitute a good for a certain individual because it cannot offer 
him the conditions of meaningful personal existence.  Sometimes the continued life of an 
individual is incompatible with the preservation of other values which also claim 
protection."65  She concludes that, "Since the distinctive and controlling element of 
human nature is the personal self or spirit, then according to the principle of totality, the 
body which is a 'part' may in some cases be sacrificed for the good of the 'whole' body-
soul entity."66   
 Although Cahill uses this line of reasoning primarily to justify withholding and 
withdrawing medical care as an acceptable means of "sacrificing" the body for the good 
of the whole person, she goes a step further by defending the morality of suicide itself on 
the same grounds.  In her view, when biological life is diminished by pain and suffering 
such that spiritual growth is no longer possible, the physical aspect of that person's life 
threatens the whole person, including the spiritual dimension.  The body then becomes 
the "enemy" or that part which threatens the whole person, and can be eliminated by 
suicide without moral guilt.  To support this conclusion, Cahill claims that a community's 
moral right to protect itself extends to the individual.  In her view, the individual's right to 
self-protection includes suicide as a legitimate means to that end. 
 Those who disagree with Cahill on this score might suggest that she misconstrues 
some fundamental aspects of Aquinas' views on the common good and altogether ignores 
                                                 
65Cahill (1987), p. 447. 
66Cahill (1987), p. 452. 
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his rejection of suicide itself.  Nevertheless, her analysis raises legitimate questions about 
physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia as a matter of social policy.  For 
instance, in light of Aquinas' claim that society has the right to protect itself from serious 
threat, consider the threat to society posed by those who consume vast amounts of limited 
healthcare resources.  The continued existence of such persons might pose the kind of 
threat to the common good that Aquinas envisioned as justification for executing certain 
members of society.   
 On this view, perhaps the state may allow physicians, as agents of the state, to 
conduct optional physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia on such 
patients as a way to protect the healthcare resources of the community.  Would a social 
policy of this sort fall under a Thomistic general justification for killing persons who are 
not innocent in the sense that they pose a threat to society?  How far would a social 
policy of this sort logically extend?  Suppose those who threaten scarce healthcare 
resources do not opt for physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia.  Could 
the state then deem the life of such persons no longer worthy of legal protection, in much 
the same way as it declared the life of certain unborn humans unworthy of legal 
protection?  Would such a determination clear legal ground for involuntary euthanasia to 
be carried out by physicians at their discretion?  A lack of innocence in the sense of 
posing a threat to the community might constitute an involuntary waiver of the patient's 
right to life, as those who are guilty of capital crimes must relinquish such a right.  
Resolving such issues is a formidable task that takes time and reflection.  
 In the interim, the general unacceptability of physician-assisted suicide stands in 
sharp contrast to the general acceptability of omitting or removing treatment.  Ordinarily, 
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allowing the patient to die by such means can be an acceptable and compassionate 
medical response to a patient's suffering, while killing that same patient by means of 
physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia as an alleged way to relieve 
suffering is not.  Proponents of physician-assisted suicide who take exception to this 
ordinary distinction claim that relief of suffering can be the overriding intended purpose 
in a case of physician-assisted suicide, just as it can be in a case of removing treatment.  
Because relief of suffering often serves to justify such removal, and since both practices 
involve the use of means that bring about the patient's death, such proponents argue that a 
distinction between killing and allowing to die carries no moral weight.  In their view, 
allowing the practice of removing treatment while banning the practice of physician-
assisted suicide is a contradiction that can be sustained only by ethical legerdemain.   
 Dan Brock argues this way, and illustrates his point with the situation of a 
competent patient, who has ALS and depends on a respirator.67  This patient wants to die 
and repeatedly asks that the respirator be removed for that purpose.  According to Brock, 
most would agree that physician compliance in this case would be an acceptable instance 
of allowing the patient to die.  He then compares this scenario to another case in which a 
greedy son, impatient for his inheritance, secretly removes his mother's respirator, after 
which she dies.  In his view, most would classify removal in this latter case as an 
unacceptable killing.  
 Brock argues against this sort of distinction, and claims that both acts of removal 
are simply a means of killing that can be justified by a legitimate purpose as defined by 
                                                 
67Brock, Dan (1992), “Voluntary Active Euthanasia.” Hastings Center Report 22 (March/April), pp. 13-14.  Brock is 
not so much concerned with a distinction between physician-assisted suicide and omitting or removing treatment as he 
is with a distinction between killing and allowing the patient to die by any means. 
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intention alone.  In his view, killing and allowing to die are means of equal moral status 
that bring about the patient's death.  For him, the crucial question concerns the intention 
of the actors.  In the first case, for example, because the physician intends to relieve the 
woman's suffering by removing the respirator, which is done at her persistent and 
voluntary request, the removal is a justified killing.  In the second case, however, the son 
acts with a selfish motive and without his mother's consent.  Hence, the removal of her 
respirator is an unjustified killing.   
 Brock concludes that, because both killing and allowing to die can be conducted 
with and without consent and for good as well as for bad reasons, the moral distinction 
between these two methods ought to be rejected.  He reasons that such a distinction 
reflects the faulty premise that, for the most part, allowing to die is justifiable, while 
killing is not.  In his view, given a morally acceptable purpose as defined by intention, 
the remaining crucial question is whether the patient consents to the killing.68  For Brock, 
intention makes all the difference.            
  Those who disagree with Brock might suggest that, in gathering intention, 
purpose, and means into a single psychological package for moral assessment, he omits 
some valid analytical differences.  One analytical difference affects the logic of his 
argument.  Although he correctly observes that a particular case of removing treatment 
can be equivalent to killing the patient and thus morally wrong, it does not follow that the 
general acceptability of removing treatment likewise extends to killing the patient, either 
by direct or indirect means.  The moral unacceptability of physician-assisted suicide as 
well as active euthanasia is due, not to the physician’s intention, but primarily to the fact 
                                                 
68Brock (1992), p. 13. 
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that these practices always involve unacceptable means, namely, killing an innocent 
person, while removing life-sustaining treatment ordinarily does not.  In the latter case, 
“life-sustaining” is a term that refers to treatment that temporarily suspends the course of 
an otherwise fatal pathology, and does not refer to treatment that sustains life indefinitely, 
much less save it.  To remove such treatment for good reason is to stop interfering with 
the progress of that pathology, after which it resumes its progress to an inevitable end, 
death.  In such cases, the cause of death is the underlying pathology, whereas in cases of 
physician-assisted suicide, the physician introduces an original cause of death apart from 
that pathology, which culminates in an otherwise preventable death.   
 This additional cause introduced by the physician is the aspect that Brock fails to 
account for in his argument.  Omitting the phrase "killing an innocent person" from the 
definition of physician-assisted suicide and inserting an acceptable motive in its place 
does not render that practice morally acceptable merely because the physician acts from 
that motive.  Brock's contention that the difference between physician-assisted suicide 
and removing treatment carries no moral weight is a radical break with a long-standing 
medical, legal, and moral tradition that recognizes a clear moral distinction between 
"killing an innocent person" and "fatal pathology".  Killing an innocent person is clearly a 
moral wrong, while dying from a fatal disease is one of the unfortunate consequences of 
human existence.  For this reason, Brock needs a stronger defense than the one allowed 
by his treatment of physician-assisted suicide as a unified psychological process that 
turns on intention and proximate cause.   
 Brock also does not consider a valid difference in the weight that patient 
authorization carries in relation to providing medical care as compared to removing such 
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care.  In a case of allowing to die by removing or stopping treatment, for instance, the 
right to self-determination alone can support a competent patient's decision to withdraw 
treatment, which in turn authorizes the physician to stop or omit that care.  Although the 
end result might be the patient's death, the authority and responsibility for the decision to 
withdraw treatment belongs entirely to the patient.  In stopping such treatment, the 
physician merely acquiesces in the patient's request.   
 On the other hand, the physician who agrees to assist the patient's suicide does not 
merely acquiesce in the patient's request.  In such cases, the physician decides to 
contribute an original cause of death apart from the patient's underlying pathology.  All 
else being equal, authorization for the physician’s decision to make that contribution 
would depend not only on the patient's voluntary and informed consent, but on the 
classification of physician-assisted suicide as appropriate medical care.  Such a 
classification has technical and ethical aspects distinct from those that apply to the 
patient's consent.  Aside from the ethical considerations, to qualify as appropriate medical 
care from a technical standpoint, the physician's contribution in physician-assisted suicide 
requires the support of the relevant scientific and clinical data that shows death as a 
potentially beneficial way to relieve suffering.   
 To date, however, the necessary data showing physician-assisted suicide as a 
valid form of medical care that relieves patient suffering are missing.  In the absence of 
such cognitive data, the physician's contribution to a patient's suicide as a way to relieve 
suffering lacks technical warrant. An investigation that might yield such data ought to 
begin with the premise that the suffering itself is a cognitive experience related to the 
person's subjective evaluation of her own life, as compared to an experience of pain, 
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which is the person's subjective evaluation of her own body.  Although suffering and pain 
are often interrelated and occur simultaneously, they are distinct phenomena.  If analysis 
is to yield appropriate support for physician-assisted suicide as a valid form of medical 
care, the relevant cognitive factors that give rise to patient suffering must be included and 
evaluated in the same way that physiological factors have a part in an analysis of pain.   
As a result, the physician who agrees to assist a patient's suicide merely provides a 
service that does not qualify as appropriate medical care.  In addition, the physician's 
assistance exposes the patient to unknown risks that the patient's voluntary consent alone 
cannot justify in the way that it justifies the removal of treatment.  In the case of removal, 
the patient alone assumes such risks, while in the case of physician-assisted suicide, the 
physician must assume responsibility for that exposure.  Because the physician acts in a 
professional role, the implication is that physician-assisted suicide qualifies as 
appropriate medical care.  The physician's professional and ethical error is that she does 
so without medical warrant. 
 This difference in the role of patient authorization can be viewed from another 
angle as well.  In a case of removing treatment, the physician has an obligation to honor a 
valid request in that regard, despite the causal outcome.  In other words, "From both a 
legal and moral point of view...[physicians must]...recognize and act upon a valid refusal, 
irrespective of the causal outcome."69  Sometimes, the causal outcome is the patient's 
foreseeable and intentional death.  Although the physician might not agree with the 
patient's choice, respect for autonomy bars the physician from acting on such disapproval 
                                                 
69Beauchamp, T. L. (1999), “The Medical Ethics of Physician Assisted Suicide.” Journal of Medical Ethics 25: 437-
439. 
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by forcing treatment on a competent patient who requests that such treatment be 
discontinued.70  A right to self-determination protects the patient's person and body from 
being invaded against her will.  Harsh as it may seem, the trump value of a competent 
patient's autonomous choice when it comes to refusing treatment includes the freedom to 
surrender a reasonable chance of recovery.  In such cases, convincing the patient to do  
otherwise then depends on the physician's skill of persuasion.  In a case of physician-
assisted suicide, however, physicians have no professional obligation to honor such 
requests, despite the voluntary nature of such a request and despite the assumption that 
doing so will relieve the patient's suffering.71  The medical profession itself makes it 
clear that the physician's duty to relieve suffering does not extend as far as eliminating 
the sufferer by killing the patient, either directly or indirectly.72  Yet, Brock's claim that 
there is no moral distinction between killing and allowing to die has exactly this 
implication with respect to a physician’s professional obligation.   
Consistent with Brock’s view, physicians might have a professional duty to provide 
physician-assisted suicide or active euthanasia, which parallels their duty to remove or 
omit treatment.  Given that respect for patient autonomy grounds such an obligation and 
no real moral distinction between killing and allowing to die, it seems that physicians 
must comply with a patient’s voluntary request for either physician-assisted suicide or 
active euthanasia.  On what grounds would a physician refuse?  Thus, Brock’s claim that 
a legitimate, intended purpose and consent alone together underwrite physician behavior 
                                                 
70Kamm, Frances M. (1998), "Physician-Assisted Suicide, Euthanasia, and Intending Death." Physician Assisted 
Suicide. Margaret P. Battin, Rosamond Rhodes and Anita Silvers. New York and London, Routledge, p. 40. 
71Miller, Franklin G., Ph.D. and Meier, Diane E., M.D. (1998), “Voluntary Death: A Comparison of Terminal 
Dehydration and Physician Assisted Suicide.” Annals of Internal Medicine 128(7): 559. 
72Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (1996), "Physician Assisted Suicide," Report Number E 2.211. Chicago. 
American Medical Association.  
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in both killing and allowing to die may extend beyond the level of professional option for 
physicians.  His claim may extend to the level of duty that is virtually impossible for 
physicians who oppose the practice on moral grounds to avoid.  If Brock would support 
such an extension, which seems likely, he needs a stronger defense of his original claim. 
b.  The common good. 
According to Aquinas' framework, his second reason for rejecting suicide is the 
harm it causes the common good.  For him, "common good" is an ideal system of 
institutions and social conditions designed to enhance the availability and just distribution 
of public goods and services.73  Included among such considerations are the talents, 
skills, and personal existence of each member, although the common good is not an 
attribute of individuals.  Neither is it the "collective good" of society as a whole.  Rather, 
it is the welfare of persons in communion with each other that flourishes in direct 
proportion to the flourishing of society, which in turn depends on the contribution that 
each member must make in that regard.74  In this sense, "There is no such thing as a 
happy society without happy citizens."75  Despite his emphasis on a personal obligation 
to promote the public welfare, Aquinas did not view the common good itself as the 
highest good, since human destiny transcends civil society.  Nevertheless, he viewed 
suicide as a social harm because the person who commits suicide abandons a personal 
obligation to contribute to the common good.    
                                                 
73Coleman, John A., S.J. (2001), “American Catholicism, Catholic Charities U.S.A., and Welfare Reform.” Journal of 
Policy History 13(1): 74-77.  See also Coleman (1995), “A Common Good Primer,” Dialog 34 (Fall), pp. 249-54. 
74Coleman (2001), p. 77.  
75Novak (1975), p. 66. 
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 In contrast to such a claim, a contemporary justification for physician-assisted 
suicide includes the idea that, at some point, it is reasonable for a person to decide that 
the ability to make social and familial contributions is diminished and outweighed by the 
cost of personal suffering.  When it so happens that such a person also views her 
continued physical existence as having little value, or as being a drain on social and 
familial resources, or as involving intolerable suffering, the sufferer then might view 
physician-assisted suicide as the best method of relief.76  In these circumstances, the 
assumptions might be that suicide itself is not morally wrong, and that the physician is 
the one better able to provide a painless and quick end to life.  When asked to assist a 
patient under these conditions, some physicians might concur with the patient that 
continued life has little value and conclude likewise that hastening death by suicide is the 
better course.   
 Others take such reasoning a step further and consider suicide the last 
magnanimous social contribution to be made, or perhaps required, since doing so rids 
both society and family of a burden.77  Sidney Hook, for example, wrote extensively on 
the ethics of suicide, and aptly expressed this sort of view in the following way: 
Far from being a crime against society, suicide may actually further the welfare of 
society.  The logic of utilitarian ethics inevitably leads to this position, to the surprise of a 
number of its adherents.  The greatest good or happiness of the greatest number may 
sometimes be attained by personal sacrifice, as the annals of heroism and martyrdom will 
attest...it is not altogether inconceivable that sometimes refusal to commit suicide would 
constitute a crime against society.78  
                                                 
76Brock makes such a case for competent adult patients.  See Brock, Dan W. (1999), “A Critique of Three Objections 
to Physician-Assisted Suicide.” Ethics 109: 519-547. 
77Marzen, T. J., et al. (1985), “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?” Duquesne Law Review 24(1): 1-101.  For a 
discussion of the family role in healthcare decisions, see Hardwig, John (1990), “What About the Family?” Hastings 
Center Report March/April: 5-10; and Hardwig (1997), “Is There a Duty to Die?” 
78Hook, Sidney (1927), “The Ethics of Suicide.” International Journal of Ethics 37. Cf. Hardwig (1997). “Is There a 
Duty to Die?” 
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Such utilitarian reasoning would not have been all that foreign to Aquinas, who 
considered and rejected the idea that the interests of society have this sort of priority over 
human life.  He argued that a person's specific moral duty to society is limited by a 
greater duty to God.  According to Aquinas:  
 Man is not ordained to the body politic according to all that he is and has; and so 
it does not follow that every act of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body 
politic.  But all that man is, and does, and has, must be referred to God; and therefore 
every act of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God...79  
  
By contrast, a modern resolution of a conflict between personal duties and those 
owed the state looks more to the secular law than to divine law.  An underlying premise 
of the modern approach concerns the way in which the law and morality connect at 
certain vital points to promote the common good.80  At a fundamental connection point, 
social policy sanctioned by the law receives a de facto moral acceptability by virtue of 
that connection.81  From a psychological standpoint alone, then, the fundamental 
connection between law and morality tends to generate fidelity from those to whom the 
law applies.  
 Two such points of connection concern the content of law and its administration.  
The content of the law gives formal expression to those basic moral values and principles 
                                                 
79Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 93, a. 3. 
80Hart, H.L.A. (1991), "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals." Philosophy of Law. Joel Feinberg and 
Hyman Gross, eds. Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, p. 100. 
81Some theorists deny any such connection between law and morality.  Nineteenth-century English writer John Austin, 
for instance, places human law entirely outside of the moral order.  Like Hume before him, Austin held the view that 
laws should be distinguished from the prevailing societal rules of morality.  On Austin's view, laws function merely as 
commands of the supreme political authority.  The only motive for obeying such laws is habit or fear of reprisal.  See 
Austin, John (1832). The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. New York, Noonday Press (1954), p. 184.  Cf. 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. (1897), “The Path of the Law.” Harvard Law Review 10, p. 458. 
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vital to the common good, such as "vetoing murder, violence, and theft."82  A genuine 
legal system will incorporate such values and principles to insure peace and security for 
the community.  Likewise, the administration of such rules must comply with the 
demands of justice, which requires treating like cases alike.83  Without such fairness in 
application, the law becomes a set of meaningless taboos.  Equal application of rules that 
provide for the protection of persons and property by guaranteeing a "degree of mutual 
forbearance and respect for the interests of others" is fundamental to any genuine legal 
system.84   
 Given the current lack of medical warrant for physician-assisted suicide, prudence 
requires that society err on the side of caution by maintaining a legal prohibition of that 
practice.  The absence of relevant scientific and clinical data showing its effectiveness 
justifies limiting the physician's role in this way.  Another way of stating this prohibition 
is to say that it derives largely from the idea that physician-assisted suicide violates a 
professional duty to heal and indirectly involves the physician in causing a patient's 
intentional death.  Because there is no medical and legal support for doing so, however, 
vulnerable patients are at serious risk of abuse.  To avoid that possibility, society has 
demonstrated its prudence through state law (except Oregon) and professional codes of 
ethics that expressly prohibit physician-assisted suicide.  
 The American Medical Association's Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs 
policy statement regarding physician-assisted suicide is an example of the many ways in 
which society expresses this concern about abuse.  According to that policy:   
                                                 
82Hart (1991), p. 100. 
83Hart (1991), p. 100. 
84Golding, Martin P. (1975), Philosophy of Law. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, p. 34. 
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 Allowing physicians to participate in assisted suicide would cause more harm 
than good.  Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's 
role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal 
risks.85   
 
Although not all physicians belong to the AMA, this statement influences the practice of 
medicine in part because it is consistent with the laws of most states86 and with recent 
U.S. Supreme Court opinion that rejects a constitutional "right to die".87   
Some proponents argue, however, that the systemic failure of medicine to provide 
adequate pain relief at the end of life and to protect against unwanted intrusions of life-
prolonging medical technology are reason enough to legalize physician-assisted suicide 
as a sorely needed counter to badly practiced medicine.  Such advocates claim that 
protecting patients is just a matter of factoring in the right amount of stringency, and a 
worry about abuse in physician-assisted suicide, such as that expressed by the American 
Medical Association, is much ado about nothing.88 
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that not even very stringent safeguards 
provide a reasonable degree of protection against abuse.  The U.S. criminal justice system 
and the Dutch experience with euthanasia are two venues that provide such evidence.  
Regarding the first, the U.S. criminal justice system fails to provide fair protection of 
many African-American men charged with capital crimes. This failure occurs despite the 
use of very stringent safeguards designed to protect the interests of the accused 
throughout the legal course of determining innocence or guilt.  Such safeguards include 
                                                 
85Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (1996), Report Number E 2.211 
86Myers, Richard S. (2001), “Physician-assisted Suicide: A Current Legal Perspective.” The National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly 1(3): 45-361. 
87Washington v. Glucksberg,  79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Vacco v. Quill, 80 F.3d 
716 (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996). 
88Bok, Sissela (1998), "Euthanasia." Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide: For and Against. Gerald Dworkin, 
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an adversarial system of representation wherein a panel of jurors, selected at random, 
consider the facts presented by opposing sides.  This system itself unfolds in an open 
public forum ideally in the presence of an impartial judge who guides the process 
throughout.  The judicial process also contains numerous procedural safeguards and 
subsequent reviews at many levels, the records of which are available for public scrutiny.  
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia imposed this degree of 
protection for the accused in capital punishment cases to ensure fairness and to prevent 
the state from killing innocent persons.89   
 Despite the presence of these very stringent safeguards, imposition of the death 
penalty is riddled with disparity between whites and blacks, rich and poor, from locale to 
locale, as much now as it has been throughout its use in this country.90  The consistent 
end result is a disproportionate number of blacks on death row.91  As of 1999, for 
example, blacks comprised only 13% of the U.S. population but 43% of those on death 
row and one third of those executed in that same year.92   
 The suggestion that the disproportionate number of blacks on death row or 
executed is due simply to the disproportionate number of blacks committing crimes that 
carry the death penalty is not convincing.  Consider the wide discretionary power of 
prosecutors either to seek the death penalty or to plea bargain as they see fit.  
Prosecutorial discretion and economic disparity has contributed to the unfair imposition 
                                                 
89Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
90United Nations (1998), "Death Penalty in the United States." New York, Appendix 8. 
91Michigan State University (2000), "Death Penalty Information," Available WWW: 
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92Policy Almanac (2001), "History of the Death Penalty," Available WWW: 
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of the death penalty on African-American males, despite very stringent procedural 
safeguards in the criminal justice system.93   
 Since capital punishment is a morally debatable though legalized form of 
intentionally killing certain members of society, while physician-assisted suicide is a 
form of intentionally, albeit indirectly, killing certain patients, this failure of the criminal 
justice system has at least two important implications for the practice of physician-
assisted suicide.  First, science thus far is unable to ensure fairness with respect to the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide as it has with respect to the operation of the 
criminal justice system.  Specifically, the science of DNA has promoted fairness in the 
criminal justice system by producing irrefutable evidence to support the release of 
innocent persons from death row, and more recently, by helping the accused secure 
acquittals.94   
Physician-assisted suicide, on the other hand, lacks the scientific and clinical 
evidence supporting its use as a way to relieve suffering.  Moreover, the clinical evidence 
produced by near-death experiences suggests that death does not relieve suffering for 
some patients.  Second, procedural justice is not a panacea.  If the publicly centered 
procedural safeguards surrounding the imposition of the death penalty can fail for 
vulnerable members of society, then there is reason to suppose that the privately centered 
patient-physician safeguards in physician-assisted suicide likewise can fail to protect 
                                                 
93Policy Almanac (2001), Appendix 12.       
94 Approximately three years ago, Governor Ryan of Illinois placed a moratorium on the death penalty pending the 
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vulnerable patients against abuse.95  Given the likelihood of that possibility, legalizing 
physician-assisted suicide is a premature and unacceptable step that harms the public 
interests.  
 The specific nature of such harm concerns the inequitable distribution of the 
benefits and risks associated with legalized physician-assisted suicide.  Those who are 
likely to reap the alleged benefits are the "relatively educated, well-off, politically vocal 
people...[who] tend to have good health insurance, intact, supportive families, and social 
skills and know-how to get what they want from an increasingly bureaucratized health 
care system."96  In other words, "Advocates are likely to reap the benefits while avoiding 
most of the harms.  Conversely, the harms of legalization are likely to fall on vulnerable 
members of our population."97    
Since vulnerability increases as the availability of personal resources decreases, 
those who are most vulnerable include the poor, the elderly and the very young, the 
financially distraught, the homeless, those without a personal support system, the 
marginalized, the burdensome, the incurable, and very often the terminally ill.98  
Legalizing physician-assisted suicide poses a special risk for these patients because their 
need is great and their resources limited, which can unduly influence their decisions for 
physician-assisted suicide.  Given the irreversible consequences of physician-assisted 
                                                 
95In the context of physician-assisted suicide, the vulnerable also may include women.  For example, one study of the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide in the U.S. shows that 60% of those who obtained such assistance were women.  
See Emanuel, E. J., et al. (1998), “The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide in the United States.” 
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96Emanuel, Ezekiel J. (1999), “What Is the Great Benefit of Legalizing Euthanasia or Physician Assisted Suicide?” 
Ethics 109(3), p. 641. 
97Emanuel (1999), p. 641. 
98Emanuel (1999), p. 641. 
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suicide, a reliable method of protecting vulnerable patients from abuse is needed, but not 
very likely.  The troubling question is, "Who will be around to notice when the elderly, 
poor, crippled, weak, powerless, retarded, depressed, uneducated, demented, or gullible 
are mercifully released from the lives their doctors, nurses, and next of kin deem no 
longer worth living?"99 
 Additional evidence that safeguards are ineffective in preventing abuse comes 
from the Dutch experience with euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.  Although 
controversial, such data is useful in that the core requirements of commonly 
recommended guidelines for the U.S., such as those proposed by Brock, and those of the 
1986 Dutch "Guidelines on Euthanasia" (codified in 1994) share common ground.100  
According to both sets of guidelines, the decisive motivation for death-dealing action 
must be that of unbearable suffering; the request must be made by the patient as a 
voluntary, informed, and enduring choice; and the attending physician must have 
consulted with another physician who concurs with the prognosis.  In addition, both sets 
of guidelines refer to this kind of death-dealing action as a "last resort" strategy, which 
means either that no other methods of relief are available, or that the patient has evaluated 
those alternatives as unacceptable.101  Lastly, both guidelines have strict reporting 
requirements and regulatory oversight.   
                                                 
99Kass, Leon and Lund, Nelson (1996), "Courting Death: Assisted Suicide, Doctors, and the Law." Commentary 102 
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 Cultural differences notwithstanding, these similarities, along with the 
presumption that physicians in the Netherlands profess a similar commitment to their 
patients as do physicians in the U.S., the Dutch experience provides important evidence 
regarding possible outcomes for a similar public policy in this country.  One source of 
such evidence is the extensive survey of euthanasia twice commissioned by the Dutch 
government in 1990 and again in 1995, both of which were supported by the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association and conducted with immunity from prosecution for the physician-
respondents.102  These surveys provide data on those "medical decisions concerning the 
end of life" that involved "the prescription, supply or administration of drugs with the 
explicit intention of shortening life, including euthanasia at the patient's request, assisted 
suicide, and life termination without explicit and persistent request."103   
 The results of these two surveys indicate that safeguards in the Dutch system have 
major flaws in three particular areas: reporting, physician consultation, and the incidence 
of non-voluntary euthanasia.  With respect to the reporting requirement, although 
reported cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide showed an increase between 
1990 and 1995 as compared to the total that should have been reported, approximately 
60% of such cases still go unreported each year.104  The primary reason given by 
physicians for not reporting is their reluctance to become involved in legal procedures.105  
Physicians avoid regulatory oversight primarily by falsifying death certificates with a 
                                                 
102Jochemsen (2001), p. 8.  
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notation indicating a natural cause of death.106  Since the watchful eye of mandatory 
reporting to public authorities is a basic method of preventing abuse, such deception and 
failure to report on the part of physicians suggests that safeguards do not protect against 
abuse.   
 The consultation requirement is equally ineffective in preventing abuse.  
Although physicians consulted a colleague in virtually all reported cases of euthanasia, 
they did so in only 11% of the unreported cases.  In addition, 20% of the unreported cases 
were conducted without an explicit request from the patient.107  In addition to a frequent 
lack of consultation, the quality of the consultation that does occur is less than optimal.  
For example, although genuine consultation in a case of euthanasia should be "...with a 
colleague who is an expert in the field and who is able to verify that there are no available 
alternatives for treatment," accessibility and familiarity dominate the consult process.108  
For example, the attending physician usually selects a consult from among the members 
of his or her own specialty, rather than a physician-expert in matters related to euthanasia.  
Once selected, the consultant does not always make a personal visit with the patient, 
which renders professional assessment in such cases less than reliable.  The consult also 
agrees with the prognosis more often after having been consulted by the attending 
physician in previous assisted-death cases.109  Such results indicate a substantial 
breakdown in safeguards, and perhaps a significant level of abuse in the Dutch system. 
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 Lastly, some of the controversy surrounding the evidence from the Netherlands 
concerns the reported cases of non-voluntary euthanasia.  Dutch investigators cited a 
decrease in the number of such cases, despite safeguards aimed at preventing the non-
consensual termination of patients.  Physicians justified their actions primarily with the 
claim that, in their opinion, the patient's condition was unbearable.110  Some 
commentators argue, however, that investigators erroneously excluded the number of 
cases in which physicians gave pain medication with the intent to end the patient's life 
without patient consent.  These commentators claim that including these cases in the 
count would reveal an increase, rather than a decrease, "in the number of patients killed 
without having requested it."111  Although non-consensual termination is contrary to the 
law's original intent, such cases often receive medical and judicial approval after the 
fact.112  
 In sum, the Dutch experience with euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
provides at least four lessons regarding a similar social policy in this country:113   
 1.  Despite the presence of substantial safeguards, physician-assisted suicide 
functions as an unconstrained private practice largely determined by physicians, which 
jeopardizes the lives of all patients, not just those who are more vulnerable. 
 2.  The financial and emotional burdens that often accompany dying, coupled with 
a suggestion by a family member or attending physician that the patient consider assisted-
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death as an option, can exert undue pressure on patients to agree to physician-assisted 
suicide, which imposes a need on such patients to justify their non-agreement.  
 3.  The justification for physician-assisted suicide based on unbearable suffering 
will widen to include loss of dignity as additional justification for assisted-death.  In that 
case, the existential criteria, if at all discernible, that ultimately must guide physicians in 
resolving such requests will become even more ambiguous and difficult to apply.114   
 4.  Lastly, euthanasia in the Netherlands has evolved from the legally tolerated 
practice of physician-assisted death for terminally ill, competent patients who suffer 
unbearably to the current practice of judicial and medical sanctioning of non-consensual 
termination of some patients.115  This development suggests that initiating a restricted 
practice of physician-assisted suicide in the U.S. along the lines that Brock recommends 
likewise will lead to a broader social acceptance and increased practice of assisted death 
that ultimately includes non-voluntary, and perhaps involuntary, euthanasia. 
c.  The virtuous practice of medicine.     
 Lastly, the third reason that Aquinas offers against suicide is the claim that those 
who commit suicide assume an authority over life that belongs to God.116  For Aquinas, 
human life is a gift from God that expresses God's love and goodness such that human 
existence itself establishes a relationship with God that Aquinas characterizes as a 
friendship.  On this view, life is no ordinary gift between friends that the recipient may 
refuse or return, even in the face of overwhelming misery.  Rather, life is a personal 
journey with intrinsic value and a spiritual purpose and responsibility originated in the 
                                                 
114Emanuel, Ezekiel J. (1999), p. 630.  
115Canady (1998), p. 301. 
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physical realm at God's discretion and authority.  On a human level, the instinct for self-
preservation demonstrates the intrinsic value of life, while reason itself imposes an 
obligation of due care towards life as a basic good to be pursued, which precludes the act 
of suicide.  On a spiritual level, Aquinas contends that suicide opposes our ultimate 
spiritual purpose and friendship with God, a friendship and destiny that require a resolute 
practice of virtue.  Thus, by nature and by virtue, we must reject suicide as a 
disproportionate response to the miseries of human life. 
 Aquinas' emphasis on a virtuous regard for life by the individual parallels a 
traditional view of the physician's role as one that also requires a virtuous regard for the 
patient's life and health.  In a classic sense, virtue is an acquired habit of mind and firm 
disposition to act with reasonable moderation in the circumstances at hand.117  By 
implication, the virtuous practice of medicine involves a kind of friendship between 
patient and physician that entails a benevolent regard for the patient as a person in special 
need of appropriate medical care.   
Physicians determine appropriate medical care in particular cases using a 
combination of objective factors, including their education, training, clinical experience, 
and professional instinct, balanced against the relevant scientific and clinical data, 
personal knowledge of their patients, and what a particular patient thinks is best in the 
circumstances at hand.118  Thomasma refers to these factors as the medical indicators, 
which the physician relies on to evaluate a patient's condition and to determine which 
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care is appropriate for that particular patient.119  A clinical judgment of this sort generally 
reflects the clinical protocols suggested by professional standards and practice guidelines 
relative to the patient's condition. 
Such standards are accepted and followed by those who practice within particular 
areas of medicine because they encapsulate the considered professional opinion about the 
effectiveness of a specific treatment modality.120  The supporting evidence for such 
treatment includes the scientific and clinical data that suggests a benefit in terms of cure, 
amelioration, or comfort, as appropriate, with respect to a particular disease or ailment.121  
In other words, aware that patients look to the medical profession with trust and hope for 
relief of their suffering and pain, physicians agree to provide such relief by rendering 
appropriate medical care that reflects proven professional opinion.   
 Although "appropriate medical care" refers to a level of care that is proportionate 
to the patient's physiological condition, it also must include the patient's preferences, 
which entails a balance between patient autonomy and physician integrity.122  
Responsibility for achieving such a balance falls primarily to the physician, who 
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accomplishes that task by integrating a patient's experience and interpretation of his or 
her own illness with the prevailing scientific and clinical evidence relevant to that 
patient’s condition.  This integration then forms the basis of a recommended plan of 
treatment.  The goal of this process ideally centers on cure, amelioration, adaptation, or 
enhanced coping for the patient, tempered by the patient's health status and preferences 
regarding treatment.123  In this way, professional integrity, along with the principles of 
beneficence and respect for patient autonomy, set the ethical bounds of clinical practice.  
 Beauchamp and Childress describe this process of integration and planned 
medical response in terms of basic ethical principles that guide the practice of Western 
medicine.124  In their view, beneficence is the primary ethical principle that guides the 
practitioner as she earnestly seeks the patient's best interests with medically appropriate 
care, while respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, and justice limit the pursuit of that 
goal.125  Because the precise terms of beneficence can be difficult to specify in clinical 
practice, however, its application in particular cases is subject to interpretation by both 
physician and patient, limited by the physician's professional and social duties as well as 
the patient's medical need and personal autonomy.126   
Although this interpretive process often involves conflict, the ideal end result is a 
medical response that addresses the patient's specific medical condition in light of her 
preferences.127  In that sense, the most effective plan of response evolves when 
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beneficence and patient autonomy neither compete with each other nor function 
independently.  In an ideal situation, both principles work in conjunction to guide the 
formation of a mutually acceptable treatment plan that promotes the patient's best 
interests.128  In less than ideal situations, the effort may require a compromise or 
reconciliation of a conflict between these two principles.   
 The model of clinical medicine that Beauchamp and Childress describe 
acknowledges an indispensable role for both patient and physician in the treatment 
process that is both informed and limited by their respective areas of expertise.  By 
training and experience, the physician's realm of expertise and decision-making authority 
relates to the scientific and clinical data that support the recommended medical treatment.  
On the other hand, the "expertise" of patients concerns those "personal normative values 
that guide their lives and therefore inform their responses to the available medical" 
options as presented for their consideration.129  This distinction in types of expertise both 
defines and limits the decision-making authority of patient and physician alike.  Although 
patient and physician resolve some aspects of the treatment process on a mutual basis, 
some decisions relevant to that process belong to the patient, while still others belong to 
the physician.   
 As a practical matter, such limits are easily breached.  Veatch emphasizes that 
possibility by observing a common tendency among scientists in policy-making situations 
to breach the limits of their expertise, which he characterizes as the generalization of 
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expertise.130   As Veatch describes it: "Generalization of expertise arises when, 
consciously or unconsciously, it is assumed that an individual with scientific expertise in 
a particular area also has expertise in the value judgments necessary to make policy 
recommendations simply because he has scientific expertise."131  In his view, such an 
assumption is unwarranted because it confuses the fact "that expertise in scientific facts 
of a case also leads to expertise in judgments [of] policy making regarding that case."132   
 Veatch claims that the role-specific nature of decisions with respect to policy-
making belies a common assumption that those with scientific expertise to judge "the 
way things are" also have expertise to judge "the way things should be."  Veatch argues 
that this assumption confuses a distinction between the technical and evaluative 
components of decision-making.  In his view, whether those with expertise in the 
technical component also have expertise in the evaluative component is debatable.  He 
concludes that, as long as that point goes unsettled, a generalization of expertise is an 
unwarranted assumption that can be avoided by adopting a decision model that assigns a 
separate role to these two components.   
 Although Veatch's primary concern is with the limits of scientific expertise in the 
context of policy making, his use of clinical cases in the development of his decision-
making model suggests that he views the tendency to generalize expertise as common in 
the clinical setting as well, especially among physicians.133  As a result, his recommended 
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decision-making model ought to apply in the clinical setting as well.  On this model, the 
technical component of a treatment decision belongs to the physician, whose technical 
expertise clearly includes the authority and responsibility to frame a range of medical 
options for the patient's consideration.  On the other hand, the evaluative component 
belongs to the patient, who alone has authority and responsibility to determine the 
personal worth of pursuing those options.  In short, the technical component of a  
treatment decision involves matters of scientific and clinical fact and properly belongs to 
the physician, while the evaluative component involves matters of personal values and 
preferences and strictly belongs to the patient.   
 These two different judgments--the physician's clinical judgment and the patient's 
personal judgment--merge in a plan that both patient and physician agree to follow.  
Although some patients reject the physician's clinical recommendations for various 
reasons, consent to treatment usually follows the patient's own determination that the 
benefits of receiving the recommended care outweigh the associated burdens.134  Such 
consent then enables the practitioner to render the care deemed medically appropriate and 
reflected in the mutually agreed upon treatment plan. 
 Veatch's decision model, as applied in the clinical setting, underscores the 
requirement that physicians must remain neutral with respect to those decisions that 
belong to the patient.  This requirement of neutrality is consistent with the concept of 
medically appropriate care, even though such care reflects the endorsement of one goal or 
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another.135  As Pellegrino claims, the physician's goal is to provide patient care that is 
both technically right and morally good.  Technically right medicine, in his view, 
conforms to the best available scientific and clinical data gleaned from a variety of 
sources as adjusted to the particularities of illness for each patient.  Morally good 
medicine, on the other hand, seeks to heal the whole person in a proportionate manner, 
subject to the best interests of the particular patient.  Pellegrino reiterates a required 
neutrality on the physician's part in relation to those decisions that belong to the patient, 
which he explains in terms of the objective aspects of medicine that depend on the 
scientific and clinical data provided by groups of patients as applied to particular patients.   
 Sulmasy describes the application of such medical data as a science of probability 
and the art of managing uncertainty.136  On this view, the application of scientific and 
clinical data by the physician in a particular treatment plan is twofold.  One is to 
eliminate or minimize as much as possible the uncertainty in treating a patient's specific 
medical condition in light of that patient's preferences.  The other aim is to maintain a 
reasonable degree of physician-neutrality with respect to those decisions that belong to 
the patient.  To avoid imposing her own personal values on the patient's decisions, the 
physician adopts a nonjudgmental attitude toward those decisions that strictly belong to 
the patient, especially in end-of-life care situations.137   
 From this ideally neutral perspective, physicians summarize their clinical analyses 
and diagnoses relative to a patient's medical condition as a physiological "quality of life" 
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judgment, which forms the basis of their recommendations to the patient.  Such 
recommendations reflect the physician's combination of relevant medical facts with the 
patient's expressed interests and values.  The physician's professional aim is to benefit the 
patient's physiological quality of life, while the patient's consent to treatment ideally 
reflects a similar expectation.  The treatment process itself ordinarily begins with the least 
burdensome course relative to the projected outcome, and unfolds as a contingent blend 
of burdens and benefits that continuously varies with the medical facts and the patient's 
preferences.  Although the physician's clinical judgment about the patient's physiological 
quality of life is clearly within the professional purview, the patient alone has the 
authority and right to determine the worth of living that life.138   
 In this context, a patient's request for assisted suicide seriously challenges the 
ethical integrity of this treatment decision process.  The nature of that challenge is such 
that an affirmative response by the physician, even when motivated by compassion for 
the patient, violates the virtuous practice of medicine.  The violation occurs in part 
because the ordinary blend of medical facts and patient preferences that contributes to a 
determination of appropriate medical care in ordinary cases is lacking in the case of 
physician-assisted suicide.  The blend is lacking because the data indicating death as an 
effective way to relieve intractable and unbearable suffering, as opposed to physical pain, 
are missing.  Suffering is an existential problem associated with the person, in contrast to 
physical pain, which is a physiological problem associated with the body.139  Since there 
are no objective existential criteria beyond a patient’s report by which to clinically 
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evaluate the patient's suffering, physician-assisted suicide lacks a technical foundation.  
Hence, there is no basis for the allegation that physician-assisted suicide is appropriate 
medical care.  
 As a result of this technical deficiency, the physician who agrees to assist a 
patient's suicide must look for other ways to justify their agreement.  This attempt begins 
with the physician's clinical judgment about the patient's poor quality of life, as indicated 
by the current medical condition and prognosis.  Such physicians then combine their 
clinical judgment with the patient's evaluation of her own life, which theoretically serves 
as the technical ground for their agreement.  In other words, motivated by a patient's 
request for physician-assisted suicide, physicians who agree to provide such assistance 
compare their clinical judgments with the patient's view that, due to illness and 
unbearable suffering, continued living has no value.  When the comparison is favorable, 
such physicians accept the request as valid and agree to provide the assistance.     
 A less obvious factor in this process is the physician's own subjective evaluation 
that the patient's life has no value worth preserving or protecting.  Without this personal 
judgment on the part of the physician, agreeing to assist the suicide of a patient whose 
life the physician views as worth preserving would be either irrational or nothing more 
than a technical response to the patient's request.  Assuming that neither is the case, 
physicians justify their agreement by necessarily inserting their own evaluation of the 
patient's life as an additional factor.  Physicians are led to take this step because the 
relevant scientific and clinical data indicating that physician-assisted suicide is 
appropriate medical care are missing.  In taking that step, however, physicians deviate 
from the established medical, legal, and ethical protocol in regard to rendering 
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appropriate medical care, which exceeds the limits of their professional expertise and by 
virtue of which they abandon the virtuous practice of medicine.               
 The ethical implications of the physician's error go beyond the particular case.  In 
agreeing to assist a patient's suicide, the physician not only implies that suicide itself has 
a certain medical legitimacy, such agreement elevates the physician's own anecdotal 
views about the value of continued living for a particular patient to the level of medical 
principle for all other patients similarly situated.  Yet, there is no reason to suppose that a 
physician's idiosyncratic approach to suffering and death in a particular case, should be 
the ethical basis of a medical policy that allows killing a person who no longer wants to 
live.  Veatch put the matter well when he argued against the assumption "that expertise in 
scientific facts of a case also leads to expertise in judgments [of] policy making regarding 
that case."140  At bottom, the physician's substitution of her personal views for missing 
medical facts in attempting to justify her participation in physician-assisted suicide 
reflects a subjective, selective attitude about whose life is worth living, which is an 
ungrounded show of expertise regarding patient suffering and perhaps the value of 
innocent life. 
 In the past, when physicians have acted on such a misguided principle, individuals 
and society have endured seriously harmful consequences.141  Despite such 
consequences, there is evidence that some physicians view their expertise and 
professional authority as including a right to determine the value of individual human 
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life.  For an example of such presumption, consider the results of one study in light of the 
current prohibition on allocating organs based on social criteria.  That study indicates that 
physicians continually show a bias toward lifestyle by routinely not placing recovering 
alcoholics on the transplant waiting list for livers.142  According to this study, only 10% 
of liver transplants went to recovering alcoholics, even though alcoholism is the leading 
cause of liver failure in the U.S.143   
 Such disparity is even more difficult to explain in light of yet another study that 
shows the survival rate for alcoholics who received liver transplants within a 25-month 
period did not differ from that of patients who received liver transplants as treatment for 
liver disease due to other causes.144  As a further comparison of these two groups of liver 
recipients, other studies indicate low alcohol consumption recidivism rates among 
recovering alcoholics, comparable alcohol consumption rates, and similar psychological 
complications after transplant.145  Such evidence suggests that the current disparity in 
liver allocations between these two groups of patients results from a classic "blame the 
patient" attitude by some physicians, which unfairly devalues the lives of such 
patients.146  
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 The fact that physician-assisted suicide requires a similar misplaced evaluation of 
a patient's life by the physician does not deter some physicians from claiming a legitimate 
role for themselves in assisting a patient's suicide, which reinforces their patients' 
expectations in that regard.  Consider a New England Journal of Medicine article that 
reported on physicians' attitudes about assisted suicide.147  According to that report, when 
asked whether they ought to assist in the suicide of hopelessly ill patients, a group of 
physicians responded affirmatively by an overwhelming majority of 10 to 2.  Other 
studies indicate that psychiatrists display a similar attitude about assisting a patient's 
suicide.148    
 A counter claim, however, is that physician-assisted suicide is unlike a case of 
allowing to die, primarily because it puts the physician's agency and judgment center 
stage.  The physician must exercise her unique agency status in deciding to provide (but 
not to administer) the means to an otherwise preventable death.149  The patient’s act of 
administering the lethal dose is a proximate cause of death that has no bearing on the 
moral status of the physician’s decision to provide that assistance.  Although a patient's 
request for physician-assisted suicide sets the stage for the physician's agreement, the 
physician does not merely acquiesce in that request, but makes a separate decision to 
contribute an original cause of death.  That decision can and must be evaluated on its own 
scientific and ethical merits, apart from the patient’s decision.  Since physician-assisted 
suicide fails to meet generally accepted ethical and clinical standards of medical practice, 
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it constitutes a professional impediment for the physician that may not be outweighed by 
a substituted subjective evaluation of the patient's life that has been combined with 
respect for patient autonomy.  To put it another way, securing medical and ethical 
warrant for assisted suicide is a requirement that the physician may not neglect out of 
compassion for the patient's suffering. 
  In response to this claim, proponents of physician-assisted suicide might argue 
that introducing a different proximate cause of death in the form of assisted suicide 
should not void a right to assume the risks of a death ultimately caused by a fatal 
pathological condition.  According to such proponents, a lack of technical warrant for 
physician-assisted suicide that gives rise to the necessity of physicians relying on their 
own subjective views about death, human suffering, and the worth of continued living for 
particular patients has no moral bearing on an individual right to choose physician-
assisted suicide.  Such proponents also might claim that the most effective way of 
accomplishing this goal is to legalize physician-assisted suicide for competent adult 
patients only.  
3.  Brock's objection to the legal ban.  
Brock adopts this line of reasoning in advocating the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide for competent adult patients who are terminally ill and who choose this 
method as their preferred mode of dying.  In taking this approach, Brock goes against a 
long-standing medical, legal, and moral tradition that bans the practice of physician-
assisted suicide.  Nevertheless, his overall aim is to accommodate the moral diversity 
surrounding this issue by appealing to a fundamental respect for patient autonomy and a 
right to self-determination.  
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 Brock explains his position in a recent critique of what he characterizes as a fairly 
common objection to legalizing physician-assisted suicide.150  The objection that Brock  
opposes is that physician-assisted suicide should not be legalized because it carries a 
greater potential for abuse than foregoing life support and other forms of end-of-life care.  
He provides a three-step analysis that addresses the empirical aspects of this objection.     
 In the first step, Brock defines abuse as "decisions which conflict with what 
patients do or would want."151  He then relies on this broad definition in restricting 
physician-assisted suicide to competent adult patients, in hopes of reducing the level 
abuse in the case of physician-assisted suicide to a level below that of incompetent 
patients, whose abuse is due to faulty surrogate decision-making.  His second step is to 
legalize physician-assisted suicide with substantial procedural safeguards aimed at 
reducing abuse in physician-assisted suicide to a level below that in other kinds of end-
of-life care, including pain medication that may hasten death, terminal sedation, 
"underground" physician-assisted suicide, and especially foregoing life support.152  In his 
view, these other practices are, for the most part, legally permissible and also result in the 
patient's death, but lack the safeguards that he recommends for physician-assisted suicide.  
The third step is an attempt to allay the fear that legalizing physician-assisted suicide is a 
slippery-slope strategy that ultimately will lead to involuntary euthanasia.153  To address 
this fear, Brock claims that the same strong public support of autonomy and a right to 
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self-determination that support permitting competent adults to choose physician-assisted 
suicide will act as a formidable barrier to killing patients against their wishes.  According 
to Brock, involuntary euthanasia is just too alien to our cultural mindset to worry about.   
 4.  A rejoinder to Brock's position. 
 Despite Brock's trust in safeguards, his argument is an empirical claim that does 
not coincide with the evidence provided by our own criminal justice system and the 
Dutch experience with euthanasia, as discussed above.  In addition, his claim raises both 
procedural and substantive issues.  Procedurally, Brock relies on a broad definition of 
abuse as the basis for restricting physician-assisted suicide to competent adult patients.  
Since the definition that he relies on obscures an ordinary distinction between errors in 
judgment and outright abuse, which is a distinction necessary for settling issues of 
culpability, his definition calls for more precise language.  Contrary to his original claim, 
however, such a refinement eliminates the empirical basis for excluding incompetent 
patients from participating in physician-assisted suicide. 
In addition, defining abuse more precisely leaves unresolved a substantive issue that 
Brock’s argument raises.  Due to his concern for protecting vulnerable persons against 
abuse (however defined), Brock relies on safeguards as an essential ingredient in the 
legalization of physician-assisted suicide.  Yet, there is strong evidence to suggest that 
even the most stringent safeguards do not protect some vulnerable persons from abuse.  
Since vulnerability is a characteristic common to all humans and may be exaggerated at 
any time, especially during terminal illness, physician-assisted suicide is a social practice 
that ultimately undermines autonomy for everyone, which puts all of society at risk.  
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Since abuse in physician-assisted suicide is more likely than Brock recognizes, legalizing 
that practice is an unsound strategy that perpetuates harm to the common good. 
As a result, Brock’s reliance on respect for patient autonomy and a right to self-
determination as the primary means for limiting unwanted extensions of physician-
assisted suicide is unwarranted.  Contrary to his thesis, physician-assisted suicide 
inherently serves to undermine patient autonomy in at least two ways.  First, it requires 
that a personal decision to commit suicide must pass medical scrutiny, which exceeds the 
physician's professional expertise and authority.  Second, acceding to such a request 
changes the locus of responsibility for the decision to commit suicide from the patient to 
the physician.  As a result, Brock’s assertion that physician-assisted suicide for competent 
adult patients will not evolve into a social policy that includes involuntary euthanasia is 
unsupported.  
 To explain this objection, Brock’s first step is to restrict physician-assisted suicide 
to competent adults, which has a certain appeal to it, but only because he defines abuse 
itself very broadly.  As it now stands, Brock's definition includes not only deliberate and 
intentionally faulty decision-making, but also any judgment that conflicts with what a 
patient would do or want.  In this sense, his definition does not distinguish between 
outright abuse and errors in judgment.   
 Yet, an ordinary understanding of abuse includes the notion of a deliberate, 
intentional, or reckless disregard for a patient's preferences.  Thus, an ordinary 
understanding distinguishes abuse itself from errors in judgment, a distinction necessary 
for deciding issues of culpability.  Abuse is clearly a culpable matter, while unavoidable 
errors in judgment, although regrettable, often eliminate culpability altogether.   
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 Since culpability is a vital component of accountability in cases involving a 
patient's intentional death, as in physician-assisted suicide, preserving the distinction 
between "abuse" and "errors in judgment" is necessary.  Given the seriousness of the 
outcome for the patient and the related issue of culpability, a definition of abuse requires 
more precise language than Brock offers.  A more precise definition of abuse would 
include the notion of a deliberate, intentional, or reckless disregard for what patients 
would do or want.   
Using more precise language to define abuse, however, eliminates the empirical 
basis for restricting physician-assisted suicide to competent adults.  Brock originally 
based his restriction on the allegation that surrogate decision-making is frequently 
"abusive" because it frequently conflicts with the incompetent patient's preferences.  With 
a more precise definition of abuse, this becomes an unsupported claim.  When surrogate 
decision-making reflects an "unavoidable faulty prediction" about the incompetent 
patient's preferences, which might occur frequently, rather than a deliberate, intentional, 
or reckless disregard of those preferences, the frequency of which is unknown, such a 
decision is an error in judgment rather than outright abuse.  Brock offers no empirical 
evidence to support the claim that surrogate decision-making represents a deliberate, 
intentional, or reckless disregard of what incompetent patients would do or want.  Hence, 
there is no longer reason to accept his assertion that end-of-life care involving surrogate 
decision-making is more abusive than physician-assisted suicide would be, even if 
restricted to competent adult patients.   
In any case, incorporating a more precise definition of abuse into Brock’s argument 
would not address the substance of that argument, which he articulates most clearly in the 
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second proviso.  In that proviso, Brock claims that safeguards will provide a reasonable 
degree of protection against abuse (however defined) in physician-assisted suicide.  This 
proviso amounts to an empirical claim that does not square with the evidence.  Consider 
the current and unambiguous ethical and legal prohibition of physician-assisted suicide, 
based in part on the theory that it puts patients at serious risk of abuse from their 
physicians and is fundamentally opposed to the physician's duty to heal.  Despite that 
prohibition, however, studies show that 12% of physicians, when asked, have acceded to 
their patient's request for assisted suicide.154  Other studies suggest a more extensive 
“underground” practice of physician-assisted suicide.  For example, according to a New 
England Journal of Medicine report on physicians' attitudes about assisted suicide, when 
asked whether they ought to assist in the suicide of hopelessly ill patients, physicians 
replied in the affirmative by an overwhelming majority.155  Still other studies indicate 
that psychiatrists view assisted suicide with a similar attitude.156   
 In light of such data, Brock's claim that legalizing physician-assisted suicide with 
substantial safeguards will provide a reasonable degree of protection against abuse 
through the force of law is not persuasive.  Given that some physicians do not follow the 
current legal ban on physician-assisted suicide, there is reason to suppose that physicians 
would place themselves above the law once again, should they see fit, and not follow 
other safeguards that allow that practice within certain parameters.  The dominant role of 
physicians in healthcare decisions means that the effectiveness of safeguards depends on 
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their voluntary compliance.  According to the above data, however, if physicians were to 
find the safeguards regarding the practice of physician-assisted suicide unacceptable, it 
seems that their compliance is not very likely.157     
 The prospect of criminal prosecution for failing to follow specific safeguards is 
not likely to encourage physician compliance either.  Although some physicians ignore 
the current legal ban on physician-assisted suicide, no physician has ever been 
successfully prosecuted for participating in an "underground" practice of physician-
assisted suicide.158  Hence, there is reason to suppose that prosecution would not likely 
follow on the heels of non-compliance with respect to legalized physician-assisted 
suicide guidelines.  At issue is the effectiveness of safeguards to protect patients from 
abuse.  The troubling question is, which physicians won't comply with those safeguards 
and under what conditions?  At worst, will allowing physician-assisted suicide eventually 
lead to involuntary euthanasia?   
Brock attempts to allay such fears with the claim that legalizing physician-
assisted suicide on a restricted basis will not lead to involuntary euthanasia.  In taking this 
third and final step in his three-part compromise, he cites strong public support for 
autonomy and an individual right to self-determination as a formidable bulwark against 
involuntary euthanasia.  Contrary to this assurance, however, is the suggestion that the 
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practice of physician-assisted suicide inherently serves to undermine patient autonomy in 
at least two ways.  First, it requires that a personal decision to commit suicide must pass 
medical scrutiny, which exceeds the physician's expertise.  Second, acceding to such a 
request changes the locus of responsibility for that decision from the patient to the 
physician.  
 Regarding the first way, the patient who requests assisted suicide from a 
physician transfers a personal decision about suicide to the clinical setting.  In that 
setting, the patient's decision must pass medical scrutiny before it can be carried out.  
Medical scrutiny takes precedence in this situation because the physician must judge not 
only the patient's competence, as expected, but also the extent and intensity of the 
patient's suffering to determine whether death is the appropriate remedy.  Yet, there are 
no medically relevant criteria or clinical practice guidelines by which to judge the 
existential quality of the patient's suffering or the worth of continued living.159  Suffering 
is an existential problem associated with the person, in contrast to physical pain, which is 
a physiological problem associated with the body.160 
 Regarding the second way in which physician-assisted suicide undermines patient 
autonomy, consider the roughly 30,000 suicides each year in the United States carried out 
without help from others.161  Consider also that physicians do not possess unique 
knowledge about how to succeed at suicide.  Pharmacists and nurses, for example, also 
have that kind of knowledge.  In addition, the Hemlock Society publishes information 
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regarding methods that lead to a successful suicide.  There are organizations based in 
other countries that publish similar information.  Hence, there is no technical reason for 
the physician's participation in physician-assisted suicide.162  As a result, the patient's 
request for such assistance and the physician's agreement must be explained in terms 
other than autonomy and self-determination.   
 One likely explanation is that a patient's request for physician-assisted suicide 
reflects a desire to change the locus of control and responsibility from the patient to the 
physician.  In other words, "those who commit suicide on their own may have an internal 
locus of control; [while] those who want others to assist them may want to avoid 
responsibility for their own death."163  Indeed, some studies show that people are "more 
willing to accept responsibility for good deeds than for bad deeds, for successes rather 
than failures, and for joint outcomes than for outcomes produced by oneself."164  Given 
the social and moral stigma attached to suicide, "some potential suicides may see the 
participation of others, especially physicians, as making them less morally at fault 
themselves."165  The psychological factors that cause such a desire might render the 
patient's request understandable, but those factors also serve to undermine autonomy and 
self-determination, which invalidates the physician's agreement to assist the patient's 
suicide predicated on that basis. 
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 For these reasons, Brock has not shown that legalizing physician-assisted suicide 
on a restricted basis with substantial safeguards renders it less abusive than other forms of 
end-of-life care, including foregoing life support.  Because legalizing physician-assisted 
suicide perpetuates its inherent potential for abuse, it poses a serious risk for all of 
society, especially the more vulnerable members.  Thus, the ethical and legal ban should 
continue. 
B.  Modern proportionality times two: Gury and Knauer. 
 Like the classical interpretation of proportionality as developed by Aquinas, 
modern interpretations of that concept also have roots in double effect reasoning, but 
yield a very different meaning.  While the classical meaning concerns the use of 
reasonable means in a given set of circumstances, modern interpretations of proportionate 
reason, which are based on the works of Jean Pierre Gury and Peter Knauer, focus on 
outcomes.  Gury's original interpretation stresses a predominance of good in the 
immediate outcome, while Knauer's later interpretation of that concept entails a 
maximizing of values or minimizing disvalues in the long run and on the whole.166 
 According to Gury, "It is permitted to posit a good or indifferent cause, from 
which a twofold effect follows, one good, but the other bad, if there is...a proportionately 
grave reason, the end of the agent is honest, and the good effect follows from that cause, 
not from a mediating bad one."167  With a focus on positing causes, Gury places less 
emphasis on forming the right intention and insists on a proportionately grave reason for 
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causing an evil effect, unless a particular virtue requires one to refrain from actuating that 
cause.  Later theorists interpret Gury's requirement in terms of weighing or balancing 
various goods against evils or harms, which is an important shift in meaning and 
emphasis for the later development of proportionalism as a distinct moral theory.168  
Although Gury reformulates Aquinas’ double effect reasoning in terms of positing causes 
and proportionate reason, he adopts the classical prohibition of evil means, relying on the 
Pauline principle that it is unlawful to do evil that good may come of it.169   
 Knauer provides yet another shift in the meaning and scope of proportionate 
reason.  Although he follows Gury by focusing on a net balance of good in the outcome 
as justification for allowing evil to occur, Knauer adds the requirement that such effects 
must be measured in the long run and on the whole, which is to measure an act in its 
fullest sense.170  In Knauer's view, an act that does not produce a net balance of good in 
its fullest sense is counterproductive and, as he says, ultimately self-contradictory.  
Because such acts oppose their own end, as excessive whaling ultimately depletes the 
supply of whales, they are morally impermissible.  Knauer claims that such acts are at 
bottom exploitative, and in his view, exploitation is intrinsically evil.171  
 Knauer further modifies Gury's line of reasoning with the claim that every act has 
evil consequences insofar as choosing a value unavoidably precludes choosing another 
value, and value foregone is a premoral evil in the sense of deprivation.172  In other 
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words, the pursuit of good always extracts a certain price, if only in terms of fatigue, 
which is “opportunity costs” in the jargon of an economist.  Justification for causing such 
deprivation depends on whether there is a commensurate reason as specified by the sum 
total of an act in its fullest sense.  For this reason, Knauer considers this sort of calculus 
the fundamental principle of all morality.  As he puts it, "Today, the principle of double 
effect is most briefly formulated as follows: One may permit the evil effect of this act 
only if this is not intended in itself but is indirect and justified by a commensurate 
reason."173   
 On Knauer's account, "commensurate reason" amounts to maximizing values or 
minimizing disvalues in the long run and on the whole, which is a thesis that McCormick 
summarizes with the following criteria:   
1.  There is a value at stake at least equal to the value sacrificed. 
 2.  There is no less harmful way of protecting the value here and now.  
 3.  The manner of its protection here and now will not undermine that value  
     in the long run.174   
 
These criteria suggest that Knauer's interpretation of proportionate reason is a matter of 
weighing different values against each other or against harms.175 As proponents of 
utilitarianism have long known, establishing a predominance of good in any sense, either 
in the immediate outcome or in the long run and on the whole, can prove difficult in 
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practice.176  Since tragic choices are inevitable in the real world, such criticisms perhaps 
highlight the difficulty rather than the impossibility of doing so. 
 Knauer also reintroduces the familiar "intention" language found in the Thomistic 
version of double effect reasoning, which compensates for Gury's neglect in this regard, 
but distinguishes between psychological and moral intention.  For Knauer, psychological 
intention pertains to the practical aspects of an act, while moral intention corresponds to 
the presence or absence of commensurate reason.177  An agent might psychologically 
intend an evil cause or means, as long as there is a commensurate reason for doing so.  
For example, a surgeon who amputates a gangrenous limb psychologically understands 
and accepts that the patient will no longer have use of the limb, but morally intends to 
preserve that patient's life.  In such cases, preserving life is a commensurate reason that 
justifies the premoral harm of amputation.  For Knauer, the moral question is whether an 
act having bad effects is permitted.  In his view, the answer depends entirely on whether 
there is commensurate reason for allowing that harm.178 
 A primary difference between these three versions concerns the way in which 
each handles proportionate reason.  Classical proportionality concerns the relationship 
between the means and the end, and as an aspect of double effect reasoning does not 
entail that the good outweigh the bad.  Indeed, although there must be a substantial 
reason for allowing bad effects, such effects can outweigh the good.179  To put it another 
way, Thomistic proportionalism functions on the premise that an act of a certain kind is 
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always right (or wrong), while the Gury-Knauer versions focus on the consequences that 
one should bring about, namely, a predominance of good in the outcome.180  In this 
respect, Gury looks to the immediate outcome, while Knauer requires a choice of the 
greater good by evaluating consequences in the long run and on the whole.  For Knauer, 
maximizing the good is the only fundamental moral principle. 
 1.  Gury and the immediate effects of assisted suicide. 
 These differences notwithstanding, physician-assisted suicide fares no better 
under a modern interpretation of proportionality than on a classical interpretation of that 
principle.  Consider first Gury's account of proportionality as a predominance of good in 
the immediate outcome, excluding the use of evil means.181  Whether physician-assisted 
suicide has the desired effect must be judged from two different perspectives.  From the 
patient's perspective, the desired effect must be that death brings an immediate relief of 
suffering, which must outweigh both the burdens of continued existence and the negative 
effects, if any, of causing death.  Since possibly only the patient knows whether a 
physician-caused death has the necessary desired effect, the physician is unable to verify 
the relevant effects of causing the patient's death.  Thus, the patient's perspective has no 
bearing on whether physician-assisted suicide is a proportionate medical response.   
 From the physician's perspective, physician-assisted suicide clearly fails to meet 
Gury's requirement regarding the immediate net effects of an act.  The immediate effects 
of death are only partially known by the physician and chiefly concern the 
neurophysiological status of the patient's corpse.  The remaining effects concern the 
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patient's suffering and are unknown by the physician.  Hence, the physician is unable to 
evaluate physician-assisted suicide in a technical sense.  Since physician-assisted suicide 
has no technical basis, it cannot qualify as a proportionate medical response.  As a result, 
according to Gury's account of proportionality, the physician's agreement to assist the 
patient's suicide as a way to relieve the patient's suffering is technically and thus morally 
unfounded.    
 Physician-assisted suicide also fails to meet Gury's criterion that the end cannot 
justify the means.  Since physician-assisted suicide involves the physician in killing the 
patient, who is innocent in any morally relevant sense, the physician's agreement to assist 
the patient's suicide involves the physician in means traditionally viewed as morally 
unacceptable.  As a result, the burden of proof rests with those who would take exception 
to the widely held view that killing innocent persons is morally unacceptable social 
policy, especially when carried out by private citizens, such as physicians.                 
 Proponents of physician-assisted suicide might counter with the suggestion that 
physician-assisted suicide can be viewed as a form of experimental medicine or research 
involving human subjects.182  In the case of medical experimentation, risks to the human 
subjects are frequently unforeseen but accepted by the participant, while all benefits 
might accrue to others who do not participate in the experiment.183  The proponents of 
physician-assisted suicide might claim that the same condition applies in a case of 
physician-assisted suicide.  The patient who requests physician-assisted suicide could 
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voluntarily accept the risks of that procedure, unforeseen or not, and can do so despite the 
fact that others are the primary recipients of the associated benefits.  As a case in point, 
terminally ill patients might request physician-assisted suicide, based on the belief that 
their loved ones will be relieved of the financial and emotional burdens associated with 
their prolonged terminal illness.184    
 Those who oppose this sort of altruistic reasoning, based on the suggestion that 
physician-assisted suicide is analogous to experimental medicine, might claim that this 
comparison fails for the following two reasons.  First, the ethics of research involving 
human subjects is such that current law does not release investigators from liability for 
negligence, despite the participant's voluntary assumption of risks.185  In the case of 
physician-assisted suicide, however, such a proviso may have little force because a 
question of negligence is not likely to arise.  Since family members are the most likely 
source of charges of neglect, such a charge is not likely to arise in the case of physician-
assisted suicide that centers primarily on relieving their suffering, and secondarily on 
relieving the patient's suffering. When the family members so burdened consent to the 
patient's choice for physician-assisted suicide so as to bring them relief, and they indeed 
experience such relief after the patient's death, they are not likely to bring charges of 
neglect against the physician who helped bring about their relief.  Such a charge also 
seems less likely when patients seek physician-assisted suicide to help their families.       
 The second point concerns the fact that researchers not only expect medical 
experimentation to yield benefits, which partly justifies the experiment itself, they also 
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expect to measure those benefits, if not in conjunction with the current experiment, then 
at a subsequent point when sufficient evidence from additional experimentation 
accumulates.  In the case of physician-assisted suicide, however, since evidence 
concerning the medical benefits of death in terms of relief for patient suffering does not 
accumulate on this side of death, so to speak, such benefits remain a matter of personal 
conjecture, or theological and philosophical speculation rather than clinical fact.  Because 
scientific measurement of how well physician-assisted suicide relieves patient suffering is 
thus far not possible, the underlying rationale for experimental medicine itself, namely, a 
measurable enhancement of human life, is absent.  Proponents of physician-assisted 
suicide substitute that missing rationale with a view of suffering as a contingent, 
uncharacteristic feature of human life to be eliminated at all costs, including the 
elimination of the sufferer in a painless manner.186  Such a claim seems as extreme as the 
view that the sufferer's life should be preserved at all costs, especially when doing so 
allows healthcare providers and caregivers opportunity to indulge their concern for the 
one who suffers.  Given the difference in the underlying rationale for physician-assisted 
suicide as compared to experimental medicine, supporters of physician-assisted suicide 
will have to look elsewhere for ethical support.  
 2.  Knauer and the long-term effects of assisted suicide. 
 Physician-assisted suicide fares no better under Knauer's theory of 
proportionality.  Knauer modifies Gury's requirement that there must be a "predominance 
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of good in the immediate outcome" by adding the notion that a commensurate reason 
must be measured in the long run and on the whole, which is to measure an act in its 
fullest sense.  Knauer’s insistence on this measure derives from his claim that every act 
seeks a value that unavoidably involves the foregoing of some other value.  While 
economists refer to such trade-offs as opportunity costs, Knauer maintains that this 
sacrifice in values constitutes a premoral evil to the extent that double effect reasoning 
governs every act.187  For this reason, Knauer rules out all acts that ultimately produce a 
net gain in evil, because such acts are counterproductive and self-contradictory in the 
long run and on the whole.  By the same token, he also insists on the less onerous method 
of pursuit.  By placing double effect reasoning at the heart of moral analysis, Knauer 
provides the foundation for the moral theory now known as proportionalism.188 
 On Knauer’s account, physician-assisted suicide fails as a proportionate medical 
response for two reasons.  First, the practice itself undermines individual autonomy and 
self-determination in the long run due to its potential for abuse, and on the whole, 
because it yields an injustice for those with fewer resources.  Second, there is a less 
onerous method of relief available, namely, acceptance.  
Regarding the first reason, Knauer claims that the net effect of pursuing certain 
values must be measured in the long run and on the whole.  According to these criteria, 
the realization of certain values ultimately must not undermine or nullify those or other 
equally important values.  In the case of physician-assisted suicide, as shown earlier in 
the objection to Brock’s argument, the likely failure of safeguards to protect the 
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autonomy and right to self-determination of vulnerable persons ultimately applies to all 
others as well.  Because terminal illness often intensifies one’s vulnerability, the potential 
for abuse in the practice of physician-assisted suicide exists for all persons.  Hence, 
allowing that practice undermines autonomy and self-determination in the long run. 
On the whole, aside from a question of abuse, the practice of physician-assisted 
suicide raises an issue of justice for those with fewer resources.189  To explain, like 
Brock, some proponents of physician-assisted suicide argue that one way to prevent an 
injustice stemming from a premature choice is to establish that practice as an option of 
last resort.190  Such a requirement usually means that the patient is terminally ill,191 and 
that certain prior steps have been taken, including “adequate screening for depression, 
full exploration of alternatives,” and that “appropriate medical and social supports” have 
been exhausted.192  On this view, it would be an injustice for some persons to choose 
physician-assisted suicide and thereby forfeit a portion of their lives that they otherwise 
would have chosen to live out had other available care existed.  A last-resort strategy 
seeks to avoid such a possibility by ensuring that a patient’s choice is free from physician 
bias regarding when and for whom the option is appropriate.193  It also helps ensure that a 
patient’s choice is free from erroneous assumptions about prognosis and the effects of 
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treatment.194  In theory, the end result is that a patient’s choice of physician-assisted 
suicide more likely reflects a “voluntary, informed, and settled decision to die.”195   
In practice, however, such a policy cannot be applied fairly.  All competent adults 
who would choose physician-assisted suicide simply do not have an equal amount of 
resources to purchase the medical care available or to establish and maintain the kind of 
relationship with a physician that ought to precede and support a voluntary and informed 
choice for assisted suicide.196  For those with adequate resources, “last resort” truly 
means “after all that can be done technologically has been done,” while for those with 
fewer resources, it means “after all that can be afforded has been bought.”  Those falling 
into this category include the poor, the underinsured, the uninsured, and many of the 
elderly.  Their lack of resources, which puts them into this category, is largely due to 
socioeconomic factors not entirely within their control.  Yet, society is unwilling to 
mitigate the effects of such a disparity by ensuring the same level of healthcare for all 
persons.   
As a result, physician-assisted suicide may become an option of last resort for the 
disadvantaged sooner than for the privileged who can afford the available healthcare to 
alleviate their medical condition.  On the flip side, physicians, who are under various 
pressures from third-party payers and others, may too readily accept such requests 
because their disadvantaged patients do not have the resources to explore alternatives or 
to undergo the appropriate psychological evaluation that might suggest another 
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approach.197  Such consequences cause serious doubt about a genuine exercise of 
autonomy and self-determination, to the extent that allowing physician-assisted suicide 
constitutes an injustice for those competent adults with fewer resources.198  
The autonomy of patients who request assisted suicide may be compromised by 
psychological factors as well, which ultimately raises a question of competency.  
Although a request for assisted suicide is not necessarily irrational, the request can be 
motivated by factors other than desire for death.  Factors such as “grief, depression, 
anxiety, organic mental disorders, and family and personality issues have all been 
implicated in patients’ decision to hasten death,” whether through the cessation of life-
sustaining treatment or through physician-assisted suicide.199  There is evidence, 
however, showing a direct link between requests for physician-assisted suicide and 
clinical depression.200  For example, a recent study shows that “Desire for hastened death 
among terminally ill cancer patients is not uncommon.  Depression and hopelessness are 
the strongest predictors of desire for hastened death in this population and provide 
independent and unique contributions.”201   
Based on such evidence, the New York Task Force claimed that, “The majority of 
individuals who kill themselves suffer from depression that is treatable with appropriate 
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clinical care.”202  Yet, “too often, clinicians fail to detect treatable depression or other 
psychiatric illness, assuming that the depression is expected or beyond treatment.”203  
This professional failure can be explained in part by the fact that “most doctors are not 
adequately trained to diagnose depression especially in complex cases such as patients 
who are terminally ill.”204  Such consequences led the American Medical Association to 
state that a physician’s initial response to a request for assisted-suicide, regardless of the 
physician’s willingness to comply, must be to explore the meaning behind the request.205   
Part of that exploration must include evaluating the patient’s competency.  Indeed, 
evaluating the competency of patients who request physician-assisted suicide is often 
proposed as an important safeguard against abuse.206  Such evaluations not only help  
determine “whether the request is competent and voluntary or the result of distorted 
judgment from a mental disorder such as depression.”207  Assessing the competency of 
patients who request assisted suicide is an indispensable preliminary step to interventions 
aimed at treating depression, hopelessness, and the inadequacies of social support 
systems, which are “important aspects of adequate palliative care, particularly as it relates 
to desire for hastened death.”208   
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Although evaluating a patient’s desire for death might ensure that “only competent 
patients have access to assisted suicide,” the guidelines and standards to aid in such 
evaluations have not been developed by mental health experts, especially psychiatrists, 
who are usually identified as the best qualified to protect the autonomy of such 
patients.209  The absence of standardized measures in this area might explain why a 
majority of psychiatrists in one survey reported a lack of professional confidence “to 
determine in the context of a single consultation if a mental disorder or depression 
impaired the judgment of a patient requesting assisted suicide.”210  Such results also 
might reflect the fact that psychiatrists ordinarily do not work with seriously ill and dying 
patients in hospitals, nursing homes, or hospice settings.211   
On the other hand, a group of forensic psychiatrists, who frequently evaluate 
competency of individuals in the judicial process, reported in another survey that the 
evaluation process they recommended to assess the competency of patients requesting 
assisted suicide might be burdensome for terminally ill patients.212  Without some form of 
standardized measures, however, there is no benchmark against which to assess the 
validity of particular evaluations of patients who request assisted suicide.  In that case, 
the claim that physician-assisted suicide in the long run and on the whole promotes 
autonomy and self-determination is unsubstantiated.213  
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Turning now to the second reason that Knauer’s interpretation of proportionality 
fails to support physician-assisted suicide, he claims that there must be no less harmful 
way of securing the value sought.  In the case of physician-assisted suicide, however, 
where the value sought is relief of suffering, a less onerous method of securing that value 
is through acceptance.  Although difficult--if not impossible--for some patients to 
achieve, acceptance is more likely when treating the patient as a whole person, rather 
than simply as a patient who is terminally ill.  This conclusion relies on a view of 
acceptance that Kubler-Ross and others advocate in their treatment of the terminally ill.   
In the clinical setting, acceptance should not be left solely to the patient.  It can be 
promoted by the physician and other caregivers who can inspire the patient with hope for 
the “good that is yet to be…even when there is no remedy for the sickness.”214  The 
caregiver, especially the attending physician, fosters a sense of hope “by a spoken or 
unspoken promise that this man or woman who puts such trust in [the physician] will not 
be abandoned to die alone; that the meaning of the life soon to end will be perpetuated 
within our memories and our actions; and that insofar as this can be managed, no 
suffering will disturb the tranquility of the final days.”215  Although this last step is not 
always possible, to be sure, “The methods of palliative care, or comfort care, have in the 
past few decades reached a level of effectiveness such that suffering thought at first to be 
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intractable can almost always be relieved.”216  The genuinely compassionate caregiver 
will undertake the effort. 
IV.  The heart-wrenching cases and assisted suicide. 
After every available treatment has been carried out, however, suppose some 
terminally ill patients cannot achieve acceptance, their pain management is no longer 
effective, and their suffering remains unbearable.  Although perhaps rare, these are the 
“hard cases” that raise a question of whether such patients have a right to die by some 
active means that hastens death.  This question compels a reexamination of the absolute 
rule against both physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia.  Many 
proponents would argue that, in banning both options, society forces such patients to live 
in “irremediably distressing and degrading conditions.”217       
Proponents want to avoid such an outcome by allowing physician-assisted suicide 
and voluntary active euthanasia in “hard cases” where nothing else medically can be done 
to alleviate the patient’s suffering.  Likewise, some opponents of legalizing either 
practice still make room for such cases in their opposition.  For example, John Arras 
opposes the legalization of both physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active 
euthanasia, but would permit the covert practice of both in exceptional, rare cases.  Arras 
refers to such cases as tragic, and claims that “compassionate physicians…like Dr. 
Timothy Quill, will ultimately be willing, albeit in fear and trembling, to ‘take small risks 
for people [they] really know and care about’” and accede to requests for assisted 
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suicide.218  Arras’ willingness to accommodate hard cases relies on the assumption that 
“…whatever choice we make, whether we opt for a reaffirmation of the current legal 
restraints or for a policy of legitimation and regulation, there are bound to be victims.”219  
Although a covert policy would not be subject to regulation aimed at preventing abuse, 
Arras claims that the force of law and the threat of licensure revocation would “serve, for 
the majority of physicians, as powerful disincentives to abuse the system.”220   
Ezekiel Emanuel is another opponent of legalization that holds a similar view about 
permitting physician-assisted suicide on a covert, rare-case basis.  Emanuel argues that 
society ought to continue the legal ban on physician-assisted suicide, but claims that “in 
exceptional cases [such] interventions are appropriate, as acts of desperation when all 
other elements of treatment—all medications, surgical procedures, psychotherapy, 
spiritual care, and so on—have been tried.”221  In his attempt to modify an absolute ban 
on physician-assisted suicide, however, Emanuel does not consider the current lack of 
psychiatric guidelines or standards by which to evaluate a request for assisted suicide.222   
Howard Brody also opposes legalization of physician-assisted suicide, but would 
permit that practice in cases where all medical interventions have failed to achieve a good 
death and the patient makes a voluntary request for such assistance.  Brody, however, 
advocates a post facto approach similar to the course once followed by the Dutch.  He 
proposes that, when the physician who carries out the patient’s request has been charged 
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with criminal homicide or assisting in a suicide, the physician be allowed to invoke a 
legal defense that he refers to as a “compassionate response to a medical failure.”223  In 
explicating the nature of that defense, Brody describes an elaborate and open review 
process by which the morality (and legality) of providing assisted suicide can be 
determined on the merits of each case.224  With this strategy, Brody wants the legal ban 
on assisted suicide continued, while allowing that practice as an option for patients no 
longer willing to endure their condition in the face of medical futility. 
While these and similar proposals appear to offer a compromise position between 
extremes, they are problematic in at least three ways.  First, as discussed above, such 
approaches fail to account for the complex nature of suicide itself, “particularly among 
patients confronting a terminal illness, which makes interpreting and responding 
appropriately to requests for assisted suicide far more difficult than is often assumed.”225   
According to some specialists in end-of-life care, thoughts of suicide are common among 
the terminally ill.  Rather than reflecting a genuine desire to die, however, such requests 
are generally symptoms of undiagnosed clinical depression, unexplored fears of dying or 
of becoming a burden, or improperly managed physical pain.226   
Without exploring and treating the underlying issues that cast doubt on the 
voluntary nature of such requests, the danger of a social policy that allows physician-
assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, even in rare cases, is that a patient’s 
                                                 
223 Brody, Howard (1992), “Assisted Death – A Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure,” NEJM  (327), 
p.1384. 
224 Brody (1992), p. 1387. 
225 Coleman (2002), p. 19. 
226 Muskin, P. R. (1998), “The Request to Die: Role for a Psychodynamic Perspective on Physician-Assisted Suicide.” 
JAMA 279, pp. 323-28.  See also Foot, Phillipa (1977), “Euthanasia”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 85. 
 184
request may be accepted at face value.  Legitimizing either practice would encourage 
acceptance on that level.227  After all, once physician-assisted suicide and voluntary 
active euthanasia become acceptable medical practice, physicians would have less 
incentive to explore the reasons behind a request for such assistance, especially when the 
attending physician has already formed a judgment that such a choice is appropriate.  The 
consequences of that possibility, however remote, are unacceptable, especially when 
there are less drastic ways of addressing the patient’s needs.228  Without further research 
and clinical training preparing physicians to confront and respond in a professionally 
competent manner to the underlying issues that give rise to such requests, allowing either 
practice even in rare cases is an inadequate and premature medical response.   
Second, advocates of the “hard case” rule presume and highlight the rarity of such 
cases as reason to allow physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia, but 
reality would suggest otherwise.  For, it is difficult to control the expansion of a social 
policy that allows exceptions to an absolute ban on either practice.  Other “hard cases” 
are “bound to emerge on the other side of the line and with it the pressure to extend the 
outer boundaries of the exceptions to embrace these new ‘hard’ cases.”229  Although such 
expansion may not be unlimited, setting out the criteria that identifies a genuine “hard 
case” could be an endlessly flexible and downright illusive undertaking.  Consequently, 
the irreversible and radical consequences for the patient render the “hard case” scenario 
an inappropriate basis of a social policy that allows either practice.   
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Third, because rare and exceptional cases by their nature are not representative, 
the class of persons who qualify under the exception must be carefully identified.  This 
entails the adoption of criteria and guidelines to carve out the exceptions and the 
establishment of safeguards to protect against abuse.  That very process would transform 
physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia into social policy, subject to 
the same considerations discussed above.  Those considerations yield the conclusion that 
“hard cases” cannot transform either physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active 
euthanasia into acceptable medical practice.   
V.  Conclusion. 
The claim that physician-assisted suicide is a disproportionate and unacceptable 
medical response to patient suffering might seem counterintuitive.  Given the nature of 
suffering as an unrelenting and oppressive tension between hope and despair, the 
psychology of its relief seems obvious.  On this view of suffering, "if you are hopeful that 
some end can be achieved, then you normally ought also to be afraid when its 
accomplishment is threatened, relieved when the threat does not materialize, angry at 
those who intentionally obstruct progress toward it, and satisfied when you finally 
achieve it (or disappointed when you fail)."230  On this approach, the principle of 
beneficence, or acting in the patient's best interests, might be construed as doing what the 
patient wants, given her autonomy and a preemptive right to self-determination. 
 Although the traditional interpretation of beneficence has meant acting in the 
patient's best interests, historically, that principle has given preemptive status more to the 
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physician's wishes than to the patient's.  In addition, there have been different views 
about how the physician ought to promote the patient's best interests.  Beneficence as 
strong physician paternalism perhaps began in 1803 with Thomas Percival's Medical 
Ethics, augmented in 1847 by the American Medical Association's first Code of Medical 
Ethics, both of which deemed the patient's best interests as equivalent to her medical 
interests.231  On this view, because the physician had the training and skill to determine 
the patient's medical interests and the knowledge to secure those interests, the physician 
expected the patient to defer all medical judgments to him (rarely to "her" in those days).  
Combined with the physician's legitimate authority to decide about medical facts, this 
expectation quite naturally gave rise to a view of beneficence in terms of paternalism.  
Paternalistic physicians believe they know what is best for the patient better than the 
patient.232  On this model, physician authority ranks above patient autonomy in the 
clinical setting.  
 A shift away from the physician's authority as preemptive in the clinical setting 
toward the dominance of patient autonomy began with changes in payment mechanisms 
for healthcare services in the early 1940's.  At that time, employers and employee unions 
began acting as third party payors for healthcare services, which increased demand for 
those services.233  This demand increased steadily through the 1960's, and rose sharply in 
1965 with the federal enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid healthcare payment plans 
for the elderly and indigent.  As a result, patients began to view themselves as consumers 
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of healthcare services, and consumers have a voice in which services they want and 
when.   
 The trend toward a consumer-based healthcare market continues unabated, which 
has produced a corresponding refinement in the public's expectations about the scope and 
quality of healthcare services.234  Not surprisingly, physicians have responded to that 
trend by recognizing patients as consumers in need of satisfaction.235  One result has 
been to supplant the physician's preemptive authority with the patient's autonomy, which 
carries the weight of a more sophisticated view of healthcare and financial ability to pay.    
 The patient's preemptive right to make treatment decisions has been reinforced 
with several landmark legal cases that have affirmed the patient's rights over the 
physician's authority.  Consider the 1972 ruling in Canterbury v. Spence that affirmed the 
patient's right to an informed consent before receipt of care, and the 1976 ruling in In re 
Quinlan that affirmed the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining technology.  The rulings 
in these two cases clearly show that patients or their surrogates legally can and should 
make autonomous healthcare decisions, even over the objections of their physicians.236  
This emphasis by the judiciary on patients' rights has further eroded the physician's 
traditional unilateral decision-making authority, correctly so, but also has contributed to 
the replacement of beneficence with autonomy as the fundamental value.   
 The transformation from physician authority to patient autonomy as the 
predominant ethical principle in the clinical setting has produced a gratifying public 
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confidence in the view that it is permissible to forego life-sustaining technologies under a 
variety of conditions, although death will be the result.  Now, public opinion is shifting 
even further to the view that requesting aid from physicians in dying is no longer a 
request for mercy killing, but merely a request for aid in hastening an entirely natural 
process.237   
 One objection to this conclusion is the claim that the pendulum of public opinion 
has shifted too far.  Rather, patient autonomy and beneficence must remain in balance 
with one another so as not to endanger vulnerable members of society, such as those with 
AIDS, Alzheimer's disease, spinal cord injuries, severe deformity, and those who are a 
financial burden on family and society.  Given that vulnerability, a request for physician-
assisted suicide calls for an alternative response by the caregiver.  
 The view that patient autonomy alone can justify causing the patient's death 
presents a view of the patient as "body to be disposed of at the patient's will."  Such a 
view treats the patient as the means to an end, which objectifies the body as a mere 
instrument.  To comply with the moral imperative to treat persons as more than mere 
ends, the physician must view all patients, including the terminally ill, in a more holistic 
way---as situated persons with spiritual and intellectual as well as physical needs, all of 
which vitally influence and determine the patient's suffering.  Paying attention to all of 
these aspects of the patient's life rather than to just the physical better enables the 
physician to treat the whole person and to relieve the patient's suffering without causing 
her death. 
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 Such an attitude requires the physician to sustain a compassionate presence with 
that patient.  Ideally, the physician fulfills this commitment best by refusing to leave her 
patient alone and isolated in her illness, and by not confirming the patient's fears about 
death with a promise of death that relies on the patient's fears and feelings of despair to 
work its relief.  This physician also insists that those who can and should provide comfort 
and care to the patient, regardless of professional standing, should do so as an integral 
part of the healing process, as the patient so desires.  This physician relieves all 
unnecessary pain of any kind or intensity when relief is available, even if such relief 
hastens an unintended death and provided that the patient desires that kind of relief.  
When cure is not possible, the physician aids her patient's continued life in a reasonable 
manner so as to avoid postponing an inevitable death against her patient's will.  By 
sustaining a compassionate presence in this way, the physician relieves the patient's 
suffering by satisfying the clinical needs of her patient, as those needs relate to illness and 
death. 
 In sum, the morally defensible alternative response to a request for physician-
assisted suicide is to treat patients as whole persons and to help the suffering patient find 
peace through acceptance.  Assisting the patient in this way can be part of an essential 
palliative care plan, which should aim for a level of acceptance comparable to that 
attained by those who go through divorce, or death of a loved one, or other such personal 
tragedies.  Hospice care programs often use this approach effectively, which depends on 
viewing the patient holistically.  
  As a result, the argument against physician-assisted suicide from the physician's 
perspective is not an argument against the right of patients to evaluate their own lives, nor 
 190
is it an attempt to refute the reasons patients might give in support of their choice of 
suicide.  Such evaluations are subjective in nature and may be valid from the patient's 
perspective.  In addition, the reasons supporting such conclusions are too numerous and 
too complex to consider.  Although a decision to kill oneself is a prima facie denial that 
life is worth living, such a judgment is reserved to the individual whose life is in question 
and depends on a personal rather than a medical context.238  Hence, there is no quibble 
here over the view that suicide can be a rational decision, at least in the theoretical sense 
that one might support such a decision with reasons that other rational persons might 
affirm as valid.239      
 Second, this objection to physician-assisted suicide does not assume any value or 
purpose to suffering.  For the religious minded, suffering can have redemptive or 
retributive value.240  Such interpretations may have relevance to the debate about causing 
the patient's death, and may help patients determine the meaning of their own suffering.  
Despite the personal value that suffering may have for some patients, the argument 
against physician-assisted suicide presented here relies on the view that suffering is a 
disvalue to be avoided, prevented, or resolved whenever possible, though not at all costs.  
Just as physicians have no obligation to preserve life at all costs, they likewise have no 
obligation to relieve suffering at all costs.     
  Lastly, the argument in this chapter is not against a right to die.  Securing such a 
right can be a matter of legal stipulation, as the voters in Oregon and some other 
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countries have done.  In the U.S., the petitioners in Washington v. Glucksberg and in 
Vacco v. Quill sought affirmation of a constitutional right to die from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Their petition sought an exemption for physicians from criminal liability in 
causing a patient's death on condition that the patient was terminally ill, death was 
imminent, and the patient voluntarily requested such assistance from the physician.  
Although the justices did not find a constitutional right to die in either case, their ruling 
explicitly encouraged physicians to aid the dying process with more aggressive palliative 
care measures, even at the risk of hastening the patient's death but without causing that 
death.241  The Court's emphasis on medically appropriate alternative methods of assisting 
the patient's death does not bar other states from enacting measures similar to Oregon's 
law that permits physician-assisted suicide.  Thus, future efforts to provide for a right to 
die and a concomitant right to assisted suicide might very well succeed.  Rather than 
argue against such a right, however, the claim defended in this chapter is that physician-
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Chapter  4 
 
Holistic Medicine 
God, grant me serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and 
wisdom to know the difference. 
         
 
 
I.  Introduction. 
As the analysis in Chapter 3 shows, Thomasma and Pellegrino argue that a 
combination of several factors determines an appropriate clinical response to a patient’s 
medical condition.  In their view, choosing the appropriate medical care and providing 
that care in a proportionate manner are chief among those factors.  The appropriateness of 
the care chosen depends on the physician’s professional judgment, based on the relevant 
clinical and scientific data, and the patient’s preferential judgment, based on various 
personal factors.  Such appropriateness also depends on the outcome of a “benefits versus 
burdens” analysis related to the patient’s condition and proposed treatment.  This calculus 
should be guided by the principle of proportionality, which aims at maintaining a desired 
balance between the benefits and burdens of treatment.  To maintain that balance in an 
ethical manner, however, the analysis must be conducted together by patient and 
physician.  Such mutuality helps ensure that the principles of beneficence and respect for 
patient autonomy work in conjunction, rather than compete with one another.  Ideally, 
these are the major factors that continuously shape and redefine the care plan as needed 
throughout the course of treatment.   
To the extent that a patient’s suffering lends itself to this medical protocol, the 
nature of suffering adds yet another dimension to the specific care plan eventually 
developed.  According to the analysis provided in Chapter 2, suffering is a state of 
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emotion that is a distinct experience from physical pain, although the two experiences 
may be and often are related.  Suffering itself, however, is a psychological phenomenon 
with many specific causes, including pain, loss of function, disability, chronic illness, and 
so on.  More generally, suffering is the feeling of distress that arises in connection with a 
disruption in the way important personal matters are perceived to be at the moment as 
compared to how it is perceived that such matters ought to be.  Sufferers often describe 
this kind of experience in spiritual terms as grief over an actual or anticipated loss of self.  
Depending on the circumstances, this feeling of personal disintegration can give rise to an 
unrelenting and oppressive tension between hope and despair, the intensity of which 
varies with the magnitude of the loss and the sufferer’s disposition.   
From the individual’s perspective, Viktor Frankl claimed that a crucial step in 
resolving all suffering depends on the meaning and value that each gives to our own 
experience in that regard.  From the caregiver's perspective, on the other hand, Eric 
Cassell claims that there are two primary ways to relieve suffering in the clinical setting.  
One is to guide patients to assign meaning to their medical condition, which often 
resolves the suffering associated with that condition.  The other is a spiritual focus that 
assists patients in developing a sense of transcendence, which is most effective in 
restoring a sense of wholeness after injury to an individual's self or personhood.  
To that end, he offers three specific goals of patient care that seeks to reduce or 
minimize suffering.1  The first goal is to define all diagnostic or therapeutic plans in 
terms of the sick person, rather than in terms of a disease.  The second goal is to 
                                                 
1Cassell, Eric J.  (1991), The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine. New York and Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 241. 
 194
maximize the patient's function and not necessarily thepatient's length of life.  The third 
goal is to minimize the family's suffering as well as the patient's suffering, although 
Cassell does not offer a discussion of how to resolve a conflict in this regard between 
patient and specific family members.   
The fundamental notion behind Cassell's approach is that caregivers must focus 
on fostering the best interests of the sick person rather than on merely treating a disease.  
In his view, sick persons usually know better than others what their best interests are, 
what aspects of function matter most to them, and when they are suffering.  With this 
approach, Cassell acknowledges the clinical need to include the patient’s knowledge as a 
vital element in relief of suffering.  Doing so, however, requires working more closely 
with patients and their families than is customary in traditional medical practice.  
Cassell’s approach minimizes this limitation by focusing on a patient’s suffering as a 
psychological condition that involves the whole person, rather than as a physiological 
condition that involves primarily the patient’s body.  In this sense, Cassell offers a 
holistic approach to patient care.  
Holism is a concept used by many disciplines to indicate an integrative and 
comprehensive understanding of whole systems with constituent linkages and 
continuities among related parts.2  The life sciences, for example, often employ the term 
“vitalism” in referring to a holistic theory of living organisms.3  As applied in the 
healthcare context, holism is a particular patient care strategy wherein the caregiver 
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focuses on the patient as a whole person, and not only as a person with a diseased body.4  
In this sense, medical holism can refer to a wide range of care techniques, from the 
unconventional to the more orthodox methods that complement traditional medical 
practice. 
 Medical holism stands in sharp contrast to Cartesian dualism, which had far-
reaching effects on traditional Western medical practice.5  Descartes discarded notions of 
the harmony and unity of the human organism and substituted a conception of the body 
and mind as separate and distinct.6  Alster observes that some writers maintain that 
Cartesian dualism “wrecked havoc” on what was a holistic medical orientation at the 
time.7  Alster offers Capra’s view as an example: 
The greatest change in the history of Western medicine came with the Cartesian 
revolution.  Before Descartes, most healers had addressed themselves to the interplay of 
body and soul, and had treated their patients within the context of their social and 
spiritual environment.  As their world views changed over the ages, so did their views of 
illness and their methods of treatment, but their approaches were usually concerned with 
the whole patient.  Descartes’ philosophy changes this situation profoundly.  His strict 
division between mind and body led physicians to concentrate on the body machine and 
                                                 
4 For an early discussion of what role medical holism was to play in healthcare, see Robinson, G. C. (1939).  The 
Patient as a Person:  A Study of the Social Aspects of Illness.  New York, The Commonwealth Fund.  Although 
medical holism has roots deep in antiquity, Robinson was one of the first advocates in the modern era of medicine.  For 
another early advocate, cf. Peabody, F. W. (1925).  “A Study of 500 Admissions to the Fourth Medical Service, Boston 
City Hospital.” Boston Medical and Surgical Journal  193:630.  See also Williams, T. F. (1950).  “Cabot, Peabody, and 
the Care of the Patient.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 24:  462-481.  For a discussion of the practice of herbal 
medicine, see Tobyn, Graeme (1997), “The English Physician: Herbal Medicine and Therapeutics”, in his Culpeper’s 
Medicine: A Practice of Western Holistic Medicine, Rockport, MA. Element Books, Inc., pp. 176-226. 
5 Alster, Kristine Beyerman (1989).  The Holistic Health Movement.  The University of Alabama Press.  Tuscaloosa 
and London., p. 11. 
6 Alster (1989), p. 11. 
7 Alster (1989), p. 11. 
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to neglect psychological, social, and environmental aspects of illness.8  Drawing on 
Hippocrates and Galen, through Galileo and Baron, Alster points out, however, that 
holistic and dualistic theories have always competed for dominance in the practice of 
Western medicine.9 
 Outside the bounds of conventional medicine, medical holism is often viewed as a 
radical alternative method of patient care that emphasizes preventive and therapeutic self-
healing strategies.  These unconventional strategies aim at enhancing one’s own 
biological mechanisms with natural rather than artificial means.10  Naturopathy is one 
example of a self-directed healthcare regimen that heavily relies on “natural foods, light, 
warmth, massage, fresh air, regular exercise, and the avoidance of drugs” to cultivate and 
nurture the body’s own healing powers.11 
 Within the bounds of conventional medicine, on the other hand, holistic medicine 
can refer to techniques that complement and augment traditional medical practice.  In this 
sense, medical holism functions on the premise that an adequate healthcare system 
responds to patients as persons who are ill and fully recognizes the need to integrate the 
many parts of their lives.  Doing so promotes health, while ignoring that need can lead to 
sickness.12  In sum: 
 Holistic health…is a state of integration of the physical body and of the mental 
and emotional soul-self, in harmony with the spiritual self….The concept refers to the 
fact that the whole of a person is greater than the mere sum of his parts, and that there is 
                                                 
8 Alster (1989), p. 11. 
9 Alster (1989), p. 13. 
10 Eskinazi, Daniel P. (1998), “Factors That Shape Alternative Medicine.”  JAMA 280(18), p. 1622. 
11 Glanze, Walter D., et al., eds. (1992). The Mosby Medical Encyclopedia. NY, Penguin Group.  Herbal medicine, 
which has roots in both the East and West, might also extend outside the bounds of conventional medicine. 
12 Alster (1989), pp. 48-49.  See also Gordon, J. S. (1996), “Alternative Medicine and the Family Physician.” 
American Family Physician 54(7), pp. 2205-10. 
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an approach to the whole person who is ill, instead of merely to his parts or to his illness 
as if they were separate from the whole of him.13 
 
 
                                                
Despite the appeal of this strategy, some physicians may find it difficult to situate 
the patient as a “person” in the way that medical holism requires.  Such difficulty in part 
stems from the fact that each patient has a unique genetic makeup and personal history, 
which extensively shapes a person’s current lifestyle, and might have led to the present 
medical condition.  For example, alcoholism and sexually transmitted diseases are 
ailments directly related to lifestyle, although other factors are involved as well.  The 
nature of these ailments demonstrates the extent to which lifestyle alone, however, can 
influence a patient’s health status, which raises a question about how much treating 
physicians must learn about their individual patients to meet the expectations of medical 
holism.  Such principles seem to require physicians to learn a great deal in this respect, or 
at least to communicate more effectively with their patients, before attempting to 
formulate a sound treatment plan.14  Given the financial and time constraints on most any 
clinical practice, however, such a task might prove unrealistic, if not impossible.  As a 
result, perhaps in some cases or at some point the primary responsibility for patient care 
must shift to others.15 
 Another difficulty in treating the patient in a holistic sense concerns various other 
factors in the patient’s life, including the patient’s economic, social or employment 
 
13 Svihus, R. H. (1979),  “On Healing the Whole Person:  A Perspective.” The Western Journal of Medicine  131 (6):  
pp. 480-481. 
14 Bar, Bonnie, RN, M.S. (1998). “The Effect of Holism on the Health Care System.” Hospital Materiel Management 
Quarterly 20(1), p. 73.  See also Principle Number 3 of the American Holistic Medical Association’s Principles of 
Holistic Medical Practice (Albuquerque, NM), which states that “Holistic Physicians expend as much effort in 
establishing what kind of patient has a disease as they do in establishing what kind of disease a patient has.” 
15 Hardwig raises a similar question.  For instance, he suggests that requiring physicians to spend more time with 
terminally ill patients on their spiritual concerns may be asking too much of physicians.  In his view, physicians are 
already overburdened by other constraints.  See Hardwig, John (2000), “Spiritual Issues at the End of Life: A Call for 
Discussion,” Hastings Center Report 30(2), p. 30. 
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circumstances.  These factors often play a significant role both in whether a clinical 
encounter takes place at all, and in the kinds of healthcare decisions made.16  The 
physician’s or caregiver’s awareness of these factors, however, often has no consequence 
in terms of prevention and cannot alter therapeutic outcomes.  Imagine a typical coal 
miner with severe breathing problems after years of working in the mines.  This miner 
also has a family to support, no other job skills or realistic employment alternative, and 
no means to look for work in another locale.  Although some temporary medical relief 
might be available for this kind of patient, ultimately, such a person needs an altogether 
different work environment to realize any lasting health benefits.  Telling him to quit his 
job to save his health and life seems pointless and insensitive, without simultaneously 
providing him with other social and economic remedies as well. 
 The reality of such difficulties suggests that medical holism will ultimately fail as 
an effective clinical approach to patient care, because, in the face of inevitable suffering 
and death, it cannot deliver on its promise of “wholeness” as a reward for human 
striving.17  Since health is not a static commodity, something to be attained once and for 
all time, medical holism is not a reliable patient care strategy.  Health is an ideal 
maintained more or less through a dynamic process of living and caring that has a lot of 
loose ends and many uncontrollable variables.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Rosenberg, C. E. (1998).  “Holism in Twentieth-Century Medicine.”  Greater Than The Parts:  Holism in 
Biomedicine, 1920-1950.  C. Lawrence and G. Weisz.  NY, Oxford University Press, p. 339. 
17 Marty, M. E. (1994).  “The Tradition of the Church in Health and Healing.”  International Review of Mission  
83(329):  227-243. 
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II.  Modified medical holism. 
The philosophy of William James provides a possible way to address such a 
criticism.  James modified simple holism with a concept of “someness” to better 
understand the whole.  In his view, “someness” indicates that only some of the parts of an 
integrated whole connect with each other, while other parts do not connect at all.18  
Although James was articulating his world view with this concept, “someness” has 
relevance to resolving the apparently unrealistic claims of medical holism.  A patient’s 
life too has both connected and unconnected parts, which limits the attainability of 
wholeness and a corresponding health status.  The limitations imposed by reality suggest 
that a modified version of medical holism that incorporates the notion of “someness” 
might offer a less ambitious but effective approach to patient care, especially at the end of 
life. 
The limited connections in a patient’s life yield a partial set of meanings useful 
for interpreting and coping with disease and suffering.  As a result, modified medical 
holism means that neither physicians nor other caregivers can be expected to heal 
everything or be all things to all patients.19  Rather, modified medical holism addresses 
only the patient’s medically relevant suffering, especially at the end of life.  Within 
limits, it also may complement traditional medicine in acknowledging the efficacy of 
nontraditional preventive and therapeutic measures, such as spiritual exercises, various 
meditation techniques, and massage or touch therapy to name a few.  Relying on such 
                                                 
18 James, W. (1977).  A Pluralistic Universe.  Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 40-41. 
19 Kopelman, L. and Moskop, J. (1981).  “The Holistic Health Movement:  A Survey and Critique.”  Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy 6(2), p. 226.  See also Tillich, P. (1961).  “The Meaning of Health.”  Perspectives in Biology 
and Medicine 5(1), p. 92. 
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unconventional measures when the occasion arises recognizes other dimensions of a 
patient’s life—mental, spiritual, and emotional—in addition to the patient’s physical 
needs.  On this approach, the practitioner views the patient as a whole person with many 
needs, rather than merely as a patient with physical needs only.   
Although some needs of the patient will go unmet, viewing patients in a holistic 
manner makes it possible to meet their needs more fully, which, in turn, makes it possible 
to relieve their suffering more effectively, irrespective of whether that suffering takes the 
form of grief or spiritual distress.  From a clinical standpoint, the practitioner who 
follows this strategy must sustain a continuing compassionate presence with the one who 
suffers, especially at the end of life when suffering can be very intense and difficult to 
resolve.  To sustain a compassionate presence, the caregiver must not only be physically 
present at the appropriate times, she also must make herself available to the patient and 
her family according to their need for personal contact.  This entails a commitment to 
being with patients, “…at times in silence, to be a nonjudgmental force in their lives, and 
to allow them the time and space…to heal.”20   
Giving deliberate attention to the physical, mental, emotion, and spiritual needs of 
a patient does not necessarily require a physician or nurse, although such professionals 
may orchestrate that attention as the need arises.  Other professional healthcare providers, 
beloved family members, special friends, members of the clergy, or pastoral counselors 
can and should be involved more directly in the healing process.  This kind of 
involvement by others seems especially crucial at the end of life, when the primary focus 
of patient care is relief of suffering.   
                                                 
20 Slater, Victoria E., RN, Ph.D., et al. (1999). “Journey to Holism.” Journal of Holistic Nursing 17(4), p. 373. 
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Resolving the grief and spiritual distress of dying patients depends on various 
techniques and many other persons besides the physician and nurse.  As a result, 
modified medical holism means that at times others will share responsibility for the 
patient’s care.  If the medical profession were to embrace the claims of medical holism in 
this sense, a very different kind of academic and clinical training for physicians and other 
healthcare providers would become necessary to change the current orientation toward 
patients and the physician’s responsibility in that regard. 
A.  Community. 
The holistic approach to patient care, especially at the end of life, is centered in 
community, caring, compassion and comfort for the patient as a whole person, with a 
special emphasis on the patient’s spiritual concerns.  The aim is to inspire the patient to 
view herself yet as a person of value to be loved and cared for even in her end-of-life 
suffering.  In some cases, this very caring may lead to her healing in an emotional or 
spiritual sense.  In the words of Portier-Young: 
Healing is a process which begins and ends with the formation of community; it is 
only through human relations that the greater illness of isolation finds a cure.  The one 
who suffers alone finally breaks beneath the weight of her grief and chooses death over 
life.  Those who see themselves in the midst of a caring and nurturing community that 
grieves with them, cares for them, and helps carry their burdens, choose life and rejoice 
in its blessings.21 
 
Although it is clear that Portier-Young’s description will not fit all patients, for some, the 
experience of personal healing may allow the expression of caring and compassion for 
others even as those patients embrace the end of their own lives. 
                                                 
21 Portier-Young, Anathea (2001), “Alleviation of Suffering in the Book of Tobit:  Comedy, Community, and Happy 
Endings.”  The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 63, pp. 48-49. 
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If healing is a process that begins and ends with community, then the notion of 
who is community is important.  Defining community can be a difficult task.  Loewy 
explains community in this way: 
…community originates in the family and in the nurture experienced by infants as 
they develop their sense of self and begin to stretch their fledgling autonomy in the 
embrace of …beneficent communities.  Such communities relate to and with other 
similar communities, and inevitably mingle.  When I speak of community, I do not have a 
static entity in mind but rather see community as a fluid association and relationship.  
Starting with the family and the extended family and progressing outward, communities 
extend and interlock until they encompass the world.22 
 
Because communities are dynamic and not static, “defining communities and delineating 
the exact relationships between community and the individuals or smaller communities 
which compose it is…an evolutionary process.”23   Loewy argues that communities are 
more than mere associations of people, but rather a true community sees itself as a 
good.24  He distinguishes mere associations and true communities in this way: 
In a mere association, individuals who have used the association as a means 
toward attaining a private good will stand ready to abandon the association once the goal 
is attained….Members of a true community share values and goals which become 
communal values and goals rather than remaining merely private interests which at a 
given time happen to coincide…A community then is seen as an evolving entity, 
underwritten by a social contract conceived in the necessary nurture and beneficence 
shown toward the infant whose differentiation of self from nonself occurred in that 
setting and whose fledgling autonomy, therefore, began in the context of beneficence.  A 
community is constituted not only to prevent mutual harm but, where possible, to 
ameliorate suffering.  Solidarity in such a community is seen as cemented by the 
realization that all are concerned in each other’s welfare and will, to the extent possible, 
focus their resources on furthering this shared value.  The relationship of the individuals 
to community is one of mutual necessity:  Individuals need community to express, to 
enunciate, and to enable their personal flowering and communities need individuals to 
continue their own communal existence and growth. 25 
 
                                                 
22Loewy, Erich H. (1991),  Suffering and the Beneficent Community: Beyond Libertarianism.  SUNY Press, p. 77. 
23Loewy (1991), p. 79. 
24Loewy (1991), p. 79.  
25Loewy (1991), pp. 79-80. 
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For Loewy, community is the group of persons who care for each other and also for 
others outside the group who, by virtue of their being cared for, then become part of the 
community. 
Loewy’s focus on a “network of caring” as the defining characteristic of 
“community” with the family as its initial cornerstone parallels the definition of family 
described in a recent report commissioned by the Institute of Medicine.  Although this 
report focuses on family as the primary setting for chronic disease management, the 
authors define family as a “group of intimates with strong emotional bonds 
(identification, attachment, loyalty, reciprocity, and solidarity) and with a history and a 
future as a group.”26  This definition includes the primary and secondary forms that 
families often take in contemporary society.  Primary family configurations include not 
only the traditional group of biologically related individuals, but also those who reside in 
the same household, as well as those related by function, that is, the “group involved in 
dealing with the everyday affairs of the patient and the family.”27  Secondary family 
configurations include those temporary intimate relationships that develop during a crisis 
or bereavement episode, and those relationships of longer duration that depend on shared 
cultural and religious beliefs.28  In any case, family relationships share three basic 
characteristics: “they persist over time, they are emotionally intense, and they involve 
                                                 
26Weihs, Karen M.D., Fisher, Larry Ph.D., and Baird, Macaran, M.D. (2002), “Families, Health and Behavior: A 
Section of the Commissioned Report by the Committee on Health and Behavior: Research, Practice and Policy, 
Division of Neuroscience and Behavioral Health and Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of 
Medicine, National Academy of Sciences.” Families, Systems and Health 20(1), p. 8.   
27Medalie, Mack H., M.D., and Cole-Kelly, Kathy, M.S., M.S.W. (2002), “The Clinical Importance of Defining 
Family,” American Family Physician 65(7), p. 1277.  
28Medalie and Cole-Kelly (2002), p. 1278. 
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high levels of intimacy in day-to-day life.”29  In this sense, a family is not constrained by 
the number, configuration, sex, sexual preference, age, or ethnicity of its various 
members.30  Such conceptual flexibility at times can raise an important question as to 
who is family, who is community.           
The question of who is community is similar to the one posed in the New 
Testament: who is my neighbor?  In that parable, the answer is twofold.  Your neighbor is 
the one you encounter who needs care, and a neighbor is one who cares for those she 
encounters in need of care.  “To have the courage to see your neighbor’s suffering and to 
assume responsibility to alleviate it without just walking by are the responses in which all 
care originates.”31  Kierkegaard qualifies this “other-regarding” theme by describing 
“neighbor” as the one nearest, but not in a preferential sense.  For him, neighbor is a 
concept that means a reduplication of self, or “what philosophers would call the ‘other’, 
the touchstone for testing what is selfish in self-love.”32  In this context, Kierkegaard’s 
phrase “reduplication of self” implies the familiar admonition to “love thy neighbor as 
thyself,” for only by renouncing selfishness is one able to love the other, to be neighbor, 




                                                 
29Weihs, et al. (2002), p. 9. 
30Holder, B., et al. (1998), “Engagement of African American families in research on chronic illness: A multisystem 
recruitment approach.”  Family Process 37(2), p. 131. 
31 Eriksson, Katie (1997), “Caring, Spirituality and Suffering,” in Roach, M. Simone, C.S.M., ed., The Convergence of 
Caring and Spirituality. Paulist Press, p. 68.  
32 Kierkegaard, Soren (1946), “Works of Love” in A Kierkegaard Anthology, Robert Bretall, ed., The Modern Library, 
New York, p. 288. 
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B.  Caring. 
In the health care context, caring in a holistic sense means to look upon the patient 
as a suffering human being, not simply as a person who is ill.33  Katie Eriksson describes 
this kind of caring in this way: 
Caring is…the essence of humanity and the basic constitutive phenomenon of 
human existence.  True caring is not a form of behavior, nor a feeling or a state.  It is an 
ontology, a way of living…Caring is a deep human and professional communion.  The 
idea of caring is to alleviate suffering in a spirit of caritas, that is, faith, hope and love.  It 
is compassion upon which true caring is based.  The human person was born to live in 
communion with others.  Communion is the basis for all humanity (citations omitted).  
One logical consequence of this premise is that all forms of caring are variations on 
human communion…communion means ‘the act of sharing’, ‘an intimate relationship 
with deep understanding’…Caring communion, true caring, occurs when the one caring 
in a spirit of caritas alleviates the suffering of the patient.34 
 
On this view, “Caring communion provides a culture that is characterized by warmth, 
presence, rest, respect, frankness and tolerance.  Fundamental entities are…eye contact, 
listening, and language…The meaning of caring communion can be summarized as the 
ability to do good for another person.”35 
The caring theory described by Eriksson is expressed as the “Gerasim Model” by 
Susan L. Taylor.36  Gerasim was Ilyich’s servant who cared for Ilyich simply and gently 
in his final months.  The Gerasim Model of caregiving has as its goal the care and nurture 
of the individual patient, as opposed to the cure of the patient.  The model is based on the 
relationship between the patient and the caregiver, a crucial element of which is the 
caregiver’s acceptance of the patient and the illness.  This acceptance derives from honest 
                                                 
33 Eriksson (1997), p. 73. 
34 Eriksson (1997), p. 79. 
35 Eriksson (1997), p. 80. 
36 Taylor, Susan L. (1997), “The Gerasim model of caregiving: Reflections on Tolstoy’s novella, ‘The Death of Ivan 
Ilyich’.” Death Studies, pp. 299-304. 
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communication and yields patient-directed comfort measures that combine with a 
consistent, gentle and simple approach to caregiving. 
 The central theme of Tolstoy’s novella is “our need to be loved even when we are 
unlovely and unlovable.”37  Gerasim, the servant, represents that unconditional loving 
and compassion, including the acceptance of the distasteful aspects of care, and 
communicates his acceptance of the illness and the person.  Even as Ilyich comments on 
his feeling of separation and distance from those in good health, Gerasim’s simple and 
gentle approach crosses this barrier.  As a result, Ilyich is able to transcend his suffering 
and find a place where, for a moment, his suffering is forgotten.  In contemporary 
parlance, Tolstoy describes a therapeutic milieu or clinical setting where a patient is able 
to complete her journey.  In this setting, the patient can break free from fear to face her 
death and herself.38 
 C.  Compassion. 
 Compassion is another component of the modified holistic approach to patient 
care.  Compassion “is the root of all our other-regarding concerns…Compassion is an 
affective attitude … that is, by nature, altruistic….It represents one’s consideration for 
the welfare of others.”39  Friedland describes compassion more fully in this way: 
Compassion is traditionally regarded as a mental state in which one takes the 
suffering of another as her or his own.  This is not to say that one actually feels the pain 
itself.  To feel compassion is to have a sympathetic concern for the condition of another, 
while engaging in some degree of empathy.  Compassion…combines these two activities 
so that one person is able to gain a deeper insight into the inner life of another.  It is an 
                                                 
37 Greenwood, E.B. (1975), Tolstoy: The Comprehensive Vision. New York. St. Martins Press, p. 122. 
38 Taylor (1997), p. 299.  As noted supra, Hardwig suggests that accepting a duty to die allows the patient to face and 
overcome her fear of death.  Taylor suggests that a patient can face her fear of death as a result of unconditional love 
and compassion from another, and thus, by implication, the patient need not embrace the view that she has a duty to die 
in order to face her death. 
39 Friedland, Julian (1999),  “Compassion as a means to freedom.”  The Humanist (Jul/August),  pp. 35-39. 
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emotive feeling that looks into the totality of another’s condition because it is motivated 
by a wholehearted concern for that person’s welfare.40 
  
Cultivating a sense of compassion allows the caregiver to respond to the patient as the 
patient needs and to see the value in providing comfort to the patient.41 
 D.  Comfort. 
  Katharine Kolcaba posits a comfort model of patient care based on the 
involvement of a compassionate caregiver.42  On this model, comfort has two 
dimensions.43  The first dimension consists of three states--relief, ease and transcendence.  
Relief is defined as the experience of having had a specific need met; ease is defined as a 
state of calm or contentment; transcendence is defined as a state of enhanced ordinary 
powers.44  Comfort facilitates gains in physical or psychological performance and is 
essential for a peaceful death, because a dying person requires psychic strength for 
acceptance and release.  The second dimension of comfort refers to the particular 
contexts in which comfort occurs, which are four.  The first context is physical and 
pertains to bodily sensations.  The second context is psychospiritual, pertaining to the 
internal awareness of self, including self-esteem, the meaning in and to one’s life, and 
one’s relationship to a higher order or being.  The third context is social, which includes 
the patient’s interpersonal, family, cultural, financial and informational relationships, 
                                                 
40 Friedland (1999), p. 35. 
41 The way a patient perceives her needs may be her way of describing and communicating her suffering.  Thus, 
listening to the patient’s needs with compassion can give the caregiver clues as to how to ameliorate the patient’s 
suffering.   See Fagerstrom, Lisbeth RN, MNSc, et al. (1998),  “The patient’s perceived caring needs as a message of 
suffering.”  Journal of Advanced Nursing  28 (5), pp. 978-987. 
42 Kolcaba, Katharine Y., MSN (1994),  “A Theory of holistic comfort for nursing.”  Journal of Advanced Nursing 19: 
1178-1184. 
43 Kolcaba (1994), p. 1179. 
44 Kolcaba (1994), p. 1179. 
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while the fourth context is environmental.  On this model, providing comfort to patients 
requires the caregiver to acknowledge an “inter-related mind-body-person-world…[so as 
to promote] solidarity and connection rather than distance and control.” 45  The caregiver 
who provides comfort must perceive the patient’s needs from this perspective, which is 
an ability that depends on the caregiver’s “attentiveness, noticing and presencing.”46 
Ideally, an increase in comfort itself reduces negative tensions and increases 
positive ones.  Positive tensions lead to constructive health-seeking behaviors on the part 
of the patient, including the dying patient.  Enhancing comfort promotes the health of the 
whole person, even in the face of death.47  Comfort also includes effective pain 
management, but is not limited to drug therapy.  Comfort can be enhanced in many ways 
and by many different caregivers, including chaplains, who must take time to be present 
with the patient and to provide unconditional love. 
E.  Spiritual care. 
 In the course of providing unconditional love, caring, compassion and comfort for 
the patient, the holistic caregiver seeks to understand the spiritual needs of the patient as 
well, especially the dying patient.  Spiritual needs extend beyond the religious dimension.  
Spirituality is an integral part of every individual’s character and personality irrespective 
of the person’s religious beliefs, and can ultimately affect the individual’s response to 
illness and dying.48  In its broadest sense, the spiritual dimension of the human person 
encompasses the inherent need to find satisfactory answers to the ultimate questions 
                                                 
45 Benner, Patricia (1997),   “A Dialogue Between Virtue Ethics and Care Ethics.”  Theoretical Medicine 18, p. 55. 
46 Benner (1997), p. 55. 
47 Kolcaba (1994), p. 1181. 
48 Oldnall, Andrew, BSc{Hons} RGN DPSN (1996),  “A critical analysis of nursing:  meeting the spiritual needs of 
patients.”  Journal of Advanced Nursing 23, pp. 138-144. 
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concerning the meaning of life, illness, and death.49  The individual’s deepest 
relationships with others, with self, and with God (or other influential focus) are at the 
core of the individual’s spirituality.50  
The search for meaning in life has long been viewed as a central spiritual concern.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Frankl claimed that a search for meaning is a search for 
understanding the world about us and is a significant, universal human motive.  In this 
respect, Frankl shares the concern of existential phenomenologists, such as Heidegger, 
who focus on the meaning of life, virtue, morality, freedom, and death, and who 
recognize and understand that the search for meaning depends on certain assumptions. 51  
As Carol Smucker points out in her study of spiritual distress, one such assumption is that 
people are a total indissoluble unity engaged in an interrelationship with the world.52  A 
person’s existence has meaning through her experience of the world, and this person-
world relationship can be known through analysis of the language or dialogue used to 
describe that experience. 
From this perspective, certain experiences often lead to spiritual distress, 
characterized by a feeling of disharmony, of being disconnected and without meaning.53  
The types of experiences that most frequently cause spiritual distress include altered 
transcendent relationships, values or beliefs, loneliness, fear of the unknown, guilt and 
                                                 
49 Oldnall (1996), p. 138. 
50 Oldnall (1996), pp. 138-139. 
51 Gelven, Michael (1989), A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Northern Illinois University Press, 
Dekalb, Illinois, p. 16. 
52 Smucker, Carol PhD, RN (1996),   “A Phenomenological Description of the Experience of Spiritual Distress.”  
Nursing Diagnosis  7(2), April-June, p. 82. 
53 Smucker (1996), p. 82. 
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regret, anger toward God, and loss of hope.54  This loss of human contact, meaning, and 
hope can be especially poignant at the end of life.  For the dying patient, meaning may be 
declining because the future is waning, which may signal spiritual distress or crisis.   
The holistic caregiver is attentive to the patient’s experience of such phenomena, 
and understands the need to respond to the patient’s spiritual needs, distress or crisis.  
According to Smucker, the holistic caregiver responds to the patient’s spiritual distress 
with the knowledge that healing is more than the simple correction of bodily ailments. 55   
In cases where physical cure is impossible, patients often need spiritual comfort, which 
the caregiver offers with sensitivity and respect for the patient’s cultural and spiritual 
beliefs.  Offering spiritual care in this manner requires an open dialogue with the patient, 
which establishes trust with the patient and encourages the patient to make her own 
suggestions about how the caregiver can assist.  Through this same process, the caregiver 
obtains permission from the patient to respond from her own spiritual perspective to help 
the patient who is in spiritual distress.  
For the caregiver, providing spiritual comfort as an aspect of medical holism 
relies on an integrative understanding of health care.56  Integrative healthcare focuses on 
the individual’s health and its decline in the context of the patient’s life.  In this respect, 
integrative healthcare is an “ethics of the everyday” because it stresses “those basic 
interactions that can profoundly shape and influence who we are and how we experience 
                                                 
54 O’Brien, M. (1982), “The Need for Spiritual Integrity”, in Human Needs and the Nursing Process, H. Yura and M. 
Walsh, eds., Norwalk, CT, Appleton-Century-Crofts. 
55 Smucker (1996), p.  90. 
56 Guinn, David E., J.D., Ph.D. (2001),  “Ethics and Integrative Medicine:  Moving Beyond the Biomedical Model.”  
Alternative Therapies  7(6), p.  72. 
 211
ourselves in the world….”57  Frequently, the source of at least some of the dying patient’s 
suffering is her removal from the “everyday.”  Such isolation can interfere with, if not 
hinder, her final spiritual growth.  When the caregiver regards the dying patient in light of 
who she is and has been in the world, such regard can stem the isolation that often clouds 
the dying process.  For this reason, the mere presence of the caregiver can be a vital form 
of spiritual care.58 
Since spirituality concerns the wholeness of life, health and well-being, it often 
involves self-transcendence.59  According to one definition, self-transcendence is “a 
characteristic of developmental maturity whereby there is an expansion of self-
boundaries and an orientation toward broadened life perspectives and purposes.”60  In this 
sense, “spirituality” concerns “the ways we transcend ourselves that are not based on 
reason alone.”61  Dunne describes self-transcendence in a spiritual sense as the search for 
ultimate meaning, for the “beyond” toward which we have been drawn throughout our 
lives: 
…people facing death are concerned less with what they can account for and 
more with their hopes, their companionships, and all the happy, baffling decisions they 
made that opened up to them a richer and deeper life.62 
 
                                                 
57 Guinn (2001), p. 72. 
58 Oldnall (1996), p. 42.  Given that holism recognizes the spiritual facet of the human being, Oldnall calls for better 
education for caregivers who want to respond in a holistic fashion, in particular nurses, in the area of caring for the 
patient’s spiritual needs.  Oldnall cautions that spiritual needs should not be confused with psychological needs, and 
thus nurses and other caregivers need more guidance about the total make-up of the human being.  Oldnall observes 
that often, by their mere presence, nurses are offering spiritual care. 
59 McGee, Eileen M., R.N. M.S. (2000), “Alcoholics Anonymous and Nursing:  Lesson in Holism and Spiritual Care.” 
Journal of Holistic Nursing 18(1), p. 19. 
60 McGee (2000), p. 19. 
61 Dunne, Tad (2001),  “Spiritual Care at the End of Life.”  Hastings Center Report (March-April), p. 23. 
62 Dunne (2001), p. 23. 
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Ultimately, self-transcendence can be an aspect of healing and recovery.  To that end, 
Dunne specifically recommends that caregivers afford patients opportunity to talk about 
these matters by relating the narrative of their lives.  In the telling of their stories, patients 
often realize a deeper understanding and experience of self-transcendence by coming to 
terms with broken relationships and unfulfilled commitments.  By encouraging this kind 
of communication with the patient, the caregiver establishes a companionship that 
strengthens the patient in her struggle with ill health and impending death. 63  For the 
dying patient, such care can lead to spiritual recovery, healing and a peaceful death.   
The self-transcendence embraced by the holistic process of recovery in Alcoholics 
Anonymous, with its emphasis on group support and its view of health as the 
maintenance of a spiritual condition, offers additional guidance for caregivers who want 
to practice holistic therapies.64  The ideal of AA is to provide group support and spiritual 
care in a compassionate, caring community without medical “orchestration”.  Members 
of AA and practitioners of holistic therapies alike are well aware of the mind/body 
connection, and acknowledge the concept of an undivided wholeness in the universe.65  
On this view, human beings are not tripartite entities composed of “body, mind, and 
spirit.”66  The holistic caregiver, in the tradition of AA, would seek to inspire patients to 
“sense that our lives [are] part of a much larger whole.”67  Although prayer and mediation 
are among the basic spiritual tools allowed and encouraged by AA to foster this sense of 
                                                 
63 Dunne (2001), pp. 25-26. 
64 McGee (2000), p. 19. 
65 McGee (2000), p. 18. 
66 McGee (2000), p. 18.  
67 Newman, M. (1994), Health as Expanding Consciousness, 2nd ed. New York. National League for Nursing Press, p. 
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transcendence, other healing therapies with the same purpose include the practice of 
humility and service to others.68 
 Since the AA holistic model is grounded in patient empowerment, members never 
refer to themselves as victims of alcoholism.69  Perhaps the dying patient need not see 
herself as a victim, inasmuch as all humans face mortality.  Rather, those patients who 
perceive themselves as victims might find solace in imitating the newcomer to AA, who 
embraces the motto, “trust God, clean house and help another drunk.”70  If given love, 
comfort and compassion, and if viewed as a whole person by caregivers, friends and 
family, the dying patient may be inspired to transcend self and help another dying person. 
 Some holistic principles parallel to the AA model can be found in the Hospice 
movement as well.  According to the founder of the modern hospice movement, Cicely 
Saunders, Hospice attempts to offer the dying person unconditional love, compassion, 
comfort and spiritual care.71  Hospice advocates a multidisciplinary approach to patient 
care that emphasizes symptom control, attending to spiritual as well as physical needs, 
and care of the family.72  Although there are residential hospices as well as hospice units 
in hospitals, in the United States, the emphasis is on hospice care in the patient’s home.  
The goal of hospice in any setting, however, is to help the dying patient achieve “healing, 
wholeness, and hope.”73  To that end, hospice focuses on healing the spiritual pain, or 
suffering, of the dying patient.  This suffering is often a complex state of emotion 
                                                 
68 McGee (2000), p. 19. 
69 McGee (2000), p. 21. 
70 McGee (2000), p. 22. 
71 Dunne (2001),  pp. 22-26. 
72 Emanuel, Ezekiel J., Emanuel, Linda L. (1998), “The promise of a good death.”  The Lancet 351( 9114) p S21. 
73 Carr, William F. (1995),  “Spiritual Pain and Healing in the Hospice.”  America  August 12, p. 26. 
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consisting in “fear of dying, guilt and regret about one’s life, and sadness about the 
imminent separation from wife or husband or children or friends.”74  In Saunders’ view, 
the only way to help dying patients resolve their suffering and find spiritual peace is by 
providing a level of spiritual care that helps them find meaning in death.75  Because only 
the patient can find such meaning, however, the caregiver’s task is to encourage the 
patient in that search by creating space and time for the patient to talk about spiritual 
pain.  
 Unless a professional healthcare giver works in a hospice or has been trained in 
the holistic approach of hospice care, the caregiver may not feel prepared to support the 
terminally ill patient in her last days of life.76  To better prepare caregivers in that regard, 
Fanslow-Brunjes offers the HOPE System.77  The HOPE System is a formal spiritual 
assessment tool that consists in a series of questions designed to help a patient explore 
spiritual issues and concerns.  Each of the letters in the acronym is a category of 
questions that the caregiver asks the patient.  For instance, “H” questions concern the 
sources of hope, strength, comfort, meaning, peace, love and connection.  “O” questions 
are about the role of organized religion in the patient’s life.  “P” questions explore the 
patient’s personal spirituality and practices.  Lastly, “E” questions center on the effects of 
medical care and end-of-life decisions.  This system relies on the premise that dying 
                                                 
74Carr (1995), p. 27. 
75 Carr (1995), p. 28.  See also, Marrone, Robert (1999).  “Dying, Mourning and Spirituality:  A Psychological 
Perspective.”  Death Studies 23: pp. 495-519. 
76 For ways of providing spiritual counseling in a diverse society, see Zinnbauer, Brian J., and Pargament, Kenneth I. 
(2000),   “Working With the Sacred:  Four Approaches to Religious and Spiritual Issues in Counseling.”  Journal of 
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77 Fanslow-Brunjes, Cathleen, RN, MA (1997),  “Hope:  Offering comfort and support for dying patients.”  Nursing 
(March), pp. 54-57.  See also Anandarajah, Gowri and Hight, Ellen (2001), “Spirituality and medical practice:  Using 
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patients have three basic needs: to know they won’t be abandoned; to have the 
opportunity to express themselves; and to maintain hope.78  When any of these needs go 
unmet, the patient very likely experiences spiritual distress.  This series of open-ended 
questions helps the patient identify the source of that distress.  Resolving that distress can 
renew hope for the patient which might enable each dying patient to live more fully until 
the moment of death.79   
By the same token, the HOPE system also acknowledges that assessing the 
patient’s level and source of hope is an important step that enables the caregiver to 
support the dying patient and her family.  In much the same way that Kubler-Ross 
identified certain stages in accepting death, the HOPE system recognizes that patients and 
their families typically experience hope in four stages.  Those stages are hope for cure, 
hope for treatment, hope for prolongation of life, and finally, hope for peaceful death.80  
Since patients and their families are often in differing stages of hope and acceptance, 
caregivers must provide honest responses to the questions of patients and their families.  
The HOPE system is one way for caregivers to keep the communication door open for 
further conversation with patients about their spiritual concerns.   
Dying patients may exhibit sudden spontaneous changes in what they hope for; 
these changes are often triggered by perceived physiological changes, or “body 
wisdom.”81  The caregiver should be flexible in responding to the patient’s changes in 
hope.  As a result, caregivers may find themselves in the role of mediator between the 
                                                 
78 Fanslow-Brunjes (1997), p. 54. 
79 Fanslow-Brunjes (1997), p. 54. 
80 Fanslow-Brunjes (1997), p. 55. 
81 Fanslow-Brunjes (1997), p. 56. 
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patient and her family, as the need arises for communicating the patient’s changing hopes 
to family members who hold on to other hopes.  As the patient comes to hope for a 
peaceful death, the caregiver must recognize that a peaceful death requires the absence of 
physical pain as well as the absence of emotional and spiritual suffering.82  Thus, in 
addition to attending to the patient, it is important that the caregiver help family members 
understand the dying process and the patient’s own “body wisdom.”83  In this regard, 
caregivers can explain to family members many of the behaviors of the dying, such as no 
longer eating or drinking, withdrawal or reminiscing.   
In addition, caregivers must stand ready to be interpreters for the family.  In this 
regard, caregivers should understand that some dying patients who perceive that their 
close family members are not at peace with the imminent death will sometimes 
encourage their loved ones to go home for the night or out for a meal.  The patient will 
then die while the family is gone.  Upon their return, the family is often distraught that 
the patient died while they were away.  It is at this time that the sensitive caregiver can 
explain that the patient chose “the moment that would spare his family the final moments 
of death out of love for them…[t]his…is called the ‘wisdom of the dying and the choice 
of the moment.’”84  “Under the HOPE System, the caregiver sees her role as helping 
patients and families clarify their own hopes and understand those of their loved ones, so 
they can be present for each other during the dying process.”85  With this system, the 
caregiver helps not only the patient, but also the family, find meaning and peace.  
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III.  Some troubling questions. 
The underlying presupposition of holistic medicine mirrors Viktor Frankl’s 
argument that each of us must give meaning to our own suffering and death.  Holistic 
medicine promises relief, especially to dying patients, by helping them find meaning and 
hope.  Despite that assistance, or perhaps because of it, some patients still may choose 
physician-assisted suicide as a way to find meaning in their lives.  One reason that some 
patients might choose physician-assisted suicide, according to John Hardwig, is not 
necessarily because they are terminally ill or suffer unbearably themselves.  Rather, they 
perceive as unfair the burdens that their illness causes others, and because relieving 
others of such burdens is an urgent goal for these patients, they often perceive a duty to 
die.86  David Thomasma offers yet another reason, namely, that some patients might 
embrace physician-assisted suicide as an act of martyrdom.87  Supposedly, each of these 
reasons is an effort by the patient to give meaning and purpose to her life by giving 
meaning and purpose to her final suffering and ultimate death.  Closer analysis shows, 
however, that neither Hardwig nor Thomasma proves his case.  As a result, the 
presumption stands that holistic medicine is the preferred medical response to a patient’s 
request for assisted suicide.  Because it honors the patient as a whole person, and 
involves community care, compassion and comfort for the patient, it can be the preferred 
choice for dying patients and their families as well. 
 
 
                                                 
86 Hardwig, John (1997), “Is There a Duty to Die?” Hastings Center Report 27(2), pp. 34-42. 
87 Thomasma, David C. (1998), “Assisted Death and Martyrdom,” Christian Bioethics 4 (2), pp. 122-42. 
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A.  Hardwig’s “duty to die”.  
 Hardwig posits that within the health care context, under some circumstances, 
there is a duty to die.88  His discussion of such a duty suggests that there are two groups 
of sufferers.  There is the primary sufferer, namely, the person with the chronic or 
terminal illness or who is demented or debilitated.  There are also the often unidentified 
secondary sufferers, namely, the family coping with the person who is ill.  Hardwig’s 
focus suggests that the amelioration of the family’s suffering can come about through the 
self-imposed death of the primary sufferer.  Given a view of suffering as involving grief, 
loss of self, hope and despair, spiritual distress, and the search for meaning, Hardwig’s 
claim might seem plausible.    
Hardwig develops this “other-regarding” duty to die this way.  Current advances 
in western medicine save many lives and enable many of us to live longer.  Such 
advances also deliver “most of us over to chronic illnesses and …[enable]…many of us 
to survive longer than we can take care of ourselves, longer than we know what to do 
with ourselves, longer than we even are ourselves.”89  Faced with becoming demented or 
debilitated, “there may be a fairly common responsibility to end one’s life in the absence 
of any terminal illness at all.”90   
                                                 
88 Hardwig grounds a duty to die in family relationships.  He argues that “[t]he impact of my decisions upon my family 
and loved ones [as opposed to society] is the source of many of my strongest obligations and also the most plausible 
and likeliest basis of a duty to die” (Hardwig, p. 36).  He states that “the fundamental insight underlying a duty to die” 
is found in the situation that when continuing to live will impose significant burdens--emotional, extensive caregiving, 
destruction of life plans, and financial hardship--on your family and loved ones (Hardwig, p. 38). Observing that the 
word “responsibility” “would perhaps be the most appropriate word,” Hardwig clarifies that he intends “no implication 
that there is a law that grounds this duty, nor that someone has a right corresponding to it” (Hardwig, p.42, n. 1).  This 
suggests that Hardwig’s theory is really one of altruistic other-regarding love, rather than duty.     
89 Hardwig (1997), p. 35. 
90 Hardwig (1997), p. 35 
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Observing that most bioethics schools of thought share in one of the “deeply 
embedded American dreams: the individualistic fantasy,” Hardwig notes that “[w]ithin a 
health care context, the individualistic fantasy leads us to assume that the patient is the 
only one affected by decisions about her medical treatment.”91  Calling this assumption 
“morally obtuse,” Hardwig argues that since most of us are not hermits, but rather “are 
affiliated with particular others and most deeply, with family and loved ones,” sharing 
“deeply interwoven lives,” we are barred from making “exclusively self-regarding 
decisions” about whether we should live or die.92  In caring for us--the demented or 
debilitated--the lives of our loved ones can be seriously compromised, overwhelmed, 
exhausted, emotionally devastated and financially decimated.93  In this regard, Hardwig 
makes it clear that he is “not advocating a crass, quasi-economic conception of burdens 
and benefits, nor a shallow, hedonistic view of life.”94    
He also acknowledges that, “[g]iven a suitably rich understanding of benefits, 
family members sometimes do benefit from suffering through the long illness of a loved 
one,” inasmuch as “[c]aring for the sick or aged can foster growth” or “pull a family 
together.”95  Noting that families have responsibilities to stand by us through illness and 
death, Hardwig concludes that “[i]f my loved ones are truly benefiting from coping with 
my illness or debility, I have no duty to die based on burdens to them.”96  Family 
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responsibility, however, is not a “one-way street.”97    Given the reciprocal nature of 
family solidarity, altruism, and loyalty, the primary sufferer may be called upon to make 
sacrifices as well, which may include abandoning her life. 
Hardwig admits that there are objections to such a duty.  In his view, “[T]he most 
serious objections to the idea of a duty to die lie in the effects on my loved ones of ending 
my life.”98  He also notes the most common objections, which include the following:  
“(1) there is a higher duty that always takes precedence over a duty to die; (2) a duty to 
end one’s own life would be incompatible with a recognition of human dignity or the 
intrinsic value of a person; and (3) seriously ill, debilitated, or dying people are already 
bearing the harshest burdens and so it would be wrong to ask them to bear the additional 
burden of ending their own lives.”99   
Hardwig acknowledges that these are important objections, but ultimately 
suggests that “[d]eath—or ending your own life—is simply not the greatest evil or the 
greatest burden.”100 Hardwig places greater weight on a family member’s loss of savings, 
home and career as a counter to a loved one living a little longer, although he insists that 
this contention “does not depend on a utilitarian calculus.”101  For this reason, he does not 
believe that “it would be morally permissible for me to ruin the rest of my partner’s life 
to sustain mine or to cut off my sons’ careers, impoverish them, or compromise the 
quality of their children’s lives simply because I wish to live a little longer.”102   
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 Hardwig overstates his case in that most impending deaths surely do not have 
such consequences.  If the scenario he presents is not representative, the question is 
whether it provides sufficient reason to promote a duty of such magnitude.  In addition, 
there are some gender inequalities that he seems to overlook.  For example, will a man 
who has been the “sole provider” for his family’s financial needs perceive burdens on his 
family more than a woman who has not been the sole provider for her family’s finances.  
How should we account for such gender differences in establishing who has the duty to 
die?  Is the duty he advocates strictly a matter of perception?  Hardwig suggests that the 
answer to a question of who has a duty to die is “very particular and contextual,” and 
should be decided by the primary and secondary sufferers together in view of their 
histories and relationships.103  In his view, however, some considerations make it more or 
less likely that one has such a duty.   
Hardwig claims that, generally, a duty to die is more likely when continuing to 
live will impose significant burdens on your family and loved ones; or when you have 
already lived a full and rich life; or when your loved ones’ lives have already been 
difficult or impoverished; or when your loved ones have already made great contributions 
or sacrifices to make your life a good one; or when the part of you that is loved will soon 
be gone or seriously compromised; or when you have lived a relatively lavish lifestyle 
instead of saving for illness or old age; or, as you grow older.104  On the other hand, one 
condition that makes it less likely that one has a duty to die is the extent to which the 
                                                 
103 Hardwig (1997), p. 38.  I do not review Hardwig’s discussion of whether the incompetent have a duty to die, 
except to note that he contends that “only those who were formerly capable of making moral decisions could have such 
a duty” (Hardwig, p. 39). 
104 Hardwig (1997), pp. 38-39. 
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person who is ill has made a good adjustment to her illness or handicapping condition.  In 
this situation, the duty is less likely, because “[a] good adjustment means that smaller 
sacrifices will be required of loved ones and there is more compensating interaction for 
them.”105  Another feature of the situation which makes it less likely that there is a duty to 
die is when the ill person can still make significant contributions (not necessarily 
financial ones) to the lives of others, especially her family.106   
 Hardwig also gives scant attention to the social environment that contributes to 
the burdens of dying when he acknowledges that promoting a duty to die may seem “a 
misplaced response to social negligence.”107  Indeed, some hold the view that “if our 
society were providing for the debilitated, the chronically ill, and the elderly as it should 
be, there would be only very rare cases of a duty to die.”108  He concedes that there are a 
number of social policies that could dramatically reduce the incidence of such a duty, but 
observes that our society seems unwilling to shoulder the financial burden of such 
programs.  In his view, society instead continues to “shift the burdens of caring for the 
seriously and chronically ill onto families in order to save costs for our health care 
system.”109   
In response to this social failure, Hardwig argues that the dying may have to pick 
up the slack.  He attempts to soften the blow of having to shoulder this burden for society 
by claiming that it is important for the individual to find meaning in death, which will 
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107 Hardwig (1997), p. 40. 
108 Hardwig (1997), p. 40. 
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enable them to embrace death rather than fear it.  He realizes that the meaning we find in 
death may turn on how we find meaning in life:   
We do not even ask about meaning in death, so busy are we with trying to 
postpone it.  But we will not conquer death by one day developing a technology so 
magnificent that no one will have to die.  Nor can we conquer death by postponing it ever 
longer.  We can conquer death only by finding meaning in it.110 
 
Relying on Kant’s view that “human dignity rests on the capacity for moral agency 
within a community of those who respect the demands of morality,” Hardwig claims that 
“recognizing a duty to die affirms my agency and also my moral agency.  I can still do 
things that make an important difference in the lives of my loved ones.”111  On this view, 
“There is dignity and a kind of meaning in moral agency even as it forces extremely 
difficult decisions upon us,” such as choosing to die for the sake of our families.112  Such 
a choice affirms rather than destroys the necessary connections in our lives.  To make this 
point, Hardwig writes: 
If I end my life to spare the futures of my loved ones, I testify in my death that I 
am connected to them.  It is because I love and care for precisely these people (and I 
know they care for me) that I wish not be such a burden to them.  By contrast, a life in 
which I am free to choose whatever I want for myself is a life unconnected to others.  A 
bioethics that would treat me as if I had no serious moral responsibilities does what it can 
to marginalize, weaken, or even destroy my connections with others.113 
 
Because “life without connection is meaningless…[t]he individualistic fantasy, though 
occasionally liberating, is deeply destructive.”114  For this reason, Hardwig concludes that 
“We can, then, find meaning in death only through a sense of connection with something 
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that will survive our death” and “for most of us, the connections that sustain us are to 
other people.”115  Hardwig briefly restates his case in the following way: 
If I am correct, death is so difficult for us partly because our sense of community 
is so weak.  Death seems to wipe out everything when we can’t fit it into the lives of 
those who live on.  A death motivated by the desire to spare the futures of my loved ones 
might well be a better death for me than the one I would get as a result of opting to 
continue my life as long as there is any pleasure in it for me.  Pleasure is nice, but it is 
meaning that matters.116 
 
 B.  Assessment of Hardwig’s case. 
 In this very personal account, Hardwig grounds a duty to die in familial 
relationships.  He argues that “[t]he impact of my decisions upon my family and loved 
ones [as opposed to society] is the source of many of my strongest obligations and also 
the most plausible and likeliest basis of a duty to die.”117  He states that “the fundamental 
insight underlying a duty to die” is found in the situation that when continuing to live will 
impose significant burdens--emotional, extensive caregiving, destruction of life plans, 
and financial hardship--on your family and loved ones.118   
Ackerman critiques this sort of altruistic reasoning with “the paradox of the 
selfless invalid.”119  In describing this paradox, Ackerman observes:  
…the desire to forego high-tech life-prolonging or experimental curative 
treatment in order to avoid being a burden specifically to one’s loved ones raises an 
additional problem that I call ‘the paradox of the selfless invalid.’  That is, either the 
patient’s loved ones want him to die quickly in order to preserve their inheritance or 
otherwise make their lives easier, or they do not.  If they do not, the patient does them no 
favor by foregoing life-prolonging or experimental curative treatment for their sake.  If 
they do, then why is the patient sacrificing what would otherwise be left of his life (or 
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sacrificing his long-shot chance at a cure) for people who love him so little that they 
value his life less than their money or freedom from encumbrance?  Wouldn’t a truly 
loving family find such a sacrifice appalling?”120   
 
Although Ackerman’s position may seem a bit rigid, in her view, a truly loving family 
would not want the loved one to die for them, as such an act would only increase their 
suffering in the long run, rather than relieve it.  For this reason, Ackerman rejects the 
claim that there is a duty to die.   
In all fairness to Hardwig, he makes it clear that he intends “no implication that 
there is a law that grounds this duty, nor that someone has a right corresponding to it.”121 
As a result, he suggests that “responsibility” rather than “duty” might better indicate the 
thrust of his argument.  Despite this qualification, his other-regarding principle raises 
troubling questions about the role of society in creating the very burden that families 
must endure, which he expects the primary sufferer to shoulder.  His expectation relies on 
a narrow view of relationship and the connections that matter.  We are connected in many 
important ways that extend well beyond our families throughout our lives.  To say that 
the burden of death belongs only to the individual and her family ignores the vital 
interaction and sustenance of those other relationships in the larger community.   
As a result, it seems preferable and far more urgent to argue that society should, 
in the name of justice, promote a more comprehensive healthcare system, since it is 
inevitable that some of its members will become either demented or debilitated prior to 
death.  It is an injustice to expect the primary sufferer to take on the additional burden of 
sacrificing her life in part because society will not accept its responsibility to ease the 
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dying process for individual members.  Even when the patient has other altruistic reasons 
for accepting that extra burden for society, the expectation that there is a duty in that 
regard unjustly shifts society’s burden onto the family and in turn onto the most 
vulnerable person.  His opponents might argue that, with this approach, Hardwig gives 
new meaning to “the individualistic fantasy” that he aims to reject. 
 Interestingly, Hardwig focuses on only one side of his argument.  He posits that a 
primary sufferer who has made peace with her illness or handicapping condition may 
have less of a duty to die.  He relies on the premise that a good adjustment means that 
smaller sacrifices will be required of those who suffer.  The secondary sufferers, namely, 
the loved ones, may still be able to have worthwhile interaction with the primary sufferer, 
who may still be able to make significant emotional contributions to the family.  This 
concept of making peace with one’s condition is akin to the argument that acceptance 
serves to ameliorate suffering, which is an argument that cuts both ways.  If the primary 
sufferer can “accept” her condition and thus ease her suffering, perhaps the secondary 
sufferers also can “accept” their suffering in connection with the patient’s condition.  In 
that case, suffering will decrease among all family members with a concomitant 
reduction in the perception of either being a burden or bearing a burden.   
Many of the observations that Hardwig makes support the claim that holistic 
medicine is the preferred medical response to those who suffer rather than positing a duty 
to die.  On a holistic view, the community is expected to care not only for the primary 
sufferer but also for the secondary sufferers, who may need respite and protection from 
financial ruin.  Abandoning the “individualistic fantasy,” however, does not have to result 
in a duty or responsibility to die; it can result in a communal duty to care for the 
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chronically ill, the dying and their families in a holistic fashion.  Paradoxically, 
Hardwig’s observations inspire the need to change our view of others, and of ourselves, 
as burdens.  It further inspires us to find meaning in death, and perhaps the suffering 
attendant to it, which, as he admits, may include affording my family the opportunity to 
participate in my death and suffering by caring for me until the end.  My death, then, can 
afford meaning to the lives of my family members.  Thus, it is not necessary for me to 
end my life prematurely in order for my death to have meaning either for myself or my 
family. 
C.  Thomasma’s “martyrdom”. 
Hardwig is not alone in suggesting that there are noble reasons to end our lives. 
David Thomasma considers the possibility of taking one’s life as an act faith in God, as 
an act of martyrdom, and examines this possibility in the context of Roman 
Catholicism.122  Thomasma asks the question, “If, in fact, conditions can be created to 
suspend the rule against killing, as was done, for example, in just war theory, then why 
could not similar conditions be developed for suspending the rule against killing in cases 
of euthanasia?”123  In appealing to the Roman Catholic tradition, Thomasma analyzes this 
question from the “richer perspective” of “Christian martyrdom and what it reveals about 
willing one’s own death.”124    He looks at the way in which the martyred saints 
                                                 
122 Thomasma (1998), pp. 122-142. 
123 Thomasma (1998), p. 123. 
124 Thomasma (1998), p. 123. 
 228
approached their own death and “wonder[s] aloud …if their deaths might shed some light 
on the physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia debate….”125   
Thomasma begins his analysis by examining the history of Catholic/Christian 
pacifism.  For instance, in examining the life of the historical Jesus, a social critic and a 
non-violent agitator, Thomasma remarks that Jesus demonstrated effectively the dignity 
of others through his non-violent responses.126  In this regard, it is required of Christians 
“to take up the cross and follow him.”127  In Thomasma’s view, the cross does not 
necessarily involve any and every kind of suffering, sickness or tension.  Rather, the 
“believer’s cross must be, like his Lord’s, the price of his social nonconformity.  It is not, 
like sickness or catastrophe, an inexplicable, unpredictable suffering; it is the end of a 
path freely chosen after counting the cost.”128  According to Thomasma, the followers of 
Jesus understood that the Reign of God as preached by Jesus “was a new social order of 
love,” and that the fundamental reason for this social order of “love for all persons, 
friends and enemies alike, was that God is Love, and that all humans are created and 
redeemed by Him.”129   
Thomasma contends that the first three centuries of the Apostolic Church were 
“marked by conscientious objection from a substantial number of Christians” evidenced 
by “a willingness to die rather than acknowledge a supposed divinity of the Emperor.”130  
The Constantinian Church, having metamorphosed into a “principalit[y] and power” of 
                                                 
125 Thomasma (1998), p. 123.  Thomasma acknowledges his long-held pacifism, but “brackets out” his own 
convictions against killing, “like Husserl’s famous methodology of epoche, to see where the reasoning in this analysis 
takes us.” 
126 Thomasma (1998), p. 125. 
127 Thomasma (1998), p. 125. 
128 Thomasma (1998), p. 125. 
129 Thomasma (1998), p. 126. 
130 Thomasma (1998), p. 127. 
 229
the world, “had to accommodate to secular society and establish norms to govern it 
responses to new challenges about which Jesus or the tradition said nothing.”131  
Thomasma writes:  
The accommodation to secular society eventually took the form of permitting 
certain forms of killing under very strict, exceptional circumstances (such as the 
conditions articulated for a just war).  The rule against killing was paramount in its 
definition of the limits of personal dominion over the lives of others and oneself.  It was 
then and still is today a form of both respecting the inherent dignity of human lives, and 
the divinity of a universal God.132 
 
 As Thomasma points out, over time the Church struggled with the “creative tension vis-
a-vis the world” but embraced different and potentially discordant positions.  Known as 
the “Catholic compromise,” this compromise with secular society led to the Reformation, 
which spawned non-violent sects such as the Mennonites and Quakers who rested their 
positions on the sanctity of human life.133  For Thomasma, the implication is that, with 
respect to euthanasia and assisted suicide, perhaps another compromise may be needed.   
 Thomasma succinctly states the traditional Christian rule against killing, as it 
relates to euthanasia and assisted suicide, in this way: 
For the most part, the theological rejection of euthanasia and assisted suicide rests 
on the notion that any person derives his or her life from God the creator, and that 
therefore that life is not one which can be taken with impunity.  To take life unjustifiably 
is to take over the role of God the creator. It is to take dominion over life, usurping the 
prerogative of God alone.  In effect, to kill others or oneself for any reason is to deny the 
power and presence of God in the lives of human beings.  It is a form of disbelief, another 
sign of the dysfunction in human life that entered with original sin and is exemplified in 
the Bible by the fratricide of Cain and Abel.134 
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To cite a contrasting view, Thomasma points out that Kuitert, Reformed theologian and 
humanist philosopher, argues that “the rule against killing signifies a rule against taking 
life irresponsibly rather than a rule against taking innocent life,” that is, “[o]ne cannot 
take life capriciously because it would violate the respect for God’s presence and power 
over human life.”135  Thomasma suggests that, on Kuitert’s view, “this prohibition does 
not rule out taking one’s own life for rational and responsible reasons.”136   
 To support his claim, Thomasma points out that the Old Testament offers ideas 
about death that form part of the background of the rule against killing.  These ideas 
include that death is an evil not originally intended by God; that death is due to human 
responsibility (or irresponsibility); and that death is a result of sin.137  Alongside the Old 
Testament, however, the New Testament offers “a different and contrasting view of death 
that also feeds into the rule against killing…[but].. may provide some possible 
justification for suspending the rule.”138  The “new” view of death includes “death as a 
rebirth,” and “death as a passage …to a life of endless and unconditional love and 
happiness.”139  Thomasma argues that, “On this view, while death is an ontological evil 
for personal bodily identity, it is a spiritual good because it brings about the maturing of 
the Christian into a new life.”140  Thomasma writes: 
Death may be a good, then, and intending or willing it may be a virtue (citations 
omitted).  Note that this line or argument has little to do with personal autonomy and 
choice, or a concomitant argument for a right to die, but much to do with an enhanced 
                                                 
135 Thomasma (1998), p. 129. 
136 Thomasma (1998), p. 129. 
137 Thomasma (1998), p. 130. 
138 Thomasma (1998), p. 130. 
139 Thomasma (1998), p. 130. 
140 Thomasma (1998), p. 130. 
 231
view of ordinary human persons who through redemption are transformed into mini-
Christs.141 
 
Having been deeply affected by the work of a Slavic Jesuit, Ladislaw Boros, 
entitled The Mystery of Death (1965), which suggested that Jesus committed suicide,142  
Thomasma writes that his “interpretation of the events surrounding the passion and death 
of Christ has been colored by this conviction that one can and should sacrifice one’s life 
for a higher good for the sake of others.”143  In the health care context, Thomasma 
suggests that “[m]ore importantly…those around such persons have obligations to assist 
in this sacrifice, to accede ….by withholding and withdrawing their technology.”144  
Thomasma admits that the question remains “whether this duty to stand aside includes 
one that sometimes requires active assistance.”145 
Thomasma observes that in most cases of traditional martyrdom, the killing of the 
martyr, though with some degree of consent on the part of the martyr, stems from 
motives of hatred of that person and what he stood for.146  But what about killing out of 
love or mercy, or allowing oneself to be killed out of love or mercy?  Traditional 
martyrdom usually involves instances where the individual does not request death 
directly, but “is rather swept up in thoughtless, vengeful violence.”147  “[I]n the case of 
killing out of love, the individual requests death from the doctor, from a family member, 
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a friend, or even sometimes an officially designated ‘enemy,’ but requests their death for 
a higher purpose,  a symbol of some commitment to the Divine.”148  
For Thomasma, “[t]he motive, the intent, does make a major difference in the 
morality of the act.”149  The examples offered by Thomasma to support his claim include 
the killings of St. Sebastian and St. Perpetua, each of whom were killed by the state 
(Rome).  In the case of St. Sebastian, it was for the compassion he showed Sts. John and 
Paul; in the case of St. Perpetua, it was for her commitment to Christ.  Each aided their 
executioners in completing their state ordered duties.150  Sebastian is known for ordering 
his men, fellow archers, to carry out the state’s order lest they meet a similar fate. 151  
Perpetua is known for guiding the sword in the hand of her reluctant executioner to her 
throat.  As Thomasma notes that “the Christian martyrs all had one thing in common, a 
disregard for one’s life in light of a higher principle of conscience, love of God and the 
Church.”152   
Thomasma offers several reflections, based on his acceptance of Boros’ argument 
that Jesus did will his own death and put into action a plan to bring it about.153  
Thomasma comments that “[t]here is an active intent and plan in Jesus’ mission that is 
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missing in those who think we should shun willing and acting to bring to pass our own 
death or the death of another.”154  Acknowledging that some may object that there is no 
need for further redemptive acts on the part of others because Jesus alone was destined to 
die “once for all,” he points out that from the Christian martyrs’ perspectives, they did 
just that:  “they imitated Christ’s death and through that imitation considered their deaths 
a gain.”155   
 Another reflection centers on death as a good.  In terms of physiological survival, 
Thomasma admits that death “truly is an evil.”156  “Clinically speaking, however, death is 
often seen as a friend, a rescuer from suffering, and a relief.”157  More to the point, 
“Theologically speaking, death is for the Christian a new birth into the resurrected life 
promised through Christ and already experienced in the world.”158  For these reasons, he 
argues that discussions of euthanasia should “distinguish among the many meanings of 
death, as many perhaps as life itself.”159  For those considering assisting death, “[t]he 
morality of assisting death requires a complete analysis of this meaning for the person 
who is dying.”160  He concludes that because such a death may be “a participation in the 
redemptive act of Jesus, such a death may contain sufficient good to overcome the usual 
philosophical analysis of evil intent and outcome.”161 
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 As a final reflection, Thomasma focuses on the participants themselves and 
suggests: 
If death can be a good, and one can will that death in favor of a higher purpose, 
then those who assist in bringing it about can conceivably participate in this good act if 
their own motives are those of love and devotion to the person and/or that to which the 
person is dedicated.162 
 
Concerned about good intentions and good ends being confused with good acts, 
Thomasma cautions, however, that “[i]t does not follow automatically that a good intent 
and a good end are sufficient to make an act good.  If the action itself is evil, then a good 
intention and a good end cannot redeem it.  This is where the ethical analysis can be 
enriched by the stories of martyrdom.”163   
 Without question, however, Thomasma places all of this discussion in the context 
of the Christian faith when he writes:  “[t]he point to underline here is the redemptive and 
courageous motive of giving up one’s life for one’s faith.”164  Thomasma is careful to 
point out that his reflections are not based on standard autonomy.  Unlike Hardwig, 
Thomasma does not engage in a benefits/burdens analysis about how the suffering or 
dying of the primary sufferer is affecting the secondary sufferers emotionally, physically 
or financially.  Instead, Thomasma suggests the following analysis: 
…it seems too facile to interpret the rule against killing as implying that one could 
never intend the death of another.  If one can so under certain circumstances, when death 
is perceived by the dying person as a good, or by the family and loved ones attendant 
upon the suffering of someone they love, then that death is a good thing, and intending it 
is also a good, perhaps even a virtue.  If death can be sometimes seen as a good, then it 
can be virtuous to will or intend such a death.  As the martyrdom stories suggest, actively 
                                                 
162 Thomasma (1998), p. 137. 
163 Thomasma (1998), p. 137. 
164 Thomasma (1998), p. 138. 
 235
assisting in that death may sometimes but rarely be subsumed in to God’s greater 
redemptive plan.165 
 
Ultimately, Thomasma remains a pacifist because he “think[s] that is what Jesus asks of 
all of us,” and is cautious about assisting death of any kind.166  Aware of the “brutalities” 
of  “a highly technologically-dependent civilization,” however, he poignantly concludes: 
…it is a brutality to the sacredness of human life to extend it unduly, to deny its 
origins and its ends, and to manipulate it in the person of the dying for the sake of legal 
fears, new and unusual interventions, and technological misperceptions about 
fundamental human acts like eating and drinking.  To wish to say “no” to all of this may 
be a grace given by God, and to help may be an act of faith in the invisible hand of 
God.”167 
 
 D.  Assessment of Thomasma’s case. 
 With all due respect, it seems that Thomasma has been overly influenced by 
Boros’ view of the death of Jesus.   It is a misreading of the Gospel accounts to suggest 
that Jesus willed his own death in the sense that he wanted to die and put into place a plan 
to bring it about.  Indeed, the Gospel of Mark, for example, reports that Jesus prayed to 
be relieved of his impending suffering and death if possible, but accepted God’s will in 
that regard rather than his own.  Later, Mark’s account relates that Jesus foresaw that he 
would be handed over to the power of sinful men, indicating that, under their control, his 
condemnation and death would be their responsibility.168  Although his divine power of 
omniscience gave Jesus foreknowledge of his human death, it does not follow that he 
willed that death or sought to bring it about.   
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Jesus’ intended mission all along was to carry out the will of God, which was to 
preach the message that God loves his people and calls his people to love each other.  In 
the course of carrying out this mission, it became clear to Jesus that such a message and 
the following that it generated were threatening the secular government and the religious 
establishment.  What Jesus did despite that awareness was to remain “on message” and 
true to his mission.  Considering his mission in purely human terms, he must have sensed, 
much like Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ghandi, that if he did not shrink from his mission 
and message, his personal safety may be at risk at the hands of those who chose to hate 
him.  In fact, as it turned out, he was killed.  This does not mean, however, that he willed 
his death.  It only means that others decided to kill him in order to end his “cause.”  His 
triumph was that, even in the face of death and in the course of his ignominious death, he 
remained true to his calling to do the will of the Father, namely, preach the Father’s 
message of love and forgiveness. 
 Thomasma similarly misconstrues the actions of Sebastian and Perpetua when he 
suggests that they engaged in self-killing.  Each of these martyrs was killed by orders of 
the state either because of their faith or compassionate actions.  The fact that they did not 
resist their executioners, and for the temporal sakes of their reluctant executioners even 
“aided” them, does not mean that they engaged in self-killing.  In the United States, 
persons sentenced to death in capital punishment cases usually courageously or 
cooperatively walk down the hall and either step into the electric chair or lay down on the 
execution gurney without resistance.  It does not follow that these persons are engaging 
in self-killing.  Rather, they are submitting themselves to the authority (albeit 
questionable) of the state. 
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Thomasma’s thesis that the martyrdom of Jesus and certain of the saints amounts 
to a kind of self-killing is similar to an interpretation often applied to the circumstances 
surrounding the death of Socrates in ancient Greece.  Plato reports on those 
circumstances primarily through the dialogues.  In one of those dialogues, the Apology, 
Plato describes the charges brought against Socrates by the Athenian government, and 
reveals the testimony during the subsequent trial that ended in a sentence of death for 
Socrates.  According to this account, Socrates devoted himself to the pursuit of truth and 
knowledge through careful inquiry and analysis, and taught his method of philosophy 
primarily to young students.  Eventually, the Athenian government charged him with the 
treasonous crimes of “corrupting the minds of the young, and of believing in deities of his 
own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state.”169  In his own defense, 
Socrates testifies at trial that he is an emissary of god, and that he would, and indeed 
must, resume the practice of philosophy were the court to set him free.  He describes his 
philosophical mission in terms of a commitment to persuade others to care for their souls 
by making truth and understanding their chief concern and goal in life.  In that regard, 
Plato relates the following testimony given by Socrates: 
And if any of you disputes this and professes to care about these things, I shall not 
at once let him go or leave him.  No, I shall question him and examine him and test him; 
and if it appears that in spite of his profession he has made no real progress toward 
goodness, I shall reprove him for neglecting what is of supreme importance, and giving 
his attention to trivialities.  I shall do this to everyone that I meet, young or old, foreigner 
or fellow citizen…This, I do assure you, is what my God commands, and it is my belief 
that no greater good has ever befallen you in this city than my service to my God.  For I 
spend all my time going about trying to persuade you, young and old, to make your first 
and chief concern not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the highest 
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welfare of your souls, proclaiming as I go, Wealth does not bring goodness, but goodness 
brings wealth and every other blessing, both to the individual and to the state.170 
 
Despite Socrates’ appeal to such a noble cause, in the end, the court condemns 
him to death, and imposes a method of execution that requires Socrates to drink hemlock 
by his own hand.  This deliberate act on the part of Socrates has given rise to the 
suggestion that he committed suicide.171  Those who favor this interpretation argue as 
Thomasma does regarding the death of Jesus, that is, both had a way out of the 
circumstances that led to their execution.  In the case of Jesus, the implication of 
Thomasma’s reasoning is that, since Jesus instituted the plan that led to his own death 
and because he had foreknowledge of such results, he controlled his own fate to some 
extent.  In the case of Socrates, had he accepted the limitations which the Athenians 
wished to impose on him, his life would have been spared.172  The conclusion is that, 
because Socrates refused such limitations and eventually drank the hemlock as the state 
ordered, he engaged in self-killing.  In other words, “Had the Athenians hanged 
[Socrates], there would have been less doubt about the State’s responsibility for his death; 
but the method actually invites suspicion of complicity on Socrates’ part.  In fact, the 
moral ambiguity entailed is probably just the reason why the Athenians afforded him this 
means of execution,” so as to avoid the suspicion that they unjustly killed Socrates.173 
One way to resolve the uncertainty about the participation of both Jesus and 
Socrates in their own executions is to place responsibility for that process where it 
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belongs, which is on the state in both cases.  Neither Jesus nor Socrates intended to die, 
even though that outcome was quite certain for both.  Rather, Jesus intended to remain 
faithful to his mission and overcome death by overcoming the devil,174 while Socrates 
intended to persist in his commitment to the philosophical life, even if that meant that 
each would die at the hands of the state for their faithfulness.  In this sense, both Jesus 
and Socrates “died heroically, a martyr to truth, a victim of prejudice, fear and 
resentment.”175  Paul Shorey claims that this interpretation of the circumstances 
surrounding Socrates’ execution is “…the overwhelming impression which the Apology 
still produces on the minds of sensitive undergraduates…”176  No moral uncertainty 
attaches to Socrates’ act of drinking the hemlock, just as none attaches to the condemned 
prisoner’s act of stepping into the electric chair or of laying down on the execution 
gurney.  In such cases, the prisoner’s last act, however deliberate and intentional, is 
merely part of an unavoidable, state-ordered execution for which the state must accept 
full responsibility.               
Lastly, Thomasma cites several exceptions to the rule against killing, and relies on 
the Roman Catholic tradition that supports these exceptions to suggest that altruistic 
suicide might be a valid addition to the list.   The exceptions that Thomasma cites are just 
war, capital punishment, and self-defense.  The Catholic tradition that he relies on, 
however, limits the scope of the underlying moral premise in these exceptions.  In each 
exception, killing or bringing about the death of another human being is acceptable only 
as a foreseen but unintended consequence of exercising a moral right of defense, which 
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belongs to both an individual and the state.  This limitation derives from Aquinas’ 
discussion of self-defense as a kind of homicide.177  For Aquinas, the morally acceptable 
goal in self-defense, though not obligatory in itself, is never to kill the attacker.  Rather, 
the intention always must be to defend against an attacking force with an equal or lesser 
repelling force.  When a force sufficient to ward off an attack results in the attacker’s 
death, the attacker’s death must be an unintended, although foreseen, consequence.   
Even in the case of capital punishment, Aquinas contends that the justification 
rests on protection of the community.  As he puts it, “the killing of malefactors is 
legitimate in so far as it is ordered to the well-being of the whole community.  And so 
this right belongs only to those who are charged with the care of the whole community, 
just as it is the doctor who has been entrusted with the health of the whole body who may 
amputate a gangrenous limb.  But the care of the whole community has been entrusted to 
the rulers who exercise public authority, and so it is only they, and not private persons, 
who may execute malefactors.”178  Such a qualification is further reason to reject 
Thomasma’s suggestion that it is morally permissible for private persons to kill 
themselves, on the assumption that doing so will promote their spiritual well-being.   
 Some may view the distinction between foreseen and intended consequences as 
practically and psychologically, and thus morally, untenable.  If Thomasma means to set 
aside this distinction, he needs an argument to that effect.  As it now stands, however, the 
Catholic tradition that supports just war, capital punishment, and self-defense does not 
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support suicide for any reason, much less as an act of martyrdom.  Neither does it support 
physician-assisted suicide. 
IV.  Conclusion. 
Holistic medicine does not promote self-killing as a means of ameliorating 
suffering, or as an act of altruism, or as an act of redemptive martyrdom.  Instead, it 
offers patients an alternative to the belief that they want to die now through assisted 
suicide,179 or have a duty to die for the sake of their families, or need to embrace 
martyrdom as a spiritual discipline.  To effect relief without hastening death, the holistic 
approach to patient care relies on a basic premise similar to Viktor Frankl’s claim that a 
crucial step in resolving all suffering depends on the meaning and value that each gives to 
our own experience in that regard.  For this reason, Eric Cassell claims that there are two 
primary ways to relieve suffering in the clinical setting.  One is to guide patients to assign 
meaning to their medical condition, which often resolves the suffering associated with 
that condition.  The other is a spiritual focus that assists patients in developing a sense of 
transcendence, which is most effective in restoring a sense of wholeness after injury to an 
individual's self or personhood.  
The fundamental notion behind Cassell's approach is that caregivers must focus 
on fostering the best interests of the sick person rather than on merely treating a disease.  
In his view, sick persons usually know better than others what their best interests are, 
what aspects of function matter most to them, and when they are suffering.  This 
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approach includes the patient’s knowledge as a vital element in the care process, which 
requires physicians to work more closely with patients and their families than is 
customary in traditional medical practice.  Cassell’s approach minimizes this limitation 
by focusing on a patient’s suffering as a psychological condition that involves the whole 
person, rather than as a physiological condition that involves primarily the patient’s body.   
In this sense, Cassell offers a holistic approach to patient care that emphasizes 
unconditional acceptance of the patient by the caregiver, who may be friend, family, 
spiritual guide, or professional health care provider.  His method relies on honest 
communication between caregiver and patient, which can relieve the patient’s feeling of 
being a burden.  Outside the bounds of conventional medicine, medical holism is often 
viewed as a radical alternative to patient care that emphasizes preventive and therapeutic 
self-healing strategies, which aim at enhancing one’s own biological mechanisms with 
natural rather than artificial means.180  Within the bounds of conventional medicine, 
however, holistic medicine can refer to techniques that complement and augment, rather 
than supplant, traditional medical practice. 
A holistic approach to patient care relies on acceptance as a less onerous method 
of assisting patients in their search for relief of suffering.  Acceptance is not to be 
confused with giving in to despair, which does not bring relief.  In despairing, the sufferer 
merely gives up the belief that "what should be" is attainable without giving up the desire 
for that outcome.181  Confusing acceptance with despair is due primarily to the manner in 
which acceptance can have either positive or negative results for the sufferer.  Positive 
                                                 
180 Eskinazi (1998), p. 1622. 
181Frankl (1986), pp. 108; 112. 
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results occur when acceptance derives from courage and self-determination, which can 
lead to wisdom and peace.  Negative results occur when accepting a particular situation 
or outcome derives from indolent or cringing resignation, which can lead to resentment 
and bitterness.  Such an attitude is often perceived and described in terms of despair, 
when a more accurate description would be as a different form of acceptance.  In any 
case, relief of suffering follows either from having hope fulfilled or from acceptance, but 
never follows despair. 
Regardless of how one finds relief, however, suffering itself remains an 
inescapable part of the human condition, and in some cases, is nothing less than 
unmitigated misery.  Compassion for those who must endure such misery often motivates 
efforts to help them find relief.  Such a response by the observer at times can become a 
natural duty based on the dignity of human beings.182  The medical profession itself long 
ago expressed a compassionate regard for others in adopting the relief of suffering related 
to disease and illness as one of its professional goals.  This ideal, along with compassion 
and a benevolent regard for others, often motivate the individual physician to accept the 
healer's role and accompanying duty to relieve medically relevant suffering within 
reasonable limits.183  As a result, medical holism functions on the premise that an 
adequate healthcare system responds to patients as persons who are ill and fully 
recognizes the need to integrate the many parts of their lives.  Even for the individual, 
                                                 
182James, S. (1982). “The Duty to Relieve Suffering.” Ethics 93: 4021.  
183Pellegrino, Edmund D. (1983).  "The Healing Relationship: The Architectonics of Clinical Medicine." The Clinical 
Encounter: The Moral Fabric of the Physician-Patient Relationship. E. A. Shelp. Boston and Dordrecht, D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, p. 163. 
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doing so promotes health, while evading that integration can lead to sickness.184  If the 
medical profession were to embrace the claims of medical holism, a very different kind 
of academic and clinical training for physicians and other healthcare providers would 
become necessary.  Hopefully, the end result would be a radical change for the better in 
the current orientation toward patients and the physician’s responsibility regarding the 
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Nothing at all makes sense, unless we admit, with John Donne, that: “No man is an island, entire of itself; 
every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” 
         Thomas Merton 
         No Man is an Island 
 
I.  Summary of Chapter 1. 
 
A major premise of this dissertation is that suffering is a pervasive and inevitable 
consequence of human existence.  Among the many kinds, the suffering that stems from a 
medical condition can be especially perplexing, because most persons do not have the 
skills and resources to effect their own relief.  As a result, they often turn to physicians 
for healing.  Since relief of suffering is a traditional goal of medicine, the aim in Chapter 
1 is to outline the nature of an appropriate clinical response to a patient’s suffering from a 
physician’s perspective.   
An underlying assumption of the answer provided is that a physician’s clinical 
response must be guided primarily by the principles of beneficence and respect for 
patient autonomy.  For these principles to work in conjunction, however, the physician 
must respond with medically appropriate care and provide that care in a proportionate 
manner.  According to this standard, the physician offers medical care that is backed by 
the scientific and clinical data relevant to the patient’s medical condition, and equally 
important, provides such care in a manner deemed acceptable by the patient. 
An indispensable aspect of providing medically appropriate care specifically 
aimed at relief of suffering is an understanding of the nature of suffering itself.  
Nonetheless, most physicians are at a disadvantage in this regard, because the medical 
profession itself does not yet have an adequate clinical understanding of suffering per se.  
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To compensate, physicians often rely on their own personal and professional instincts and 
clinical experience to effect relief of suffering, especially at the end of life.  The 
physician’s professional limitations in this respect can be a disadvantage, and in some 
cases, might even harm the patient.  The disappointment that follows for both physician 
and patient can lead to serious and sometimes irresolvable, tragic conflicts. 
II.  Summary of Chapter 2. 
To avoid such consequences, the analysis in Chapter 2 develops a clinical concept 
of suffering, based primarily on the works of Freud, Bakan, and Cassell.  That analysis 
shows that suffering is an existential problem associated with the person, in contrast to 
physical pain, which is a physiological problem associated with the body.  Specifically, 
suffering is a state of emotion, consisting in an unrelenting tension between hope and 
despair, caused by the perception of a serious and unacceptable disruption in important 
personal matters.  As Frankl explains, when one suffers, one perceives a gap between the 
way important matters are at the moment as compared to how such matters ought to be.   
The matters are important and personal because they involve something that the 
sufferer holds dear.  The gap is unacceptable because the consequences of not 
overcoming that disruption are potentially devastating.  The sufferer’s desire and belief 
that the situation will be resolved in a favorable manner gives rise to hope, while the 
thought of being overwhelmed by those circumstances gives rise to despair.  The 
intensity and duration of the tension between these simultaneous and contradictory states 
of emotion are a function of various subjective factors, as well as the involvement of 
others and the particular circumstances that cause the suffering.   
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Given this description, it follows that relief of suffering results from eliminating 
or reducing the tension between hope and despair.  In this sense, there are two avenues of 
relief.  One avenue corresponds to the realization of a desired outcome that represents 
fulfillment of the sufferer's hope.  The other avenue corresponds to a change in the 
tension between hope and despair that reflects the sufferer’s acceptance of the situation.  
In acceptance, the sufferer relinquishes or modifies the desire and belief about a certain 
kind of outcome, and substitutes an alternative goal.  As a result, the perceived gap 
between the "what is" and the "what should be" closes.  Because there is no longer a 
perceived gap in expectations, the sufferer experiences relief. 
III.  Summary of Chapter 3.   
In the clinical setting, it sometimes happens that all medical efforts fail to bring 
relief to the patient.  Such a result can be most troubling at the end of life.  In such cases, 
some terminally ill patients come to view hastening death by suicide as the most effective 
way to relieve their own suffering.  To address this issue, the analysis in Chapter 3 
highlights the moral complexity surrounding physician-assisted suicide.  Developed in 
two stages, the conclusion is that physician-assisted suicide is a disproportionate medical 
response to a patient’s suffering, and must be rejected by physicians as inappropriate 
medical care. 
The first stage explores the claim espoused by Pellegrino and Thomasma that 
physicians must provide medically appropriate care in a proportionate manner.  The 
second stage develops their principle of proportionality, based on a classical 
interpretation of that principle provided by Aquinas, and a modern interpretation 
provided by the works of Gury and Knauer.  Each interpretation is then applied in turn to 
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the question of physician-assisted suicide, with the result that it fails to meet the 
requirements of either a classical or modern interpretation of proportionality.    
Based on a classical interpretation of proportionality, the physician's agreement to 
assist a patient's suicide is morally impermissible for three reasons.  First, it is contrary to 
the physician’s duty to heal.  Traditionally, a physician’s professional commitment 
involves caring for human life with medically appropriate care as determined by the 
scientific and clinical data relevant to the patient's medical condition, quality of life, and 
personal preferences regarding that care.  On this view, to heal does not necessarily mean 
to cure.  As a result, physicians can fulfill their commitment to heal even when cure is not 
possible, the patient has a poor quality of life, and death is imminent.  This standard of 
professional conduct reflects a long-standing medical, ethical, and legal tradition that bars 
the practice of physician-assisted suicide.     
Second, physician-assisted suicide is contrary to the public good.  The physician's 
participation in that practice renders it medically acceptable, which, due to its inherent 
and unavoidable potential for abuse, perpetuates harm to the common good.  Support for 
this claim relies on evidence from the Dutch experience with euthanasia and from the  
U. S. criminal justice system in regard to the death penalty.  Such evidence also serves to 
refute Brock’s claim that safeguards are an effective way to prevent abuse of vulnerable 
persons.  Based on such considerations, the prohibition of physician-assisted suicide must 
be maintained as a matter of prudence.   
Third, despite the autonomous nature of a request for assisted suicide, the 
physician's agreement to provide that assistance is contrary to the virtuous practice of 
medicine.  The virtuous practice of medicine requires the physician to provide medically 
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appropriate care, based on relevant scientific and clinical data.  There is no such data that 
shows physician-assisted suicide as an effective way to relieve suffering.  In the absence 
of such data, some physicians are led to substitute their own subjective evaluation of the 
patient's quality of life as warrant for their agreement.  This substitution deviates from 
established medical protocol and exceeds the physician's expertise.  Moreover, their 
agreement in particular cases goes to the level of medical principle for all other patients 
similarly situated, which renders physician-assisted suicide a de facto social policy.  Yet, 
there is no reason to accept a physician’s idiosyncratic approach to suffering as the basis 
of a social policy of this radical nature. 
Physician-assisted suicide is also morally impermissible on Gury’s interpretation of 
proportionality, because a predominance of good in the immediate outcome is unknown 
and incalculable.  From a medical perspective, this lack of knowledge on the physician’s 
part rules out the possibility of calculating the immediate net effect of physician-assisted 
suicide.  As a result, the clinical basis for the claim that physician-assisted suicide indeed 
relieves suffering is lacking.   
For this same reason, physician-assisted suicide also fails as a proportionate medical 
response on Knauer’s account.  Because he adds the claim that the realization of the 
values sought in the long run and on the whole must not undermine those or equally 
important values, there are two additional reasons for this failure.  First, in the long run, 
physician-assisted suicide undermines autonomy and self-determination due to its 
potential for abuse.  Second, on the whole, it creates an injustice for patients with fewer 
resources in that such patients may be forced to opt for physician-assisted suicide sooner 
than those patients with greater resources. 
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Even were the inequity that results from such disparity to be eliminated, the 
voluntary nature of a request for assisted suicide may be compromised by psychological 
factors as well, which ultimately raises a question of competency.  Although a request for 
assisted suicide is not necessarily irrational, such a possibility demands exploration of the 
motivation behind such a request, which includes evaluating the patient’s competency as 
an important safeguard against abuse.  Despite that need, however, the guidelines and 
standards to aid in such evaluations have not been developed.  Without standardized 
measures, there is no benchmark against which to assess the validity of actual 
evaluations.  In that case, claiming that physician-assisted suicide in the long run and on 
the whole promotes autonomy and self-determination is without warrant.  
The second additional reason that physician-assisted suicide fails as a 
proportionate medical response on Knauer’s account is due to his claim that there must be 
no less onerous method of realizing the values sought.  In the case of physician-assisted 
suicide, however, where the value sought is relief of suffering, there is a less onerous 
method of relief available, namely, acceptance.  Although not always possible, 
acceptance is more likely when physicians treat patients as whole persons.  In the clinical 
setting, physicians promote acceptance by inspiring hope for the good that is yet to come, 
even when no remedy or cure is available.  The physician inspire hope with an explicit or 
implicit promise that the patient will not be abandoned to die alone, and if possible, will 
not suffer unbearably or go without adequate pain management in the final days of life. 
A promise of professional non-abandonment raises yet another question about 
those “hard cases” in which every available treatment has been carried out, and still some 
patients cannot achieve acceptance, their pain management is no longer effective, and 
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their suffering is unbearable.  Some proponents argue that such an outcome is an outrage 
that should be avoided, especially in cases of terminal illness.  As a result, they advocate 
allowing the practice of physician-assisted suicide (and voluntary active euthanasia for 
that matter).  Others who oppose establishing physician-assisted suicide as a formal 
social policy nevertheless favor allowing it in some “hard cases” on an informal basis.  
In contrast to these proposals, there are three reasons that physician-assisted 
suicide should not be allowed even in hard cases.  First, allowing the practice is an 
inadequate and premature medical response, because doing so will lead physicians to 
accept such a request at face value without exploring and treating the underlying issues 
that cast doubt on its voluntary nature.  Second, it is difficult to control the expansion of 
this kind of social policy that allows exceptions, simply because other exceptions are 
likely to emerge, along with the pressure to extend the outer boundaries to accommodate 
those new cases.  Third, specifying exceptions entails the adoption of criteria and 
guidelines and the establishment of safeguards to protect against abuse.  That process can 
transform physician-assisted suicide into permissible social policy, but “hard cases” 
cannot transform physician-assisted suicide into acceptable medical practice. 
IV.  Summary of Chapter 4. 
The claim that physician-assisted suicide is a disproportionate medical response 
to patient suffering and thus must be rejected by physicians might seem counterintuitive.  
Nevertheless, the view defended herein is that the principles of respect for patient 
autonomy and beneficence must remain in balance with one another so as not to endanger 
vulnerable members of society, which precludes physician-assisted suicide.  Instead, as 
the analysis in Chapter 4 shows, physicians must treat patients, especially the terminally 
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ill, in a holistic way.  On a holistic model of medicine, patients are viewed as situated 
persons with spiritual and intellectual as well as physical needs, all of which vitally 
influence and determine an illness experience and an experience of suffering.  By paying 
attention to all of these aspects of a patient's life rather than to just the physical, 
physicians are better able to treat the whole person, and thus better able to relieve the 
patient’s suffering without causing death, even when the patient’s underlying medical 
condition cannot be cured. 
A holistic approach to patient care does not mean, however, that physicians must 
treat all aspects of a person’s life.  This model merely acknowledges that there are other 
dimensions to a patient’s life—mental, spiritual, and emotional—in addition to the 
physical that at times need special attention.  Nevertheless, neither physicians nor other 
caregivers can heal everything or be all things to all patients.  The limited connections in 
a patient’s life yield a partial set of meanings useful for interpreting and coping with 
disease and suffering.  Although some needs will go unmet on this model, viewing 
patients holistically makes it possible to meet their needs more fully, which in turn, 
makes it possible to relieve their suffering more effectively.    
From this perspective, Cassell offers two specific ways of relieving suffering in the 
clinical setting.  One is to guide patients to assign a meaning to their medical condition, 
which often brings relief.  The other is to focus on the spiritual aspects of the patient’s 
medical condition, and to assist patients in developing a sense of personal transcendence.  
Since illness and disease are a kind of injury to the self, Cassell claims that a spiritual 
focus best enables patients to recover a sense of wholeness after injury.      
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A holistic approach to patient care requires physicians to sustain a compassionate 
presence with the patient.  Physicians fulfill this commitment best by refusing to leave 
their patients alone and isolated in their illness.  The compassionate physician also insists 
that those who can and should provide comfort and care to the patient, regardless of 
professional standing, should do so as an integral part of the healing process and as the 
patient desires.  This is especially true at the end of life, where suffering can be difficult 
to relieve.  In addition, the compassionate physician relieves all unnecessary pain of any 
kind or intensity when remedy is available, even if such measures hasten an unintended 
death, on condition that the patient desires that kind of relief.  When cure is not possible, 
the compassionate physician aids the patient's continued life in a reasonable manner so as 
to avoid postponing an inevitable death against the patient's will. 
Holistic medicine is centered in community, caring, compassion, and comfort.  Its 
aim is to inspire patients to view themselves as persons of value even at the end of life.  It 
places a special emphasis on spiritual concerns, because spirituality is an integral part of 
every individual’s character and personality.  Holistic medicine is one approach to patient 
care that attempts to meet the inherent need we all have to find meaning in life, in illness 
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